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 Introduction
“Although wrongs have been done me I live in hopes.”2
The number of states, corporations, and religious groups formally disowning past records of 
egregious human injustice is mushrooming.3   Although the Age of Apology4 is a global phenomenon, the 
question of reparations—a tort-based mode of redress whereby a wrongdoing group accepts legal 
responsibility and compensates victims for the damage it inflicted upon them5—likely consumes more 
energy, emotion, and resources in the U.S. than in any other jurisdiction.  Since the final year of the Cold 
War, the U.S. and its political subdivisions have apologized or paid compensation to Japanese-American 
internees,6 native Hawaiians,7 civilians killed in the Korean War,8 and African American victims of 
medical experiments,9 racial violence,10 and lending discrimination;11 a barrage of lawsuits demanding 
reparations from slavery profiteers is on the dockets of several courts, and more are expected.12  In the 
U.S. circa 2004, reparations is the stuff not only of litigation but legislative proposals, academic and 
popular articles, news editorials, town hall meetings, campus demonstrations, television programs, office 
water cooler debates, dinner table conversations, and cyberchat groups.  If reparations is not a uniquely 
American remedy, it is no stretch to say that in the U.S. “reparations talk”13 is very much with us.
The phrase “reparations talk” is an understatement.  “Reparations debate” better describes current 
social discourse over what to do about gross historical injustices.  Although advocates maintain that 
reparations is the first step in recovering history and fashioning a more equitable collective future, critics 
describe a divisive and retrospective14 movement threatening to widen racial and ethnic fault lines running 
1
 Chiricahua Apache and Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis, Indiana. 
2 Black Kettle, Cheyenne, after the massacre of hundreds of Cheyenne by the U.S. Army at Sand Creek, Colorado, in 1864, 
http://www.pbs.org/weta/thewest/program/episodes/four/whois.htm.>
3 See William Bradford,“With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts”: Reparations, Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea 
for Peace with Justice, 27 AM. IND. L. REV. 1, 5-9 (2002/2003) (chronicling the global history of reparations).
4 See ROY L. BROOKS, ED., WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER AOLOGIES AND 
REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE 1 (coining the phrase).
5
 Reparations is a mode of redress “where a guilty party makes up for an injustice by paying or otherwise benefitting a victim.”  
Samuel C. Wheeler, Reparations Reconstructed, 34 AM. PHIL. Q. 301 (1997).
6
 In 1942 all persons of Japanese ancestry resident in designated military exclusion zones in the Western U.S. were relocated to 
internment camps.  See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218, 223 (1944) (upholding internment based on “the 
judgment of the military .  . . that there were disloyal members of [the Japanese American] population[.]”). In 1988 the Civil 
Liberties Act finally granted each individual who was relocated, interned, or deprived of property $20,000 and an apology from 
President Bush. Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988), 50 U.S.C. app. 1989(b)-4(a)-(b) (1988 & Supp. V. 1993).
7 See Joint Resolution to Acknowledge the 100th Anniversary of the January 17, 1893 Overthrow of the Kindgom of Hawaii, Pub. 
L. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510, 1514 (apologizing for the U.S. role in the forcible overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy).
8
 Richard Pyle, U.S. Commanders Told Troops to Shoot Korean Civilians, MILW. SENTINEL, Nov. 25, 2001.
9 See Apologize but Don’t Forget, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, May 16, 1997 (African Americans denied medical 
treatment in syphilis study under federal auspices at Tuskegee Institute received compensation and presidential apology).
10
 In 1923 the black community of Rosewood, Florida was immolated by white rioters with the consent of public officials.  
Martha Minow, Not Only for Myself: Identity, Politics, and Law, 75 OR. L. REV. 667, 680 (1996).  In 1994 House Bill 591 
compensated 9 survivors and created a scholarship fund for their descendants.  Jeanne Bassett, House Bill 591: Florida 
Compensates Rosewood Victims and Their Families for a Seventy-One-Year-Old Injury, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 503 (1994).
11
 A class of African American farmers recently settled a suit against the U.S. Department of Agriculture, alleging failure to 
investigate discriminatory lending practices.  Emily Newburger, Breaking the Chain, HARV. L. BULL. (Summer 2001), at 19.
12 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Current Reparations Debate, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1051 (2003) (discussing these suits).
13 See Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 
497 (2003) (coining the phrase “reparations talk” to refer to a broadening discourse on reparations for gross historical injustices).
14 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 
692 (2003) (describing reparations as “backward-looking”).
2through the American body politic. Consequently, reparative justice is hotly contested on doctrinal, 
political, and practical grounds: opponents reject the notion of collective harm and responsibility15 for 
“ancient wrongs,”16 deny linkages between the relative socioeconomic status of aggrieved racial minority 
groups and past injustices,17 and cling to limiting doctrines that deny remedies for acts and omissions that 
were lawful centuries ago.18   Reparations thus fuels unresolvable debates over the nature of minority 
disenfranchisement, the adequacy of civil rights legislation,19 the constitutionality of group entitlements, 
the ideal racial distribution of socioeconomic power, and the appropriate channel to pilot between the 
pursuit of racial justice and the preservation of social peace.20  Moreover, because a successful reparations 
movement might awaken other dormant claims, reparations debates generate resistance21 and backlash.22
Still, even if it can be realized only at the price of social unrest and the painful reopening of old 
wounds, reparations may well be the appropriate remedy in the case of specific meta-wrongs, foremost 
among them slavery.23  A significant element in the slavery reparations claim is the lost value 
consequence of the unpaid labor extracted from slave ancestors,24 and thus it is logical that, with few 
exceptions,25 proponents of slavery reparations equate the remedy with financial compensation.26
15 See id. at 698-99 (contrasting theories of group rights, or “ethical collectivism,” with the theory of “ethical individualism” that 
treats only individuals as the bearers or moral rights and duties).
16
 Wheeler, supra note 5, at 301.
17 See Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It: An Analysis of Reparations to African Americans, 67 TUL. L. REV. 597, 643 
(1993) (summarizing arguments denying that present African American economic deprivation is caused by slavery).
18
 For a much more detailed analysis of doctrinal objections to reparations lawsuits see William C. Bradford, “With a Very Great 
Blame on Our Hearts”: Reparations, Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 AM. IND. L. REV. 
1, 78-91 (2002/2003).  For a philosophical examination of hostility to reparations, see HANOCH DAGAN, THE FOURTH 
PILLAR: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION (2003).
19
 Critics of reparations are adamant in their defense of the sufficiency of existing civil rights laws.  See Tuneen Chisholm, Sweep 
Around Your Own Front Foor: Examining the Argument for Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 677, 
704 (1999) (“Most of my African American friends and advisors don’t believe that we should get into what was essentially a 
press story about whether there should be an apology for slavery in America.  They think . . . we need to be looking toward the 
future.” (quoting President Clinton).
20
 Heritage and life experience polarize the lens through which reparations is viewed.  See Verdun, supra note 17, at 646 (“[w]hat 
is obviously right to the opponent of reparations is clearly wrong to the reparationist.”).  For a detailed discussion of political and 
philosophical objections to reparations, as well as counter-arguments, see Gregory Kane, Why the Reparations Movement Should 
Fail, 3 MARGINS 189 (2003).
21
 Politics is a numbers game, and a white majority strongly disfavors reparations.  Lee A. Harris, “Reparations” as a Dirty 
Word: The Norm Against Slavery Reparations, 33 U. PEMPHIS L. REV. 409 (2003); Alfred Brophy, The Cultural War Over 
Reparations for Slavery, DE PAUL L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) (citing surveys indicating that as few as four percent of whites support 
reparations for slavery, compared to sixty-seven percent of African Americans). 
22 See Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African American Claims, 19 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 477, 494 (1998) (noting that demands for reparations trigger “regressive reactions,” rooted in fear of reduction in 
relative social advantage, by the dominant social group); DAVID HOROWITZ, UNCIVIL WARS: THE CONTROVERSY 
OVER REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY (2002) (condemning reparations as “socially destructive” and “un-American”).
23
 From 1619-1865, the enslavement of Africans “hulled empty a whole race. . . Every . . . custom, every ritual, every god, every 
language, every trace element of . . . identity, [was] wrenched from them and ground into a sharp choking dust.”  RANDALL 
ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS 216 (2000).  Slavery also stole the value-consequences of 
billions of man-hours of black labor.  See CLARENCE J. MUNFORD, RACE AND REPARATIONS: A BLACK 
PERSPECTIVE FOR THE 21st CENTURY 428 (1996) (claiming value of expropriated labor between $96.3-9700 billion).
24 See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Reparations for the Children of Slaves: Litigating the Issues, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 245, 262 
(2003) (explaining that the primary goal of reparative justice on behalf of the descendants of slaves is financial compensation).  
25 See, e.g., Lee A. Harris, Political Autonomy as a Form of Reparations to African-Americans, 29 S.U.L. REV. 25 (2001) 
(positing an independent African-American state, rather than money, as the proper form for reparations in redress of slavery); 
Thomas Bray, Granholm Tries to Slip Reparations Hook, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 9, 2002 (reporting demand by Nation of Islam 
leader Louis Farrakhan for “millions of acres that black people can build.”).
26
 For a discussion of contemporary African American reparations theory, see Note, Bridging the Color Line: The Power of 
African-American Reparations to Redirect America’s Future, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1689 (2002).
3Although money cannot undo history, it can ameliorate the socioeonomic conditions of the descendants of 
former slaves, and money is the lodestar of most reparationists.27
However, justice is not a one-size-fits-all commodity, and the potential suitability of 
compensatory remedies to the harms absorbed by any particular group is not dispositive of, nor even 
instructive in regard to, the question of whether reparations is appropriate for other claimant groups.  
Slavery is not the sole, nor the first, nor even, arguably, the most egregious historical injustice for which 
the U.S. bears responsibility.28  Moreover, cash is not the primary, or even an important, objective of some 
aggrieved groups.  Non-monetary modes of redress29 may be more effective in inducing the national 
government to accept moral responsibility, in restoring the dignity and autonomy of injured groups, and 
in healing, reconstituting, and relegitimizing the nation.30
In other words, the specific claims posed by each aggrieved group bear examination and
evaluation on their unique merits.  Although the interests of groups may converge on particular issues and 
proposals emerging in reparations debates,31 what suffices to make one group “whole” may be wholly 
inadequate for, or even harmful to, another.  Prevailing theories of justice, even those drafted in good-
faith with the intent that they be universally applicable or at least readily malleable in transit from one 
application to another, may in fact be so bounded by the cultures and worldviews in which they were 
incubated that they are unable to recognize, capture, and remedy all the injuries inflicted upon the 
aggrieved group.  Without judging its value as a remedy in general, reparations, as well as other theories 
of justice sketched and pitched at a high level of abstraction but without a comprehensive analysis of the 
context and history of the claims of the particular group in question, may, when applied, be useless at best 
and damaging at worst.  Just as “all politics is local,”32 so is all (in)justice.
For the indigenous peoples33 who have inhabited, since time immemorial, the lands within the 
external borders of the U.S., remediation of historical injustice is a pressing issue.  Despite this, 
reparations would fail to advance, and might even frustrate, important Indian objectives, primarily the 
reacquisition of the capacity to self-determine as autonomous political communities on ancestral lands.  
Because the immense injustice at the core of U.S. national history is neither broadly acknowledged nor 
27 See, e.g., Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is It Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?, 40 B.C.L. REV. 429, 
470 (1998); Molefi Kete Asante, The African American Warrant for Reparations: The Crime of European Enslavement of 
Africans and Its Consequences, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY? 3, 12 (R. A. Winbush ed. 2003); Ogletree, supra note 24, at 262.
28 See infra at pp. 4-29 (presenting the Indian claim for redress).
29
 Reconciliation, the primary paradigmatic challenger of reparations in the field of remedies for historical injustices, “aim[s] to 
heal social wounds by bringing back into the community those wrongly excluded, essentially healing through restoration of the 
polity.”  Eric K. Yamamoto, Susan K. Serrano, & Michelle N. Rodriguez, American Racial Justice on Trial—Again: African 
American Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1336 (2003).  Although reconciliation 
may be augmented by compensation, its primary concerns are to encourage the dominant group to recognize moral responsibility, 
restore the dignity of the aggrieved minority group, and craft a more symmetrical distribution of economic, political, and legal 
power.  Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801 (1999).
30 See infra at pp. 41-63.
31 See, e.g., Donald Laverdure, A Historical Braid of Inequality: An Indigenous Perspective of Brown v. Board of Education, 
WASHBURN L. REV. (2004, forthcoming) (suggesting that a “braid of inequality” suffered by both African American and 
Indian peoples could lead to a “red-black” interest convergence on questions of remediation of past injustices) (referencing 
Derrick Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980)).
32
 The phrase is attributed to former Representative Thomas “Tip” O’Neill (D-Mass.), Speaker of the U.S. House of 
Representatives.  See TIP O’NEIL, ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL: AND OTHER RULES OF THE GAME (1989).
33
 Indigenous peoples are “descen[dants] of the populations which inhabited [a] country . . . at the time of conquest or 
colonisation.”  Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, art 1.1.b, 28 
I.L.M. 1282 [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 169].
4deeply understood, Part I of this Article will provide some historical foundation and briefly sketch the 
necessary factual predicate to the Indian34 claim for redress. Part II will present and evaluate several 
theories of justice with respect to this claim.  Part III will counter these theories with an indigenist theory 
of justice intended to transcend the limitations of extant theories and accord the full measure of relief to 
Indian claimants consistent with the requirements of justice for all individuals and groups.
I. The  Indian Claim for Redress
“I want to tell you this, because I believe if you know it you will correct the evil.”35
The brutal reality of invasion, slavery, forced relocation, genocide, land theft, ethnocide, and 
forcible denial of the right to self-determine has not percolated deeply into contemporary understandings 
of U.S-Indian history.  The role of the U.S. in the deliberate destruction of Indian populations, property 
rights, and cultural patrimonies is for most Americans a hidden history that must be revealed and asserted 
as a factual predicate supporting redress before theories of justice can be evaluated.36
A.  Genocide: “The Metaphysics of Indian Hating”37
1. Conquest
In May 1493, Pope Alexander VI called upon Spanish conquistadores to discover and conquer 
new lands in the Americas in order to draw “barbarous nations” to the Christian faith.38  The subsequent 
invasion of the Western Hemisphere, predicated upon a jurisprudential assumption that the indigenous 
inhabitants were a distinctly inferior species,39 was governed by the legal principles of discovery40 and 
conquest.  As a matter of existing international law, a nation became sovereign of territory its agents 
“discovered” provided it subjugated the population and annexed its lands.41  Although prudence restrained 
34
 Indian,” “Indians,” and “Indian tribe(s)” denote the indigenous inhabitants of the U.S. in the singular, plural, and collective 
forms.  James W. Zion & Robert Yazzie, Indigenous Law in North America in the Wake of Conquest, 20 B.C. INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 55, 55 (1996). “’Native American’ is a [“politically correct”] term . . . [that] perpetuates colonial efforts to subordinate 
indigenous sovereignty to mere ethnicity, as in the case of African-American or Irish-Americans.”  Robert B. Porter, 
Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How the Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous 
Societies, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. REV. 235, 238 (1997).
35
 Little Raven, Arapaho.
36
 Most Americans are ignorant of the dark history of U.S.-Indian relations.  See VINE DELORIA & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, 
AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 102 (1983) (describing knowledge of U.S.-Indian relations as limited).
37
 The phrase is the title of a book chapter from a Melville novel that propounds the view that U.S. Indian policy is a confidence 
game with the government the confidence man and U.S. citizens, ignorant of the genocide ongoing against the Indian population, 
the dupes.  See HERMAN MELVILLE, CONFIDENCE-MAN ch. 17 (1859).
38 See WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, RED MAN’S LAND/WHITE MAN’S LAW: THE PAST AND PRESENT STATUS OF 
THE AMERICAN INDIAN 5 (1995) (citing Inter Caetera).
39
 Donald Juneau, The Light of Dead Stars, 11 AM. IND. L. REV. 1, 8 (1983).
40
 The international legal fiction of “discovery” bestowed occupancy and exclusive negotiating rights to impair the title of a 
“discovered” Indian nation upon a so-called discovering European nation.  Although Europeans initially affirmed the collective 
rights of indigenous peoples, once European military superiority was established state sovereignty trumped claims to collective 
rights, and indigenous peoples were relegated to the status of minorities devoid of legal personality and entitled to protection only 
as individuals within states.  See Lawrence Rosen, The Right to Be Different: Indigenous Peoples and the Quest for Unified 
Theory, 107 Y ALE L. J. 227, 242.  By fiat, discovery permitted colonial powers to construct mutually exclusive spheres of 
influence and thereby prevent internecine conflicts.  See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 573 (1823) (“[I]t was necessary, in 
order to avoid. . . war[,] to establish a principle, which all should acknowledge as the law by which the right of acquisition . . . 
should be regulated . . . .  This principle was, that discovery gave title to the government by . . . whose authority, it was made, 
against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by possession[.]”).  Although the discovery doctrine 
impaired Indian title only via allocation of spheres of influence, it provided colonial nations sufficient time and space to survey, 
claim, and defend footholds in what became the U.S.
41
 Juneau, supra note 39, at 8.  However, the right to acquire territory by conquest was not theoretically absolute: a ‘conquering’ 
state only gained recognizable rights to land if it entered armed struggle defensively, and as empire-building expeditions did not 
qualify as defensive wars, lands obtained thereby did not qualify as legitimately conquered.  See Lesley Karen Friedman, Native 
Hawaiians, Self-Determination, and the Inadequacy of the State Land Trusts, 14 HAWAII L. REV. 519, 559 (1992).  In practice, 
however, the legal proscription against conquest was circumvented by claims to self-defense buttressed by papal imprimatur.
5pre-18th century aggression in what became the U.S,42 conquest was eventually applied in all the 
Americas, and the period subsequent to first contact is notorious as the “Age of Genocide.” 43
2.  Slavery
In the aftermath of conquests, colonizers offered financial incentives to corporate slavers 
to create bounties between tribes, facilitating a divide and conquer strategy that served territorial 
objectives while providing free Indian slave labor to developing economies.44 Although Indian 
slavery had largely discontinued in favor of African American slavery by the early 19th century, 
Californian Indians, as late as the early 20th century, were regularly raided by slave-hunters 
looking for men to work in mines and women to work in brothels, and extermination befell many 
who resisted.45
3.  Ethnic Cleansing46
The precise number of Indian victims of the genocide47 committed by Euro-American colonizers over 
the past half-millennium evades quantification.  Estimates of the pre-Columbian indigenous population in 
what later became the U.S. range from 5-94 million,48 yet by 1880 disease,49 slaughter, slavery, and 
aggressive wars had reduced their number to as few as 300,000—and declining.50  Although luminaries 
such as President Thomas Jefferson denounced the genocide as it unfolded,51 the prevailing racial 
ideology reassured the public that the disappearance of an inferior people before the U.S. continental 
advance was a “historical and scientific inevitability.52  Initially, a legislative approach effected physical 
42 See SANDRA L. CADWALADER & VINE DELORIA, JR., EDS., THE AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION: FEDERAL 
INDIAN POLICY SINCE THE 1880s 190 (1994) (noting pre-19th century European “conquerors” would have been handily 
defeated); M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 543 (Marshall, C.J.) (“Indians . . . were fierce savages, whose occupation was war . . . [T]hey 
were as brave and as high-spirited as they were fierce, and were ready to repel by arms every attempt on their independence”).
43 See DAVID E. STANNARD, AMERICAN HOLOCAUST 55-146 (1992).
44
 BROOKS, supra note 4, at 242 (stating that “Indian slavery was . . . an integral part of the colonial economy.”).
45 See Mathew Atkinson, Red Tape: How American Laws Ensnare Native American Lands, Resources, and People, 23 OK. CITY 
L. REV. 379, 382 (1998).  For a detailed discussion of Indian slavery, see generally L.R. BAILEY, INDIAN SLAVE TRADE IN 
THE SOUTHWEST: A STUDY OF SLAVE-TAKING AND THE TRAFFIC IN INDIAN CAPTIVES (1966); CAROLYN T. 
FOREMAN, INDIANS ABROAD 1493-1938, 3-21 (1943).
46 See Ibrahim Gassama, Transnational Critical Race Scholarship: Transcending Ethnic and National Chauvinism in the Era of 
Globalization, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 133, 143 (1999) (applying to U.S.-Indian relations the euphemism “ethnic cleansing,” 
coined during Bosnian war to describe violent depopulation by one ethnic group of a territory populated by another).
47 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, December 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entry into 
force Jan. 12, 1951) (“Genocide Convention”), at art. II (defining genocide as “any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing 
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) 
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”).
48
 See James P. Sterba, Understanding Evil: American Slavery, the Holocaust, and the Conquest of the American Indian, 106 
ETHICS 424, 440 (1996) (stating that between seventy-four and ninety-four million Indians died during conquest of the 
Americas and comparing this number with the number of African Americans who perished during slavery—forty to sixty 
million—and the number of Jews killed in the Holocaust—six million).
49 See JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES (1999) (describing 
introduction of European diseases against which Indians had no immunities); RUSSELL THORNTON, AMERICAN INDIAN 
HOLOCAUST AND SURVIVAL (1992) (providing demographic data on destruction by disease of Indian populations).
50 See Lenore A. Stiffarm & Phil Lane, Jr., The Demography of Native North America: A Question of American Indian Survival, 
in THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA 23, 26, 36 (M. Annette Jaimes ed., 1992).
51 See, e.g., MERRILL PETERSON, ED., THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1313 (1984) (“the extermination of this race in 
our America is therefore to form an additional chapter in the history of the same colored man in Asia, and of the brethren of their 
own color in Ireland, and wherever else Anglo-mercantile cupidity can find a two-penny interest in deluging the earth with 
human blood.”) (reprinting personal letter of Thomas Jefferson, Nov. 6, 1813).
52 See REGINALD HORSMAN, RACE AND MANIEST DESTINY: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN RACIAL ANGLO-
SAXONISM 6 (1981).
6removal of Indian people from ancestral lands; however, when this proved inefficient,53 measures more 
clearly within the inherent powers of the executive and therefore less susceptible to judicial review were 
devised:54 Indian genocide became official policy of the U.S. and its political subdivisions.55
In the aftermath of the Civil War the might of the U.S. Army was directed toward Indian 
eradication.  Contractors induced deliberate starvation by destroying the buffalo,56 yet Indian tenacity 
necessitated more direct applications of force.57  One by one, tribes were hunted, pursued, cornered, and 
murdered.58  A series of “massacres” were written in Indian blood on the pages of American history: Blue 
River (1854), Bear River (1863), Sand Creek (1864),59 Washita River (1868), Sappa Creek (1875), Camp 
Robinson (1878), Wounded Knee (1890), and over forty others.60  Gruesome, exterminations of 
defenseless women and children were perfectly legal exercises of State and federal authority as the law 
then stood.61  By the conclusion of the “Indian Wars” in 1886,62 the pre-Columbian Indian population had 
been reduced as much 98%,63 and an Indian-free U.S. was not beyond possibility.64  Although radical 
53
 Of the many forcible relocations, the removal of the Cherokee Nation from ancestral homes in the Eastern Woodlands is 
perhaps the most infamous.  With a federal statute explicitly overruling a contrary Supreme Court opinion, the entire Cherokee 
Nation was forced, in the dead of winter, on a 1000-mile “Trail of Tears” trek to Oklahoma.  See Indian Removal Act of May 28, 
1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (overruling Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 1) (holding Cherokee were entitled to retain possessory 
interest and to exercise reserved rights under treaties of peace).  Gloating after passage of the Indian Removal Act, President 
Jackson reportedly remarked, “Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.”  FERGUS M. BOREWICH, KILLING 
THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN 46 (1996).  More than 4000 Cherokee died during the Trail of Tears.  Id. at 47.
54 See id. at 44-45 (quoting Georgia Governor Wilson Lumpkin) (“Our government over that [Indian] territory[,] in order to be 
efficient, must partake largely of a military character, and consequently must be more or less arbitrary and oppressive[.]”).
55 See Rennard Strickland, Genocide-at-Law: An Historic and Contemporary View of the Native American Experience, 34 KAN. 
L. REV. 713, 718 (1986) (lisiting passage by State legislatures of resolutions legalizing murder of Indians); see also
STANNARD, supra note43, at142-46 (noting that several U.S. States legalized murder of Indians).  Introduction of diseases to 
effect Indian deaths, although initially indeliberate when carried by infected “discoverers,” constituted genocide, as the crime is 
now defined, when deliberately transmitted.  See Genocide Convention, supra note 47.
56 See Steven J. Prince, The Political Economics of Articulation: Federal Policy and the Native American/Euroamerican Modes 
of Production 186 (1993) (noting by the 1870s many thousands starved due to deliberate buffalo eradication programs).
57
 Most Indian tribes were not passive subjects of genocide during the dark decades of the 1870s and 1880s.  Courageous armed 
resistance earned Indian warrior-heroes the begrudging admiration of adversaries.  As General George Crook, a famed “Indian 
fighter” commented in 1873, “The American Indian commands respect for his rights only so long as he inspires terror for his 
rifle.” J.G. BOURKE, ON THE BORDER WITH CROOK (1892), http://wickiup.com/wickiup/seton.
58See Atkinson, supra note 45, at 389.  Aggressive Indian Wars of the 19th century—campaigns intended to depopulate territory as 
prelude to annexation—clearly satisfy the element of deliberate killing of persons belonging to a protected class.
59
 In one of the most brutal incidents of genocide on U.S. soil, 133 Cheyenne and Arapaho women and children were murdered in 
the village of Sand Creek, Colorado on Nov. 29, 1864, by Col. Chivington and 700 troops of the U.S. Cavalry.  See generally 
STAN HOIG, THE SAND CREEK MASSACRE (1961).
60Atkinson, supra note 45, at 391.
61 See Carol Chomsky, The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military Injustice, 43 STAN. L. REV. 13 (1990) 
(describing collusion of law and force producing one such massacre-by-law).
62 In 1886 the surviving three hundred members of the Chiricahua Apache, suffering from disease, starvation, and the murder of 
over three thousand of their number, became the last Indian tribe to surrender.  DONALD E. WORCESTER, THE APACHES: 
EAGLES OF THE SOUTHWEST 167 (1979).  The entire tribe was incarcerated for a generation in military prisoner-of-war 
camps in which the population was reduced to less than half by disease, hunger, and exposure.  See RICHARD J. PERRY, 
APACHE RESERVATION: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE AMERICAN STATE (1993) (chronicling Chiricahua Apache 
conflict, surrender, incarceration, relocation, and genocide).  Upon their release in 1913, the Chiricahua were divided in two and 
relocated to reservations far from ancestral lands and surrounded by traditional rivals.  See MICHAEL LIEDER & JAKE PAGE: 
WILD JUSTICE: THE PEOPLE OF GERONIMO VS. THE UNITED STATES (1997).
63
 Sterba, supra note 48, at 440.
64
 Though a fraction of the pre-contact Indian population survived, the remainder were corralled on reservations, many infested 
with vermin and disease and lacking in adequate shelter and food.  Desperate reservation populations were initially forbidden to 
depart by illegal threats of renewed military force.  See United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695, 700-01 
(C.C.D. Neb. 1879) (No. 14, 891) (holding, contrary to position of War Department, that Indians are “persons within the meaning 
of the law” with rights to protest and move freely throughout U.S.).
7depopulation of Indian land may have been merely an efficient means to annex territory, the U.S. 
nontheless committed genocide in overtly manifesting a clear intent to kill, and killing, Indians as such.65
B.  Land Theft66
The relationship between the land and Indian people is fundamental to their physical and cultural 
survival as distinct, autonomous groups.  Indian land is constitutive of the Indian cultural identity67 and 
designative of the boundaries of the Indian cultural universe.68  Long before first contact with European 
“discoverers,” Indians proclaimed a sacred responsibility to preserve and transmit Indian land, and with it 
identity, religion, and culture, to successive generations.69  The discharge of that responsibility has been 
compromised by U.S. policies of land acquisition ranging from fraud to outright theft.
Throughout the 17th and early 18th centuries, prudence directed Euro-Americans to formally 
recognize militarily potent Indian tribes as independent sovereigns and accord them diplomatic 
recognition.70  The Euro-American foothold in North America remained tenuous, and ongoing military 
insecurity stymied territorial ambitions while stifling any notions of conquest.  Moreover, U.S. land 
hunger was largely sated by available space within the original thirteen colonies, and most land 
acquisitions from Indian tribes were of necessity accomplished by treaties of cession71 after peaceful 
negotiations.72  Still, if during its first several decades of existence the fledgling U.S. was obliged to 
recognize the sovereignty of Indian nations and to respect Indian land titles as a matter of international 
65 See Genocide Convention, supra  note 47, at art. II.  Forced sterilization of Indian women in BIA health clinics also constituted 
genocide within the meaning of the Convention.  See THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, POPULATION CONTROL POLITICS: 
WOMEN, STERILIZATION, AND REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE 91 (1985) (noting routine sterilization of up to 3000 Indian 
women per year by the Indian Health Service); Lindsay Glauner, The Need for Accountability and Reparation: 1830-1976 The 
United States Government’s Role in the Promotion, Implementation, and Execution of the Crime of Genocide Against Native 
Americans, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 911 (2002) (describing covert sterilization of up to 42% of Indian women of childbearing age 
between 1930 and 1976) (citing Bill Wagner, Lo, The Poor and Sterilized Indian, America 75, January 29, 1977).
66 See ALASDAIR MCINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 13-14 (1990) (“The property-owners of the [U.S.] are not the legitimate heirs 
of Lockean individuals who performed. . . . acts of original acquisition; they are the inheritors of those who . . . used violence to 
steal . . . vast tracts [.]”).
67 See VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 122 (2d ed. 1994) (“Indian tribes . . . identify 
their origin as a distinct people with a particular geographic site.  This origin place—which may be a river, mountain, plateau, or 
valley—becomes a central and defining feature of the tribe’s religion and cultural world view[.]”).
68
 Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: Intercultural Justice and the Discourse of Treaty Rights, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1615, 
1640 (2000).
69 See THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: ABORIGINAL PEOPLE AND ABORIGINAL RIGHTS 22-23 (Menno Boldt & Anthony 
Long eds., 1985) [hereinafter BOLDT & LONG] (“Our aboriginal responsibility is to preserve the land for our children[.]”).  So 
sacred is the Indian obligation to preserve the tribal landbase for future generations that the loss of Indian land, and the severance 
of links to ancestors, religion, and culture, is universally deemed the ultimate catastrophe.  See DALE VAN EVERY, 
DISINHERITED: THE LOST BIRTHRIGHT OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 239 (1966).
70 See William N. Fenton, Leadership in the Northeastern Woodlands of North America, 10 AM. IND. Q. 21, 81 (1986).
71
 For Indian tribes, entry into treaty relations with the U.S. was a sacred act undertaken to secure mutual advantages as well as 
create kinship bonds of peace and friendship.  See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN 
INDIAN VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600-1800 71, 112 (1997) (describing U.S.-Indian treaties as “multicultural 
agreements that impart duties of good faith and fair dealing”).  For the U.S., Indian treaties were constitutive documents 
providing the framework for an economic and political joinder of mutual sovereigns.  Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and 
Present:  Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 409 (1993).  
Thus, the Indian treaties of the post-Revolutionary period, though they ceded Indian land in exchange for U.S. promises, must be 
construed not as acts of tribal surrender but as negotiated contracts, governed by international law, in which Indian tribes 
reserved those rights not clearly granted to the U.S. and acquired other rights and privileges from the U.S.  Id. at 402.
72
 The late 18th century U.S. policy with regard to land acquisition from Indian tribes is seemingly predicated upon a desire for 
peaceful relations and mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.  See Letter from Secretary of State Knox (1789) 
(“The principle of the Indian right to the lands they possess being thus conceded, the dignity and the interest of the nation will be 
advanced by making it the basis of the future administration of justice toward the Indian tribes.”); see also 25 U.S.C. §177 (1793) 
(“Trade and Intercourse Act”) (precluding acquisition of Indian land except for by cession via a U.S.-Indian treaty).  In those rare 
18th century instances of military hostilities initiated by the U.S. to annex Indian land, most campaigns resulted in stalemate or 
decisive Indian victory.  CADWALADER & DELORIA, supra note 42, at 193.
8and domestic law,73 from the moment of its creation the U.S. was crafting legal solutions to the “problems 
caused by the . . . fact that the Indians were here when the white man arrived[.]”74
1.  Fraud and Firewater
The Indian conception of land as utterly incapable of reduction to ownership by human beings75—
an essential element of pan-Indian cosmology76—crippled tribes in their early negotiations with U.S. 
representatives operating within an imported common law tradition that commodified land.77  While 
Indian tribes generally understood treaties to create sacred kinship ties entitling the U.S. to share and 
settle the lands in question,78 the U.S., disinterested in kinship but desirous of no less than fee simple title, 
manipulated Indian (mis)appreciations of Western property rights in treaty texts incomprehensible to 
Indian negotiators not proficient in the English language.79  Moreover, U.S. negotiators secured further 
advantage by dulling Indian wits with alcohol.80  Deliberately faulty translations of treaty terms for Indian 
tribes as well as a Weltanschauung in which land is a sacred living thing incapable of reduction to 
ownership exacerbated an unequal bargaining relationship and erased the line between consent and 
coercion.81  Worse, later treaties simply codified conquest and genocide.  In sum, many of the Indian 
73 See Statement of U.S. Attorney General William Wert, Apr. 26, 1821 (“So long as a tribe exists and remains in possession of its 
lands, its title and possession are sovereign and exclusive . . . [and] we have no more right to enter upon their territory than we 
have to enter upon the territory of a foreign prince.”) (cited in Atkinson, supra note 45, at 383).
74
 FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL ANOMALY 1 (1994).  The 
Indian presence posed not only a military, but a legal, challenge to white settlement.  Although the discovery doctrine purported 
to grant the U.S., as successor state of Great Britain, the right to impair title to all Indian lands “discovered” by Great Britain, the 
Indian nations “discovered” by Britain retained aboriginal title, subject only to the superior sovereign title of the U.S., and as of 
the early 19th century many private titles claimed by whites under original grants by either the U.S. or Great Britain remained 
clouded by prior possessory rights as yet unceded by Indian tribes. See Mitchell v. United States (1835) (Baldwin, J.) (“[It is] a 
settled principle, that [the Indians’] right of occupancy is . . . as sacred as the fee simple of the whites.”).
75 See Eric T. Freyfoggle, Land Use and the Study of Early American History, 94 YALE L. J. 717, 723 (1985) (“ [Indian tribes] 
believed that land was no more subject to ownership than was air, water, sky, or . . . spirits”).
76 See VAN EVERY, supra note 69, at 239.
77 See CHARLES M. HAAR & L. LANCE LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAW 15 (1977) (quoting letter from Chief Joseph of 
the Nez Perce tribe to President Franklin Pierce) (“[T]he white man . . . is a stranger who comes in the night and takes from the 
land whatever he needs.  The earth is not his brother but his enemy, and when he has conquered it he moves on.”); Carol M. 
Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 87 (1985) (“the audience presupposed by [common law 
property concepts] is an agrarian or a commercial people” rather than the more nomadic or pastoral Indian peoples).
78 See Gerald Torres, Frontier of Legal Thought III: Translating Yonnodio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian 
Case, 1990 DUKE L. J. 625, 637 -38 (1990) (noting inability of Indian tribes to understand Western property concepts).
79 See Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 753 (1992) (suggesting language 
barriers and variant conceptions of relationship of people to land caused misunderstanding of legal nature of grants to whites).
80
 STEPHEN PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 26 (1991). 
81
 20th-century federal jurisprudence, in recognition of the fundamental unfairness prevailing during the creation of many Indian 
treaties, belatedly adopted canons of construction to guide interpretation of these instruments and mitigate the severity of their 
operation against Indian rights.  As the U.S. is the party with presumptively superior negotiating skills and knowledge of the 
language of an Indian treaty, the Court has held that it has the responsibility to avoid taking advantage of Indians and therefore 
has interpreted the terms of treaties liberally in favor of Indian parties.  See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172, 200 
(1999); Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n., 443 U.S. 658, 675-76 (1979).  The canons 
of construction also require courts to give effect to the terms of an Indian treaty as the Indians themselves would have understood 
them at the time of their drafting.  County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 246 (1985) (providing that “treaties 
should be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.”); United States v. 
Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-381 (1905).   Ambiguities in Indian treaties are to be resolved “not according to the technical meaning 
of its words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in which they would naturally be understood by the Indians[.]”  Washington, 443 
U.S. at 675-76; Winters v. U.S., 207 U.S. 564, 576-577 (1908).  Still, courts are “without authority to determine the rights of the 
parties upon the ground of mere justice and fairness, much less, under the guise of interpretation, to depart from the plain import 
of the words of the treaty.”  United States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494, 535 (1900); see also South Carolina v. Catawba 
Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. 498, 506 (1986) (“The canons of construction. . . [do] not permit reliance on ambiguities that do not exist; 
nor does it permit disregard of the clearly expressed intent of Congress.”).  Thus, despite the ameliorative influence of the canons 
of construction, Indian treaties themselves can impede enjoyment of Indian rights.
9treaties ceding land to the U.S. are physical embodiments of the fraud,82 unconscionability,83 and duress84
governing their drafting and as such are arguably subject to reconstruction and even renunciation.85
2. Conquest by Fiction: Johnson v. M’Intosh
By the early 19th century the U.S. population was clamoring for more Indian land even as tribes, 
increasingly aware of the insatiability of white land hunger, began to resist. Original legal protections for 
Indian land grew incompatible with white notions of progress, and pressure mounted to annul the 
marriage of political convenience and legal principle effected by the discovery doctrine.86  However, even 
as the U.S. waxed ever more potent, Indian tribes retained the capacity to defeat conquest, and law was 
invoked yet again to wrest away additional Indian lands.  The seminal case Johnson v. M’Intosh87
provided the opportunity whereby to expand the Euro-American foothold.
Although he acknowledged both the “impossibility of undoing past events and the fact that the 
sovereign he represented was born in sin,”88 and although he recognized that Indian tribes were as yet 
independent political communities in retention of original rights to property and self-governance, Chief 
Justice John Marshall accepted the extravagant arguments that European discovery—not Indian 
occupancy—constituted ultimate title to lands in the U.S.89 and that conquest by the discovering sovereign 
conferred good title.90   While Marshall conceded that such arguments “may be opposed to natural right,” 
he drew from the doctrine of stare decisis,91 comparisons to the practice of other states,92 and ultimately a 
jurisprudential affirmation of the “inferiority” of Indian nations93 to find that “if [such arguments] be 
indispensable to that system under which the [U.S.] has been settled, and be adapted to the actual 
82 See Patterson v. Meyerhofer, 204 N.Y. 96 (Ct. App. N.Y., 1912) (elaborating implied duty of good faith in contracting); see 
also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (January 27, 1990) [“Vienna 
Convention”], at Art. 49 (providing as a matter of customary international law that “if a [party] has been induced to conclude a 
treaty by the fraudulent conduct of another [party], the [party] may invoke the fraud as invalidating its consent to be bound[.]”).
83 See, e,g., Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C.Cir. 1965) (holding that unconscionability 
includes absence of meaningful choice coupled with contractual terms unreasonably favoring the other party); see also Vienna 
Convention, supra note 82, at Art. 53 (providing, as an international legal definition of unconscionability, that “a treaty is void if, 
at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a preemptory norm of general international law.”)
84 See, e.g., Employers Ins. Of Wausau v. United States, 764 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (providing that duress consists of 
the involuntary acceptance of terms of another party where circumstances permit of no other alternative and such circumstances 
were the result of coercive acts of the other party); see also Vienna Convention, supra note 82, at Arts. 51-52 (“[a] treaty is void 
if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force”).
85 See Friedman, supra note 41, at 559 (arguing that Indian cessions of lands in fraudulent, unconscionable, or duressive treaties 
are void or voidable); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 18-
20 (1981) (developing basis for judicial reconstruction or voiding of unconscionable contracts).
86
 P.T. SHATTUCK & J. NORGREN, PARTIAL JUSTICE: FEDERAL INDIAN LAW IN A LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
SYSTEM 113 (1991).
87
 21 U.S. at 543.
88
 Joseph William Singer, Well-Settled?  The Increasing Weight of History in American Indian Land Claims, 28 GA. L. REV. 
481, 489-90 (1994).
89 See 21 U.S. at 574 (“[T]he rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily . . . 
impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it[;] 
but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the 
soil at their own will . . . was denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made 
it. While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives, as occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be 
in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in 
possession of the natives . . . subject only to the Indian right of occupancy.”)
90 Id. at 588-89 (noting that while the denial of good title to original Indian occupants was unjust, “Conquest gives a title which 
the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the 
original justice of the claim which has been successfully asserted.”)
91 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810) (deeming Indian land vacant for purpose of uncompensated taking by State).
92 M’Intosh at 592 (noting uniform practice of European states in accepting discovery and conquest as operative in the Americas).
93 Id. at 573 (“the character and religion of [Indians] afforded an apology for considering them as a people over whom the 
superior genius of Europe might claim an ascendancy.”).
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condition of the two people, it . . . certainly cannot be rejected by Courts[.]”94  Although the progressive 
Marshall intended to impose legal limits on the future conduct of conquerors less charitably disposed 
toward Indians than he,95 M’Intosh fueled subsequent claims that “Indians were conquered as soon as 
John Cabot set foot on American soil,” “that it only required the inevitable march of history to carry out 
this preordained outcome,” and that “tribal property rights are not . . . rights at all, but merely . . . 
revocable licenses, or . . . ‘permission by the whites to occupy.’”96
3.  Trust Doctrine: Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
Subsequent cases further diminished tribal sovereignty over Indian land.  In the 1831 case, 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,97 the second in the Marshall Trilogy, Chief Justice Marshall determined that, 
despite their retention of reserved rights, to include occupancy of their lands subject only to voluntary 
cession,98 Indian tribes were mere “domestic dependent nations” under U.S. “pupilage,”99 not sovereign 
foreign nations or States within the meaning of the Constitution,100 and that as a result the Court could not 
take original jurisdiction over a case wherein the Cherokee sought to enjoin enforcement of the laws of 
Georgia on land guaranteed by treaties.101  Although Marshall held that the U.S. owed a common-law trust 
duty to Indians, not only was this duty judicially unenforceable,102 but an examination of the other 
justices’ opinions, construing the U.S.-Cherokee relationship as that between a conqueror and a subject 
people,103 hinted that the “trust doctrine,” true to its roots in medieval Christian xenophobism,104 would 
become yet another legal tool with which to diminish Indian sovereignty.105  In short order, the U.S. 
94 Id. at 591-92.
95 See id. at 597-98 (“The peculiar situation of the Indians, necessarily considered, in some respects, as a dependent, and in some 
respects as a distinct people, . . . too powerful and brave not to be dreaded as formidable enemies, required, that means should be 
adopted for the preservation of peace; and that their friendship should be secured by quieting their alarms for their property.  This 
was to be effected by restraining the encroachments of the whites . . . The authority for this . . .  ha(s) always been sustained in 
our Courts.”); see also id. at 574 (making clear that in the absence of conquest, Indian title can only be lawfully acquired by the 
U.S. through a consensual transfer, as Indians were the “rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as a just claim to retain 
possession of it . . . [The Indian] right of possession has never been questioned.  The claim of government extends to the 
complete ultimate title, charged with this right of possession, and to the exclusive power of acquiring that right.”).
96
 Singer, supra note 134, at 489-90 (noting citation of conquest theories derived from M’Intosh for proposition that Congress has 
unlimited authority over Indians) (citing Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 290 (1955) (Reed, J.).
97 Cherokee, 30 U.S.  at 1.
98 See id. at 17 (“ Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable . . . right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be 
extinguished by a voluntary cession”).
99(“[Indian tribes] are in a state of pupilage.  Their relation to the [U.S.] resembles that of a ward to his guardian.  They look to 
our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the 
president as their great father.”).  Id.
100 Id. at 11-12 (citing U.S. CONST. Art. III, sec. 2).
101 Id. at 10.
102 Id. at 20 (“If it be true that the Cherokee nation have rights, this is not the tribunal in which those rights are to be asserted. If it 
be true that wrongs have been inflicted, and that still greater are to be apprehended, this is not the tribunal which can redress the 
past or prevent the future.”).
103 See Cherokee, 30 U. S. at 16 (Johnson, J., concurring); id. at 32- 33 (Baldwin, J., concurring).  The dissent proved more 
consonant with the trend in international law, which, although it continued to sanction the creation of consensual guardianships 
with powers and duties limited by treaties between sovereign peoples, shortly thereafter abandoned altogether any consideration 
of indigenous peoples as political bodies with rights.   See ANAYA, supra  note 38, at 14.
104 See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (1996) (arguing that the trust doctrine is
a “form of scientific racism” that posits that whites have a duty to “wean native peoples from their ‘backward’ ways and to 
‘civilize’ them”); see also Freidman, supra note 85, at 563-64 (“From the very beginning, the federal-tribal trust doctrine . . . 
explicitly relied upon the ‘primitivism’ of natives to justify interference in their affairs. “); CADWALADER & DELORIA, supra 
note 42, at 196 (noting that the trust doctrine was the political will of a white population committed to the notion that Indians 
were a semi-barbarous people who ought to yield to white civilization).
105
 Such fears proved well-founded when the Supreme Court explained the trust obligation as the duty to act as “a Christian 
people in their treatment of an ignorant and dependent race.”  Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877).  The “white man’s 
burden” motivated federal Indian policy as actualized through the trust doctrine well into the 20th century.  See U.S. v. Sandoval, 
231 U.S. 28, 39, 46 (1913) (“Always living in separate and isolated communities, adhering to primitive modes of life, largely 
11
claimed trust title to all Indian lands within U.S. borders.  Although the trust doctrine106 generated a host 
of express obligations in the context of subsequent treaties, statutes, and executive orders creating Indian 
reservations,107 political pressure ensured that these judicially unenforceable obligations were almost 
never discharged with “good faith and utter loyalty to the best interests” of the Indian tribes.108
4.  Plenary Power: Worcester v. Georgia
In Worcester v. Georgia, Marshall interpreted the Commerce Clause109 to hold that Congress had 
“plenary” power over Indian affairs.110 Although the precise meaning of the term “plenary” was not 
subject to ready determination,111 its purpose was plain, and by 1900 Congress qualified all remaining 
tribal powers by express legislation.112  Moreover, by the late 1840s, with the military power calculus 
shifting113 and gold discovered out West, “whites c[ould] no longer be kept out of Indian country.”114  By 
influenced by superstition and fetishism, and chiefly governed according to crude customs inherited from their ancestors, 
[Indians] are essentially a simple, uninformed, and inferior people . . . As a superior and civilized nation [the U.S. has] the power 
and the duty of exercising a foster care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders[.]” 
106
 Over the course of the past two centuries the trust doctrine has broadened to encompass a set of duties greater those pertaining 
strictly to land, including to “ensure the survival and welfare of Indian tribes and people” and to “provide those services required 
to protect and enhance Indian lands, resources, and self-government, and also includes those economic and social programs 
which are necessary to raise the standard of living and social well-being of the Indian people to a level comparable to the non-
Indian society.”  ROBERT N. WELLS, JR., NATIVE AMERICAN RESURGENCE AND RENEWAL 19 (1994).
107
 U.S.-Indian treaties post- Cherokee unambiguously contemplated discrete reserved land bases where Indian tribes would 
exercise beneficial ownership while enjoying political, economic, and cultural sovereignty under U.S. guardianship. See
CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 14, 16 (1987) (asserting that the central thrust of federal Indian law has always been to 
create a “measured separatism”).  Indian tribes under the trust doctrine would remain distinct peoples in a political relationship 
with the U.S. based on the treaties and the Commerce Clause, which sets Indian tribes apart from States and foreign nations as 
sovereigns and provides that Congress has the exclusive authority to regulate trade.  See U.S. CONST., art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3.).
108
 In a democratic republic, a self-interested majority represents a powerful barrier to honoring treaty-commitments benefitting a 
discrete minority not formally an organic part of the body politic yet in possession of vast lands and resources.  See JOHN ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 135-79 (1980) (“There will always be a conflict when a government . . . must act both as 
trustee in the best interests of a small segment of the populace and also as a servant of the best interests of the entire society.”); 
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison) (addressing majoritarian problem).
109 See U.S. CONST., art I., sec. 8. cl. 3 (granting power to Congress “to regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”).
110
 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 536-63 (1832).  However, even as it expanded Congressional power, Worcester restricted State 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 561 (“[The] Cherokee nation . . . is a distinct community . . . in which the laws of Georgia can have no force”).
111
 The “plenary power” doctrine, with origins in medieval-era traditions of Christian cultural racism, was carried into the New 
World by Columbus, developed by successive European arrivals, and reified as moral imperative in U.S. jurisprudence to permit 
the “superior” race to exercise whatever power necessary to “civilize” indigenous peoples.  DAVID GETCHES ET AL., CASES 
AND MATERIALS IN FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 177 (3d ed. 1993); see also Robert A. Williams, The Algebra of Federal 
Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 319, 360 
(arguing plenary power “erase[s] the difference presented by the Indian in order to sustain . . . European norms and value 
structures”).  Other commentators suggest Marshall’s use of the term “plenary” was not meant to denote “absolute” or “total” 
power but rather to signify federal, as opposed to State powers, thereby shielding tribal sovereignty from State legislation.  See
Rachel San Kronowitz et al., Toward Consent and Cooperation: Reconsidering the Political Status of Indian Nations, 22 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. 507, 524 (1987).  The orthodox view suggests that “plenary” as used in Worcester implies general police powers, as 
opposed to the limited, delegated powers the federal government bears in relation to States, and as such arrogates to Congress 
general powers to regulate every aspect of Indian affairs. WILKINSON, supra note 107, at 78-79.  By the late 19th century
“plenary power” was accepted as the absolute prerogative of Congress vis-à-vis the Indian tribes.  See United States v. Kagama, 
118 U.S. 375, 381-84 (1886) (holding Congress has“incontrovertible right” to exercise authority over Indians for their “own well-
being”); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (holding Congress, under its plenary power, could abrogate a treaty 
when doing so “would be in the interests of the country and the Indians themselves”). Plenary power to dispose of Indian land is
a nonjusticiable political question, and no Congressional exercise of regulatory jurisdiction over Indian affairs has ever been set 
aside by the courts. See CADWALADER & DELORIA, supra note 42, at 200 (noting plenary power renders all disputes arising 
all U.S. Indian legislation non-justiciable political questions).
112 See AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY: SELF-GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 3 (Lyman H. Legters & 
Fremont J. Lyden eds., 1994) [hereinafter LEGTERS & LYDEN] (noting that subsequent to Kagama, Congress passed the first 
of more than 5000 laws regulating Indians).  
113
 After the Civil War, U.S. military power was so overwhelming that all subtlety was abandonded, and armed force was 
employed against Indian nations west of the Mississippi. See ALBERT K. WEINBERG, MANIFEST DESTINY 115 (1935).
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adding plenary power to the legal arsenal, Worcester and its progeny ushered in a violent phase of U.S. 
expansion, executed under the rubric “Manifest Destiny.”115
Over the next several decades the Army prosecuted a sequence of wars to perfect discovery by 
divesting Indians of their possessory interest.116  Still other wars were fought to suppress Indian unrest 
after U.S. violations of Indian treaties.117  After each genocidal campaign, a dwindled, harried, and hungry 
Indian nation in extremis sued for a peace that surrendered vast tracts of lands and political freedom in 
exchange for dependence118 and “civilization.”119  During the first decade after the Civil War the U.S. 
acquired nearly 1/4 of the land within its modern contiguous boundaries120 entirely free of any legal 
obligation to pay more than token compensation.121  Yet despite distribution of millions of cheap acres to 
settlers122 the national greed for space, fueled by an evolving inter-branch compact authorizing gratis
114
 VAN EVERY, supra note 69, at 260.  By the late 1840s, homesteaders and prospectors pressured policymakers to grant access 
to the material wealth of the American West—an area populated theretofore almost exclusively by Indian nations.  See BRIAN 
W. DIPPIE, THE VANISHING AMERICAN: WHITE ATTITUDES AND UNITED STATES’ INDIAN POLICY 73 (1982).
115
 “Manifest Destiny,” a term which first appeared in print in 1845, refers to the 19th century political philosophy holding that the 
U.S. was charged with a divinely-inspired mission of extending its moral enlightenment, democratic principles, and republican 
values to the furthest reaches of North America.  See generally WEINBERG, supra note 113.  If fulfilment of this Manifest 
Destiny required the defeat, displacement, and murder of Indians, the imprimatur of the Supreme Court supported the 
inevitability of the expansion of the frontier and affirmed divine approbation of the mid- to late-19th century Indian Wars.  Id.
116
 Theretofore, Indian claims based on lineal descendancy and exclusive occupancy earned recognition, by treaty or statute, of a 
limited possessory right to permanent occupancy known as “recognized Indian title.” See M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 543.
117
 The Supremacy Clause establishes treaties as legal authority coequal to the Constitution itself.  See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2 
(“This Constitution, and the Laws . . . which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made . . . under the authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land[.]”).  A violation of a treaty is therefore a violation of federal law unless 
Congress subsequently and unambiguously legislates to abrogate the treaty.  Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) 
(citing common-law rule supporting legislative modification of treaties); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) 
(providing Congress may modify treaty provisions, or “supersede them altogether[,]” by subsequent statute).  Although an Indian 
treaty thus binds all branches of government, Congress has plenary power to abrogate or otherwise limit it provided it does so 
explicitly and “with perfect good faith toward Indians,” which good faith is legally presumed.  Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 553; see 
also Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (upholding, under political question doctrine, 
plenary power to abrogate Indian treaties).  Moral restraint has been in as short supply as “perfect good faith:” to cure breaches of 
land provisions of Indian treaties occasioned by invasion Congress passed abrogating statutes allowing the U.S. to violate with 
impunity all of the more than 400 Indian treaties.  Singer, supra note 88, at 483-84.  For a historical review of Congressional bad 
faith, see VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES (1985).
118 Id. at 382 (“The [U.S.] Army dogged tribes across the plains, through the forests[,] in and out of desert canyons, and through 
the swamps . . . until tribe after tribe realized they would have to sign a terrible treaty or face extinction[.]”).  Treaty promises of 
annuities for peace were bitter bargains: defeated tribes were confined on distant, strange lands, restricted from engaging in 
traditional subsistence practices, and forced into dependency.  Id.
119 See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568 (1883) (“Congress . . . expected . . . the semi-barbarous condition of the Indian 
tribes [to] give way to the highest civilization of our race.”)
120 See Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation, Reparations, and Restitution: Indian Property Claims in the United States, 28 GA. L. 
REV. 453, 461 (1994) (discussing expropriation of one billion acres of Indian land from 1865-1875).
121The Court refuses to confine plenary power within the Due Process and Just Compensation Clauses, choosing abstention under 
the political question doctrine.  See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 553.  Although it held that takings of Indian property are subject to the 
5th Amendment, the Court adopted a formal distinction that permitted Congress near-unlimited freedom in establishing 
compensation requirements.  See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) (Reed., J.) (“[T]he tribes who 
inhabited the [U.S.] held claim to such lands after the coming of the white man, under what is . . . termed original Indian title or 
permission from the whites to occupy.  That . . . means mere possession not specifically recognized as ownership by Congress . . . 
This is not a property right but . . . a right of occupancy that may be terminated . . . by the sovereign . . . without any legally 
enforceable obligation to [pay] compensat[ion].”)  Given the judicially-crafted distinction between “recognized Indian title” and 
“aboriginal title,” Congress may take even those lands exclusively occupied by a tribe since time immemorial and extinguish 
Indian occupancy at will, without compensation, and for any purpose, so long as those lands were not conveyed by an official act 
of Congress or so long as the tribe did not claim them by treaty. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 118 
S.Ct. 948, 955-56 (1998) (requiring explicit congressional designation to find recognized title); CADWALADER & DELORIA, 
supra note 42, at 187-88 (Indians occupying aboriginal title land are “mere tenants at the will of the [U.S.]”). Even with respect to 
recognized title, Congress may pay compensation at levels bearing no discernible nexus to market value.  See Babbitt v. Youpee, 
117 S.Ct. 727 (1997) (subjecting plenary power only to limited constitutional restraint that Congress pay some compensation 
when extinguishing recognized title).  In sum, Indian property is beyond the Constitutional pale.  See Newton, supra note 120, at 
457-58 (analogizing federal Indian law to Communist law in that neither afford meaningful protection against takings).
122 See, e.g., Homestead Act of 1862 (granting 250 million acres of Indian land to settlers at as little as $1/acre).
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takings,123 dictated confiscation of most of the remainder of Indian Country.  In 1871 Congress exercised 
plenary power to strip away the last formal vestiges of Indian juridical sovereignty by providing that 
“hereafter no Indian nation or tribe . . . shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, 
tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty.”124  No longer compelled as a matter 
of U.S. law to treat Indian nations as foreign sovereigns, the U.S. could now acquire Indian land without 
even the pretense of consent, and Congress, unwilling to allow “(a)n idle and thriftless race of savages . . . 
to stand guard at the treasure vaults of the nation[,]” gave the Army free rein to employ genocide125 to 
crush the last obstacles on the march to the Pacific.
5.  Allotment to Present
By 1887 all two billion acres of the U.S. continental landmass had been discovered, conquered, 
and expropriated save for 138 million acres apportioned to Indian reservations, which the General 
Allotment Act of 1887 [“Allotment”]126 targeted for dismemberment.  Allotment, an exercise of plenary 
power, subdivided large swaths of communally-owned tribal lands into parcels for the private use of 
individual Indian allottees under a 25-year period of U.S. guardianship.127  Upon expiration of the trust 
period the U.S. issued an unrestricted fee patent to allottees who proved “competence,” assumed U.S. 
citizenship, and paid property taxes.128  For most tribes, Allotment was devastating: although tribal 
governments remained in situs on vestiges still under trust protection, by encouraging Indian individuals 
to formally withdraw from the tribe129 for a per capita share of tribal land, and by punishing the failure of 
unemployed allottees to pay taxes with foreclosure, reversion of title, and sale to white speculators,130
Allotment abolished Indian reservations as autonomous and integral sociopolitical entities.131
Although several tribes attempted to block Allotment,132 the Supreme Court ruled not only that 
Indian land was subject to the sovereign right to take for public use upon payment of just compensation,133
but that takings of Indian land, described by Congress as a legitimate form of “investing for the tribe” that 
123 See Singer, supra note 88, at 483-84 (stating that, as all questions relating to Indian affairs were now nonjusticiable political 
questions, “Congress and the President therefore possessed absolute, unreviewable power over Indian nations.”).
124
 Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (as amended at 25 U.S.C. §71 (1994)).
125
 Scores of tribes, their numbers reduced by war, disease, and starvation, were forced onto land reservations in the 1870s and 
1880s.  The surviving three hundred members of the last belligerents, the Chiricahua Apache, surrendered unconditionally in 
1887 after the murder of three thousand of their number.  For a comprehensive history of the genocide of the Chiricahua Apache, 
see generally LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 62.
126
 Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
127 Id.  The original plan was to allot tribal heads of household 160 acres each and to make surplus land available to non-Indians.  
See WILKINSON, supra note 107, at 19-20 (1987).  However, effects varied, and while some reservations, such as the Jicarilla 
Apache, remained unallotted (see Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 133 (1982)), others, such as the Lake 
Traverse Reservation of the Wahpeton and Sisseton Bands of the Sioux Tribe, were held to be terminated once 85% of the 
reservation had been purchased by non-Indians.  See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427-28 (1975).
128 See PEVAR, supra note 80, at 62 (noting that Allotment subjected individual Indian landowners to the full panoply of 
Territorial and State laws, including property taxation).
129
 The concept that an Indian could not simultaneously be a tribal member and a U.S. citizen persisted until Congress granted 
citizenship to “all non-citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States.”  See Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 
Stat. 253 (codified as carried forward at 8 U.S.C. 1401(b) (1988)).  Prior to 1924, “Indian naturalization was conditioned on the 
severing of tribal ties[.]”  FELIX COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 644 (1953).
130
 JAMES LOPAC & RICHMOND CLOW, TRIBAL GOVERNMENT TODAY 20 (1990).
131 See PEVAR, supra note 80, at 5 (describing Allotment as a partitioning of the tribal estate).
132
 Kiowa Chief Lone Wolf sued unsuccessfully to prevent allotment of 2.5 million acres of tribal lands, guaranteed by treaty 
against allotment, without the signature of 2/3 of adult males.  See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566 (providing that compensation for 
takings of Indian land need not be paid where Congress acts as a trustee in the “best interest” of Indian tribes despite violation of 
treaty) (abrogating Medicine Lodge Treaty, 15 Stat. 581, 589 (1867).
133 See Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902) (upholding allotment of Indian land despite violation of treaties).
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did not require either consent or notification, were precluded from judicial review.134 By 1934, Indian 
lands had been reduced by a further 90 million acres, with 26 million lost through fraudulent transfers, 
and of the two billion acres of formerly contiguous tribal landholdings all that remained was a 
fragmented, 47 million acre mosaic of reservation lands under trust, plots owned in fee simple by whites, 
and plots held by Indian individuals no longer members of any tribe.135  95,000 Indians were landless.136
In sum, the synergy of discovery, the trust doctrine, and plenary power as manifested in caselaw 
and federal policies perfected the legal theft of Indian land.137  Despite infrequent restitution and 
compensation of Indian land,138 the Constitution affords no protection to Indian tribes,139 and what remains 
of their landbase continues under siege.140 The U.S. currently wields
absolute, unreviewable power to continue the conquest of Indian nations that have not yet been 
forced to sign a treaty . . . [and to] take land held under original title as it pleases, . . . without any 
constitutionally mandated obligation to pay compensation for the taking of land possessed by 
Indian nations for thousands of years, and despite the fact that the members of such tribes are 
United States citizens otherwise protected by the Constitution.141
C.  Ethnocide142
134 Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566 (establishing that Congressional exercise of plenary power in regulation of Indian affairs, even to 
the extent of abrogating treaty-based property rights, is immune from judicial review under political question doctrine).  A skein 
of subsequent cases has reinforced, as a matter of domestic law, the sweeping breadth and depth of plenary power to abridge 
Indian treaty-based property rights.  See William J. Murphy, Jurisdiction—Sovereign Immunity—Business Owned by Native 
American Nation Granted Sovereign Immunity from Suit Arising From Its Private Off-Reservation Transaction, In re Greene, 980 
F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 681 (1994), SUFF. TRANSNAT’L L. J. 599, 601 n.16 (1994) (listing cases).  
Still, several Indian tribes continue, perhaps quixotically, to assert legal claims arising from U.S. takings of recognized Indian 
title.  See Susan Lope, Indian Giver: The Illusion of Effective Legal Redress for Native American Land Claims, 23 S.W.U.L. 
REV. 331 (1994) (evaluating such claims).
135 See Atkinson, supra note 45, at 398 (noting that due to Allotment many reservations are checkerboards of U.S. and Indian 
land, with some even populated mainly by non-Indians).
136
 Frank Pommersheim, The Reservation as Place, 34 S.D. L. REV. 246, 256, 261 (1989).
137
 More than half of the U.S. land mass was purchased at an average price of pennies per acre, while another 300 million acres 
were taken without compensation and another 700 million acres are claimed by the U.S. although it has taken no action to 
extinguish Indian title.  See Russell Lawrence Barsh, Indian Land Claims Policy in the United States , 58 N.D. L. REV. 8-9 
(1982).  Moreover, all of “Indian Country”, a legal term-of-art meaning essentially lands within the territorial limits of an Indian 
reservation, is now either trust land owned by the U.S. or non-trust land permanently Indian-occupied but subject to 
Congressional plenary power to restrict alienation and use.  See 18 U.S.C.A. §1151 (1994) (defining “Indian Country”); In sum, 
the U.S. owns superior title to all land within its borders, and efforts to reacquire Indian land are vigorously opposed by all levels 
of government. From the Indian viewpoint, non-Indians not only shamelessly “gorg[e] themselves on the spoils of old wars” but 
remain unrepentant, as evinced by ongoing land seizures.  Atkinson, supra note 45, at 381.
138 See, e.g., Maine Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C.A. §1721 et seq. (1980) (providing recognition and $81.5 
million for purchase of 300,000 acres to Penobscot, Passamaquoddy, and Maliseet).  While the U.S. has restored 500,000 acres 
since 1970, this represents .05% of the two billion acres under Indian possession at First Contact.  Newton, supra note 120, at 47.
139 United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 416 (1980) (reiterating that nonconsensual transfers of Indian land to third parties 
are insulated from the Takings Clause of the 5th Amendment provided the U.S. acts as tribal guardian, rather than as sovereign).  
Recently, several courts have mitigated the scope of plenary power marginally by requiring that the U.S. demonstrate a rational 
connection between a proposed legislative enactment and fulfillment of a “unique obligation toward the Indians” under the trust 
doctrine.  See, e.g., Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977); Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657 (9th
Cir. 1997).  Still, no court has ever set aside an exercise of plenary power as unconstitutional.
140 See Larry Sager, Rediscovering America: Recognizing the Sovereignty of Native American Indian Nations, 76 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 745, 781 (1999) (noting recent expropriations of Indian land), Newton, supra note 120, at 473 (chronicling 
post-World War II expropriations of Indian land).  Moreover, tribal efforts to aggregate land parcels fractured by Allotment and 
other federal policies are kept at bay only by the occasional intervention of the judicial branch.  See, e.g., Babbit v. Youpee, 519 
U.S. 234 (1997) (holding a provision of the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 96 Stat. 2519, 25 U.S.C. 2206, prohibiting the 
descent or devise of small fractional interests in allotments and providing that such fractional interest would escheat back to 
tribes, unconstitutional as a taking of private property without compensation).
141
 Singer, supra note 88, at 487.  Remedial legislation designed to enforce the legal equality of “all persons within the jurisdiction 
of the United States” with respect to the “full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of . . . property “ and 
the “right . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property” renders the legal burden all the more 
indefensible.  42 U.S.C. §§1981-1982 (“Civil Rights Act of 1866”).  Perhaps the only way to harmonize the statutes with the 
burdens upon Indian property is to deny that Indians are persons within the meaning of the Constitution.
142
 Ethnocide is defined as “any act which has the aim or effect of depriving [indigenous people] of their ethnic characteristics or 
cultural identity [or] any form of forced assimilation or integration, [such as the] imposition of foreign life-styles.”  
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With its Manifest Destiny secured, the U.S, heretofore oriented toward the physical separation 
and extermination of indigenous people, changed tacks to follow the prevailing political winds,143 and 
U.S. Indian policy adopted a treble action agenda: liquidation of Indian culture,144 eradication of tribal 
self-government,145 and forced assimilation of “civilized” Indians, shorn of cultural and social 
attachments, into the body politic.146  These interrelated policies painted Indian tribes as targets for a 
sinister “genocide-at-law”:147 promising to free “backward” Indians from an outmoded past and endow 
them with “civilization,” “education,” and “prosperity,”148 the BIA149 introduced religious missionaries to 
dissolve the glue of Indian society.
1. Cultural Liquidation
a.  “Kill the Indian to Save the Man”150
Of all the processes engineered to strip away Indian culture, perhaps the most nefarious was 
Congressional funding of religious schools geared toward the substitution of Euro-American, Christian 
culture in its stead.151  Beginning in the late 19th century, Indian children were spirited off to boarding 
schools where their hair was cut, their tribal clothing was exchanged for Western garb, and harsh abuses 
were meted out for speaking tribal languages or engaging in customary religious practices.152  During their 
residence, Indian children were prohibited from visiting their relatives, who, as a result, they often did not 
see for years.153  Removed Indian children, and their descendants down through the generations, have 
Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: First Revised Text of the Draft Universal Declaration on Rights of Indigenous 
People, at 6, P5, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1989/33 (1989).
143 See Russell Lawrence Barsh, Progressive-Era Bureaucrats and the Unity of Twentieth-Century Indian Policy, 15 AM. 
INDIAN. Q. 1, 10 (1991) (identifying liberal humanist intellectuals as responsible for transformation of late-19th century Indian 
policy).
144
 Culture can be defined as a “set of shared and enduring meanings, values, and beliefs that characterize national, ethnic, or other 
groups and orient their behavior which is transmitted from one generation to the next and shapes interactions with others and the 
environment[.]”  Guy O. Faure & Gunnar Sjostedt, Culture and Negotiation: An Introduction, in CULTURE AND 
NEGOTIATION 1, 3 (Guy O. Faure & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 1993).  As such, “[e]ach culture . . . records . . . experiences in 
ways that provide meaning, guidance and codes of rectitude that serve as compasses for the individual as he or she navigates the 
vicissitudes of life[.]”  See W. Michael Reisman, International Law and the Inner Worlds of Others, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV 25, 
25 (1996).  While culture is germane to the constitution of group identities, it is particularly so for Indian tribes: a communal 
culture, constituted by language, law, music, dance, religion, history, and worldview, touches every facet of Indian life and serves 
as a template for determining and patterning Indian behavior.  See Richard Herz, Legal Protection for Indigenous Cultures: 
Sacred Sites and Communal Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 691, 703 (1993) (“[Indians] without communal culture are not whole.  They 
are, as one Indian leader derisively put it, ‘just people’ and nothing more.”). Indian culture, thus construed, can be analogized to 
tribal property entitled to defense as such.  See Christine Zuni Cruz, On the Road Back In: Community Lawyering in Indigenous 
Communities, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 557, 566 (1999) (“ownership of cultural property may actually be a . . .  right, not unlike a 
right to speak a certain language or practice a religion[.]”).  For a discussion of Indian culture as a property right, see, e.g., Walter 
R. Echo-Hawk, Museum Rights v. Indian Rights: Guidelines for Assessing Competing Legal Interests in Native Cultural 
Resources, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 437, 441-51 (1986).
145
 The term “self-government” refers to the autonomous determination of the institutions, structures, and processes of political 
organization, economic development, and legal regulation.
146 See Fenton, supra note 70, at 81 (analyzing 1871-1934 federal Indian policy as acquisition of Indian land, destruction of Indian 
political leadership, and assimilation of Indians).
147 See Strickland, supra note 55, at 718 (coining the term “genocide-at-law”).
148
 Barsh, supra note 143, at 10.
149
 The BIA is the executive agency responsible for U.S. relations with the tribes and for discharge of the trust responsibility.
150
 In 1892, Captain Richard Henry Pratt, founder of the Carlisle Industrial Indian School, opined that “all the Indian there is in 
the race should be dead.  Kill the Indian in him and save the man.”  Cited in Atkinson, supra note 55, at 392.
151 See Jorge Noriega, American Indian Education in the United States: Indoctrination for Subordination to Colonialism 380-81 
in THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA [M. Annette Jaimes ed., 1992) [hereinafter JAIMES] (noting that boarding school 
curricula stressed Anglo-American, while stifling Indian, languages, cultures, and religions).
152 See id. at 371 (stating that Indian children in boarding schools were subjected to beatings, whippings, and sexual abuse well 
into the 20th century); see also Tsosie, supra note 68, at 1663 (terming this forcible process whereby full Indian participation in, 
and knowledge of, their culture was denied beginning at an early age by non-Indians as “natal alienation”); ROBERT A 
TRENNERTA, JR., THE PHOENIX INDIAN SCHOOL: FORCED ASSIMILATION IN ARIZONA, 1891-1935 (1988).
153 See Pommersheim, supra note 136, at 256-57 (noting that denial of visitation advanced the process of assimilation).
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typically lost the use of their languages, been denied cultural knowledge, and been deprived of 
opportunities to take on tribal responsibilities.154
b.  American Crusade: Eradication of Indian Religion
While Indian children underwent forced conversions, the U.S. posted Christian missionaries to 
the reservations as Indian agents with orders to ban tribal religions, initiate Christianization, and pacify 
political discourse.155  At the behest of the Indian agents, Congress launched an assault upon Indian 
religion with laws156 that weakened “marriage, family and clan relationships, the distribution of property, 
and social and political organization.”157  Courts of Indian Offenses (“CIO”) enforced these stringent 
social control mechanisms.158  In arguing for the suppression of tribal dancing and feasting, the Secretary 
of the Interior proclaimed that “[i]f it is the purpose of the [U.S.] to civilize the Indians, they must be 
compelled to desist from . . .  savage rites and heathenish customs.”159  For most of the 20th century, non-
Indian “cultural game wardens”160 circumscribed the legal exercise of Indian religion.161  Despite the 1978 
passage of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act [“AIRFA”] establishing the policy of the U.S. to 
“protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right . . . to believe, express, and exercise . . . 
traditional religions,”162 in practice Indian religions—particularly when they involve the hunting of 
charismatic mega-fauna or the use of controlled substances—have proven too enigmatic for non-Indian 
jurists to admit within the meaning of “religion” as enunciated in the Bill of Rights.163  For Indian 
154 See Sarah Pritchard, The Stolen Generation and Reparations, 21 U. NEW S. WALES L. REV. 259, 263 (1998) (discussing 
deprivation of cultural patrimony occasioned by removal of indigenous children); see also Allison M. Dussias, Waging War with 
Words: Native Americans’ Continuing Struggle Against the Suppression of Their Languages, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 905-908 (1999) 
(detailing effects of suppression of Indian languages).
155 See VINE DELORIA, CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS 108 (1969).
156
 By 1892 the BIA Commissioner had listed the following offenses as within the jurisdiction of the CIO: “participating in dances 
or feasts, entering into plural . . . marriages, acting as medicine men [i.e., practicing Indian religion], destroying property of other 
Indians, engaging in immorality, [and] intoxication.” Nell Jessup Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation: Representing Crazy 
Horse, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1033 (1995).     
157
 Sidney L. Harring, Crow Dog’s Case: A Chapter in the Legal History of Tribal Sovereignty, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 191, 
229 (194).
158
 By 1900 CIO/CFR Courts had been created on the majority of reservations, extending the criminal jurisdiction of the U.S. See
Newton, supra note 210, at 1034.  Judges were chosen from the ranks of “assimilated” Indians who were willing to cut their hair, 
wear western attire, and accept allotments.  See Andrea M. Seielstad, Unwritten Laws and Customs, Local Legal Cultures, and 
Clinical Legal Education, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 127, 139 n.28 (1999).
159Newton, supra note 156, at 1033.
160
 Rosen, supra note 40, at 227.
161
 Instances of the denial of the right to practice Indian religion are legion.  For several generations the BIA suppressed Indian 
religious practices, particularly the Sun Dance, as promoting “superstitious cruelty, licentiousness, idlreness, . . . and shiftless 
indifference to family welfare.”  COHEN, supra note 129, at 175 (citing BIA Commissioner in 1921 congressional testimony).  
Rigid proscriptions of all manifestations of Indian religion have been vigorously enforced by all three branches of the federal 
government for more than a century.  See Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and the Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-
Century Christianization Policies in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 773, 792 
(1997) (chronicling prohibition of all forms of traditional Indian religious practice).  In recent times denials have often involved 
the right to gather or use ceremonial natural materials.  See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (finding in 
legislative history and text of a federal criminal statute extending protection to eagles clear evidence of Congressional intent to 
exercise plenary power and abrogate right of the Yankton Sioux to quiet and undisturbed possession of their reservation, to 
include reserved right to hunt eagles); Sharon O’Brien, The Medicine Line: A Border Dividing Tribal Sovereignty, Economies 
and Families, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 315 (1984) (noting international travel restrictions and domestic laws prohibiting 
importation of flora and fauna prevent Indians from crossing national boundaries to gather or trade sacred items); Lyng v. 
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (discussed infra at note 219).
162American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988) 
(declaring as grounds for protecting and preserving expression of Indian religions against infringement by state action that “the 
religious practices of the American Indian . . . are an integral part of their culture, tradition and heritage[.]”).
163Racism, paternalism, and romanticism conspire to prevent protection of Indian religious freedom except when it is possible to 
cram Indian claims into the pigeonholes of the Bill of Rights and the European-derived values and traditions supporting notions 
of what religion should be—organized churches, formal institutions, a separation between the church and state, and a hierarchical 
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claimants, who have not won a single religious freedom case164 and may not celebrate the sacraments of 
their faith without threat of prosecution for violation of controlled-substance or species-protection 
legislation, the American tradition of religious freedom has been a “cruel hoax.”165
2.  Suppression of Indian Self-Government
U.S. Indian policy has long disabled autonomous determination of the political organization, 
economic development, and legal regulation of Indian tribes and people, principally by disintegrating 
tribal institutions and supplanting them with Euro-American forms of governance.  From the dark ages of 
the Allotment Era to the present, Indian legal institutions have presented an attractive point-of-entry to 
agents of forced social evolution.
a.  Legal Imperialism
Although no Indian tribe had codified a body of written law as of 1776, many tribes had kinship-
based rules of conduct and belief that conditioned members to adhere to sacred values of order, harmony, 
and peace.166 Intra-tribal disputes were typically resolved not through formal adjudication but rather with 
the aid of respected elders who would guide disputants to a restorative compromise. “[T]hough it 
relationship between the deity and worshippers. See GETCHES, SUPRA NOTE 110, AT 764 (explaining inability of non-indigenous 
judges to translate Indian claims under AIRFA into cognizable claims).  To Getches,
Indian religious life does not include the existence of a church, periodic meetings, ritual, and identifiable 
dogma.  Instead, there is a pervasive quality to Indian religion which gives all aspects of Indian life and 
society a spiritual significance . . . Judicial understanding and protection of Indian religion are hindered by a 
general unfamiliarity with Indian spiritual life, and perhaps even intolerance for religious beliefs and practices 
not succinctly defined by the ancient writings or a central authority familiar to European-developed religious 
traditions.
Id.  Conflicts over land use exacerbate judicial unwillingness to draw Indian religions within the penumbra of the Constitution.  
As Deloria notes,
America is content with religious denominations which are capable of squeezing their entire experience with 
land into a city block, into a pew, and into a pulpit, leaving plenty of environmental “elbow room” for the 
business of the real world.  As long as our religions tow the line insofar as they expect land to be sacrificed to 
our needs, we are happy . . . But when a religion dares to turn the tables and encourages humans to make 
medicine, prayers, and sacrifices in behalf of other living things, we feel violated, bullied by “an agenda,” 
and even irritated at such “primitive” ideas which hold “progress” hostage.
Vine Deloria, Jr., Is Religion Possible? An Evaluation of Present Efforts to Revive Traditional Religions, 8 WICAZO SA REV. 
38-39 (1992).
164 See Sharon O’Brien, A Legal Analysis of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, in HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN 
INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 27, 29-30 (Christopher Very, ed., 1995)]; see also New Mexico Navajo Ranchers’ Ass’n v. 
Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 850 F.2d 729 (D.C. 1988) (obligating U.S. to consider impact of actions on Indian religion but not 
obligating consultation with tribes whose religion was threatened with imminent destruction of its material foundations).
165
 Dean B. Suagee, Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples at the Dawn of the Solar Age, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 671, 712 
(1992).  Not only did AIRFA provide little intellectual support for the finding that Indian religions were “religions” with respect 
to the Constitution, but it was passed as a resolution without concrete mandate other than a requirement that federal agencies 
evaluate their policies and procedures in consultation with Indian religious leaders and report findings to Congress.  Laura Nader 
& Jay Ou, Idealization and Power: Legality and Tradition in Native American Law, 23 OK. CITY L. REV. 13, 22-23 (1998).
Moreover, judicial interpretation further guts constitutional protection of Indian religious practice: in 1988 the Court, finding no 
independent cause of action arising under AIRFA, upheld U.S. logging and construction activities on National Forest lands used 
for religious purposes by several tribes, even while conceding it was undisputed that the activities could have “devastating effects 
on . . . Indian religious practices,” on the theory that to find otherwise would be tantamount to permitting a religious servitude on 
public lands.  Lyng, 485 U.S. at 452-53 (1988) (O’Connor, J.) (“Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area those 
rights do not divest the Government of its rights to use what is, after all, its land.”).  In 1990 the Court refused to apply the 
“compelling state interest” test developed under the First Amendment to a Oregon prohibition on the use of peyote applied, in the 
case at bar, to religious practice by members of the Native American Church: a majority held it would be “courting anarchy” to 
“open the prospects of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind” 
and that “leaving accommodation to the political practice” is the appropriate means to determine the state interest in regulating 
Indian religion.  Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-77(1990).
166Ken Traisman, Native Law: Law and Order Among Eighteenth-Century Cherokee, Great Plains, Central Prairie, and 
Woodland Indians, 9 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 273, 274 (1981).
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appeared to the casual white observer that anarchy reigned,”167 spiritual consensus produced a coherent 
jurisprudence.  Despite retention of nearly exclusive subject matter and personal jurisdiction to the 
territorial limits of their reservations even as of the late 19th century,168 Indian tribes, with no easily 
identifiable legal institutions, procedures, or records, were beset by a constellation of religious 
proselytizers and BIA agents who, concluding they were without law,169 imposed legal “civilization.”170
The 1883 case of Ex parte Crow Dog,171 in which the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the federal 
conviction of an Indian charged with the murder of another Indian, induced Congress to extend the 
complete coercive power of federal criminal law to the reservations.  Determined to rectify the “savage 
quality” of tribal law, Congress applied “white man’s morality”172 with the Major Crimes Act of 1885 to 
expressly establish concurrent federal jurisdiction over major felonies committed by Indians on 
reservations regardless of the status of their victims.173  Legal challenges failed to reestablish tribal legal 
self-determination but provided the judiciary occasion to further undergird plenary power.174  The 
paternalistic assault upon Indian legal sovereignty, joined on the religious front with the adoption of the 
CIO/CFR courts, intensified during the Great Depression with the passage of the Indian Reorganization 
Act of 1934 [“IRA”].175  Although the IRA expressly recognized that tribes might create their own 
courts176 and enact their own laws,177 the legislation imposed BIA-drafted boilerplate constitutions178 that 
167WILLIAM T. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES 11 (1966).
168
 Individual federal statutes had provided for piecemeal federal prosecution of crimes occurring on Indian land since the 18th
century. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383 (extending federal jurisdiction to crimes committed on reservations by 
non-Indians) (considerably revised and codified at 18 U.S.C.  §1152 (1994).  Still, the legal regulation of reservation transactions 
not involving non-Indians was left intact well into the late 19th century, save for the removal of virtually all tribal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians.  See, e.g., United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881) (permitting Colorado to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over crimes of non-Indians against other non-Indians occurring on the Ute Reservation as no exception was made to 
territorial jurisdiction on Colorado’s admission to Union).
169See Zion & Yazzie, supra note 34, at 56-57 (contrasting U.S. practice with  international practice of recognizing validity and 
legitimacy of indigenous law).
170 See Harring, supra note 157, at 224 (quoting Secretary of the Interior Carl Schurz in 1879 report to Congress) (“If the Indians 
are to be advanced in civilized habits it is essential that they be accustomed to the government of law[.]”)
171109 U.S. 556 (1883).  Spotted Tail, an authoritarian Brule Sioux chief who had staked his political fortunes on accommodation 
with U.S. authorities, was shot and killed on the reservation by his political rival, Crow Dog.  After a peacemaking ceremony, the 
family of Spotted Tail agreed to accept a payment of $600, eight horses, and one blanket to resolve the dispute.  Harring, supra
note 157, at 205.  Despite the satisfaction of the entire Brule tribe, the case presented federal authorities the pretext for extension 
of federal criminal law to Indians.  Id. at 200-01. Crow Dog was arrested, tried in the Territorial Court of South Dakota, and 
sentenced to hang by an all-white jury.  Id. at 204-12.  However, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction finding that the 
Brule had the sovereign right to resolve disputes wholly internal to the tribe.  See Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 567-68, 571 (refusing to 
extend U.S. criminal law to acts occurring on Indian reservations on the ground that to do so would “measur[e] the red man’s 
revenge by the maxims of the white man’s morality.”).  Nonetheless, for a white majority Crow Dog was a “legal atrocity” 
inasmuch as an Indian killer had “escaped punishment.”  Harring, supra note 157, at 191, 194. 
172 Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 571.  As Rep. Cutcheon (D-Mich.) stated before the Indian Affairs Committee in 1884:
[A]n Indian, when he commits a crime, should be  recognized as a criminal, and so treated under the laws of 
the land.  I do not believe we shall ever succeed in civilizing the Indian race until we teach them regard for 
the law, and show them that they are not only responsible to the law but amenable to its penalties.  It is an 
infamy upon our civilization, a disgrace to this nation, that there should be anywhere within its boundaries a 
body of people who can, with absolute impunity, commit the crime of murder[.]
16 CONG. REC. 934 (1885).
173
 Act of Mar. 3, 1885, Major Crimes Act of 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §1153 (1994) 
and expanded to 14 felonies from original 7). The Major Crimes Act subjects Indians charged with  serious felonies to exclusive 
federal criminal jurisdiction regardless of the place of the alleged offense or the identity of the victim.  18 U.S.C. § 1153.
174 See, e.g., U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (holding, in suit challenging Major Crimes Act as an unconstitutional extension 
of federal criminal jurisdiction over murder on an Indian reservation), that Congress has plenary power, immune from judicial 
review, to exercise authority over Indians as it sees fit, for their own “well-being”).
175
 Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §1401(b) (1994).
176
 Although the IRA appeared to encourage tribal legal self-determination, tribal courts created under the IRA were merely 
revamped CIO/CFR Courts, with American substantive law governing process and imposing a regime of individual rights hostile 
to traditional Indian legal systems.  See generally Porter, supra note 34.
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created strange new substantive and procedural obligations.  Moreover, after the passage of Public Law 
280 in 1954,179 providing that specified States could unilaterally accept concurrent jurisdiction over Indian 
territory within their borders, the entire body of State civil and criminal law was extended to classes of 
cases involving Indians.180  Fearing that failure to create acceptable tribal courts would result in States 
taking jurisdiction over all cases occurring on reservations,181 and understanding that review of the 
exercise of regulatory jurisdiction over Indian affairs was an exercise in futility, tribes begrudgingly 
implemented constitutions and adversarial justice systems.182
The penultimate blow fell in 1968 when the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”)183 imposed many of 
the individualist strictures of the U.S. Constitution on tribal governments184 and smoothed the way for 
what Indian activists branded “white-man’s justice.”185  Although the ICRA amended Public Law 280 to 
require tribal consent for the exercise of State jurisdiction and left interpretation of the legislation to the 
tribes themselves,186 by the early 1970s pre-Columbian methods of social control had displaced traditional 
justice from tribal courts where an Anglo-American adversarial legal system had sunken roots.  BIA-
drafted codes permitted tribal court judges to apply tribal statutes, yet federal and State laws were 
supreme,187 and federal judicial review steered tribal jurisprudence into lockstep conformity.188  When in 
177See 25 C.F.R. § 11.100(c) (1997).
178 See THE ROAD TO WOUNDED KNEE 7 (Robert Burnette & John Koster eds., 1974) [hereinafter BURNETTE & KOSTER] 
(noting that under the IRA as implemented, only standardized, authoritarian tribal constitutions that mirrored a BIA -promulgated 
model providing for no separation of powers or branches and incorporating harsh restrictions on freedom of action in trade, 
property, land, and political associations, were ratified). Furthermore, constitutions imposed by the IRA subject tribal 
governments to majority rule principles and grant the the Secretary of the Interior or his delegate, the BIA Commissioner, veto 
power over almost all important tribal decisions.  See Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux (Dakota) Community v. Babbitt, 107 F.3d 
667 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding review and veto powers of Secretary of the Interior over tribal actions).
179Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. 280, No. 83-280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A § 1161-1162 (1994), 
25 U.S.C.A. §§1321-22, & 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)).  Although it expressly disclaimed any grant to the States of power to tax 
Indian lands held in federal trust or to abrogate Indian reserved rights under treaties, Public Law 280 extended State civil and 
criminal jurisdiction to most Indian tribes in California, Nebraska, Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin.  Alaska was added in 
1958.  See id.  Perhaps just as significantly in terms of the deevolution of authority and responsibility, Public Law 280 also 
shifted responsibility for administration and funding trust-based Indian entitlement programs to the States.  Id.
180 See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959) (upholding application of State law to Indians absent a governing federal statute 
without explicitly overturning Worcester holding that State law cannot be applied due to its harmful effect on tribal sovereignty).
181See, e.g., Nancy A. Costello, Walking Together in a Good Way: Indian Peacemaker Courts in Michigan, 76 U. DET. MERCY 
L. REV. 875, 896 (1999) (stating that Navajo Tribal Courts were created to exclude State court jurisdiction).
182See COHEN, supra note 129, at 332-35 (detailing U.S. role in the development of tribal courts). 
183Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 [“ICRA”], Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 
(1994)). ICRA limits tribal powers to define and punish offenses and imposes substantive due process provisions of Article III 
and the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 14th Amendments of the Constitution upon tribal governments. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994).
184Indian tribes were not subject to Constitutional restrictions prior to ICRA.  See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (holding 
that Indian tribes, as they are not States within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution, are not subject to its restrictions).
185Porter, supra note 176, at 271-72; ICRA was foreign to sacred tribal traditions of fairness and justice, and its reference to “due 
process,” “equal protection,” “speedy trial,” and “freedom of speech” were an unwelcome intrusion on tribal sovereignty.  See
Robert Laurence, The Convergence of Cross-Boundary Enforcement Theories in American Indian Law: An Attempt to Reconcile 
Full Faith and Credit, Comity and Asymmetry, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 115 (1998) (indicating ICRA “significantly altered the 
focus . . . from the tribal community towards the individual [.]”).
186 See 25 U.S.C.A. §§1321-22, 1326.  Congress specifically provided that interpretation of the ICRA was to be left to tribes and 
admonished that its purpose was protection of individual rights as against the administration of tribal justice without eroding the 
parameters of tribal sovereignty.  Laurence, supra note 251, at 115.  Furthermore, the sole remedy ICRA provides for a tribal 
member contesting the legality of his detention by a tribal court is a writ of habeas corpus.  See 25 U.S.C. A. §1303 (1994).
187See 28 U.S.C.A. §1360 (c) (requiring State courts exercising jurisdiction in Indian Country to apply tribal laws and customs 
only “if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law”).
188Newton, supra note 79, at 1038.  One of the most powerful instruments in enforcing control is the doctrine of comity.  A long-
standing practice of American courts is the denial of comity to tribal court judgments on the ground that tribal justices systems do 
not accord sufficient due process, which denial courts of the United States are swift to identify where tribal justice departs 
“significantly” from practices "commonly employed in Anglo-Saxon society.”  Bird v. Glacier Electric Coop., Inc ., 255 F.3d 
1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding individual rights to due process violated by closing argument in Tribal Court referencing 
history of white oppression against Indians).  Although U.S. courts are quick to disavow any interest in judicial paternalism in 
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1978 Oliphant189 denied tribes jurisdiction over the acts of non-Indians occurring on reservations,190 a new 
generation of critical jurisprudence began to question the foundations of federal Indian law.191
Although tribal proactivity and federal interposition hold State law partly at bay,192 at present 
Indian tribes may exercise jurisdiction solely over consenting tribal members on fragmented remnants of 
former tribal holdings.193  Even this vestige of sovereignty is threatened by the plenary power to extend all 
federal, and, by inaction, State laws to the reservations.194  Rediscovery of tribal dispute resolution 
methods after a century of legal imperialism, and their reintroduction in Indian Country as an assertion of 
legal autonomy, are pressing concerns, yet reacquisition of Indian law is inadequate by itself to offset the 
crushing force of federal Indian law, a mechanism “genocidal in both its practice and intent[.]”195
b.  Political Domination
Although Indian tribes are separate sovereigns in retention of all rights and powers not explicitly 
ceded to the U.S. by treaty196 or abrogated by explicit legislative intent,197 U.S. Indian policy has been 
derogation of tribal self-government, denial of recognition of tribal court judgments utterly neuters the legal autonomy of Indian 
tribes, particularly with respect to their transborder legal contacts.   See id. at 1141-43.
189 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
190 See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (denying Indian tribes inherent power to regulate hunting and fishing by 
non-Indians on non-Indian-owned land within reservation).
191See Newton, supra note 79, at 1036.  “Federal Indian law,” as distinguished from “tribal law,” is the body of U.S. statutes, 
doctrines, and caselaw that governs relations with Indian tribes.
192 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (stating that the Indian Commerce Clause divested States “of 
virtually all authority over Indian commerce and Indian tribes”); Williams, 358 U.S. at 220 (ruling that to permit States to 
exercise jurisdiction over Indians where “essential tribal relations” are involved would “infringe on the right of the Indians to 
govern themselves.”); but see County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 
(1992) (allowing States to tax reservation lands held in fee); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian 
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (allowing States to tax cigarette sales on reservations); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1980) 
(allowing State regulation of on-reservation liquor sales); Seminole, 517 U.S. at 44 (Indian Commerce Clause does not grant 
Congress power to abrogate 11th Amendment immunity of a State from suits by tribes, regardless of whether congressional intent 
to do so is clear).  The contentious battle between tribes and States over the precise boundaries of Indian legal autonomy, fought 
increasingly on the plain of taxation, continues.  See Robert A. Fairbanks, Native American Sovereignty and Treaty Rights: Are 
They Historical Illusions?. 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 141 (1995-96) (predicting future State attempts to tax Indian tribes).
193 See Montana, 450 U.S. at 564 (“exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to 
control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express 
congressional delegation.”).  Although the Montana Court recognized tribal competence to regulate aspects of the dealings of 
non-Indians who enter consensual relationships with or threaten the political or physical well-being of the tribe, subsequent 
decisions eroded these inherent powers still further.  See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 117 S.Ct. 1404 (1997) (“Montana thus 
described a general rule that, absent a different congressional direction, Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of 
nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation.”).  Presently, the presumption is that Indian sovereignty over Indian land is 
absent unless Congress explicitly legislates otherwise.  Id.
194 See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (providing that States may exercise jurisdiction over 
Indian tribes where federal law does not preempt exercise of such power, the conduct of non-Indians is at issue, and tribal self-
government will not be impeded).  Although the complex web of jurisdictional issues exceeds the scope of this Article, the 
general pattern is the transfer of legal sovereignty from Indian tribes to federal and State governments.
195
 Robert J. Williams, Encounters on the Frontier of International Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous 
Peoples’ Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660, 662-65 (implicating federal Indian law in displacement of peoples, 
dissolution of tribal institutions, domination of legal systems, and disabling of land title and cultural practice).
196 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978) (citing United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905)).  As separate 
sovereigns predating the U.S. Constitution, Indian tribes possess inherent, residual powers of sovereignty not deriving from 
Congressional grants.  See Cherokee, 30 U.S. at 16.  These inherent recognized powers include, inter alia, powers to establish a 
tribal government, determine tribal membership (Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)), administer justice, 
exclude persons from the reservation (see Quechan Tribe v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1976)), charter business organizations, 
exercise police power, invoke sovereign immunity (Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 49 (1978)), levy taxes (see Confederated 
Colville Tribes, 477 U.S. at 152-55), and regulate domestic relations (see Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976).  Still, 
although tribes retain many of the trappings of sovereign nations, the exercise of inherent tribal powers may be abrogated or 
restricted by a treaty or law or, in limited circumstances, by State laws.  See Atkinson, supra note 55, at 427.
197 See Dion, 476 U.S. at 734. In recent years, the legal doctrine that the powers lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not 
delegated but rather inherent concomitants of a limited sovereignty never extinguished by the U.S., has been under threat.  See
Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 219 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (dissenting) (rights reserved by Indian tribes under treaties may be “temporary and 
precarious” if not explicitly guaranteed in perpetuity by their plain language) (citing Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896)).
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generally hostile to the right of Indian tribes to self-govern as politically distinct communities.198  If the 
theme of the 19th century was eradication of Indians and the seizure of their land, the motif of the 20th
century was the destruction by law of tribal sovereignty.  With the passage of the IRA, Indian tribes, 
traditionally hyperdemocratic and consensus-driven institutions,199 were reconstituted and subjected to the 
veto power of the Secretary of the Interior;200 subsequent legislative and judicial action has stripped Indian 
tribes of control over their form, property, and powers.201  Relations with post-IRA Indian tribes, rather 
than proceed as if between mutual sovereigns, are conducted largely through a welter of executive 
agencies.202  As a result, the terms and conditions of Indian existence are frequently dictated from 
Washington, rather than debated on the reservations.203 Federal agencies to which Congress delegates 
power smother tribes under a blanket of regulation204 that, although it provides the means of subsistence, 
suppresses traditional modes of social control and value allocation, and the Secretary of the Interior looms 
large over every aspect of tribal life.205 A dawning recognition that Indians are entitled to self-govern has 
spurred calls to end the fundamental asymmetry of U.S.-Indian relations.  Nevertheless, decades after 
introduction of the federal policy of “Indian Self-Determination,”206 tribes remain politically subordinate 
to and thus economically dependent upon the U.S.207
198
 U.S. hostility to indigenous political forms found expression in policy statements supporting Allotment.  See ANDERSON, 
supra note 203, at 94 (quoting BIA Commissioner) (“[E])xisting forms of Indian government which [are] menacing the peace . . . 
and irritating their white neighbors, should be replaced by a regularly organized Territorial form of government[.]”)
199
 LARRY W. BURT, TRIBALISM IN CRISIS: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY 1953-1961 (1982); see also BURNETTE & 
KOSTER, supra note 178, at 15 (describing tribal governments prior to 1934 as council democracies advised by elders that 
operated on principles of consensus and voluntary compliance with decisions).
200 See id. at 183 (noting that BIA-adopted constitutions grant the Secretary of the Interior veto power over most tribal actions and 
decisions).  For an opposing view, see NICHOLAS J. SPAETH et al., eds., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 21-23 
(1993) (suggesting the IRA replaced federal with tribal governance).
201 See LEGTERS & LYDEN, supra note 112, at 6 (noting that as a consequence of the legislative and judicial diminution of their 
sovereignty, Indian tribes are now often junior partner in the hierarchy of federal, State, local, and tribal governments).
202 See Thomas Biolsi, “Indian Self-Government” as a Technique of Domination, 15 AM. IND. Q. 23 (1991) (describing U.S. 
policy of “indirect rule” through nexus of federal agencies and reorganized tribal structures).  Indirect rule imposes fiscal, 
cultural, and social costs: increased tribal bureaucratization associated with governance from afar consumes nearly half of tribal 
budgets, far more than that allocated to economic development.  WELLS, supra note 106, at 17.
203 See ALVIN M. JOSEPHY, RED POWER: THE AMERICAN INDIAN’S FIGHT FOR FREEDOM 72 (1971) (quoting 
National Indian Youth Congress President Clyde Warrior in 1967 address) (“We are not allowed to make those basic human 
choices and decisions about our personal life and about the destiny of our communities . . . Our choices are made for us . . . by 
federal administrators, bureaucrats, and their ‘yes men,’ euphemistically called tribal governments.”); see also Atkinson, supra
note 45, at 393 (describing exclusion of Indian organizations and individuals from agency planning); TERRY L. ANDERSON 
SOVEREIGN NATIONS OR RESERVATIONS? AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDIANS 148 (1995) (noting 
that rather than foster time-honored education, cultural expression, and economic development, federal Indian agencies force 
tribal leaders to lobby for federal funding for social programs developed without significant Indian participation).  
204
 Under the trust doctrine, the U.S. funds and participates in the management of a welter of complex statutory programs, 
involving education, health, social services, economic development, and resource management, on Indian reservations.  See infra 
at note 219 (listing programs). Although Indian participation in the development and administration of these programs shapes
them to fit tribal needs and values, the parameters within which such local influence are exercised are determined by Congress.
205
 ANDERSON, supra note 203, at 247 (noting veto power of Secretary of Interior over tribal decisions).
206
 In 1970 Congress delegated authority to the executive to enter contracts with Indian tribes in which federal Indian programs 
would be funded by the U.S. but responsibility for planning and administration would be assumed by tribal governments.  Indian 
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 [“ISDEA”], 25 U.S.C.A. §450 et seq. (1975.  Support for Indian Self-
Determination took on a bipartisan tint in the early 1980s.  See PRESIDENT REAGAN, STATEMENT ON INDIAN POLICY, 
PUB. PAPERS OF RONALD REAGAN 96 (Jan. 24, 1983) (“Our policy is to reaffirm dealing with Indian Tribes on a 
government-to-government basis”).  Congress authorized development of enhanced self-governance plans under the rubric of a 
“New Federalism” advanced by the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs.  See Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act Amendments of 1988, § 209, Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2296 (1988) (allowing tribes to assume 
administration of some BIA programs).  Nevertheless, federal Indian agencies remained mired in patterns of costly and 
unresponsive provision of services.  PEVAR, supra note 80, at 32 (noting investigations implicating BIA as primary deterrent to 
development of Indian self-government in areas of employment, housing, and health care).  Throughout the 1980s Indian Self-
Determination simply decentralized the fiduciary relationship, and by the start of the 1990s both major political parties, eager to 
decrease the financial drain of Indian welfare programs, cut aid while pressing Indian tribes enter the world of private enterprise.  
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c. Ethnodevelopmental Suppression
Despite significant resource endowments,208 many Indian tribes209 remain ensnared in a web of 
economic dependence,210 institutionalized domination,211 geographic dislocation, and gross 
undercapitalization..212  Although the non-legal obstacles to Indian economic independence, the first and 
foremost goal of tribal governments,213 are very real, the constraints imposed by federal Indian law are 
even more formidable.  To wit, the U.S. holds trust title to Indian lands and resources,214 and Indians 
cannot sell, lease, or borrow against their property without the express approval of the Secretary of the 
Interior.215  As the very question of secretarial approval introduces political uncertainty,216 trust-based 
land-tenure constraints diminish the relative output-values of land-intensive enterprises such as 
agriculture, ranching, and resource development.217  Moreover, U.S. management of Indian resources 
DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 36, at 7.  Although the Clinton Administration urged federal Indian agencies to adopt the 
Reagan principle of mutual sovereignty, many Indian tribes remain, paradoxically, under pupilage.  See WELLS, supra note 106, 
at 9-10 (elaborating paradox wherein continued federal funding is necessary to implement Indian Self-Determination).
207
 Empirical evidence suggests that, for Indian tribes, political domination produces economic dependence.  See ANDERSON, 
supra note 203, at 245 (“Economy follows sovereignty in Indian Country . . . The most striking characteristic of . . . successful 
tribes . . . is that they have aggressively made the tribe itself the effective decision maker[.]”).  Nonetheless, economics and
politics exert reciprocal influence, and economic dependence precludes the free exercise of Indian sovereignty.   See John C. 
Mohawk, Indian Economic Development: An Evolving Concept of Sovereignty, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 495, 499 (1991) (“Indian 
economic development may be less about creating wealth than it is about creating the conditions for political power[.]”).
208
 The irony of Indian poverty is rendered all the more acute by reference to the abundant, sustainable resources in Indian 
Country.  Timber, hydroelectric sources, grazing land, minerals, oil and gas, and wildlife abound.  However, the U.S., as trustee, 
controls leasing and production of these assets.  See, e.g., Prince, supra note 56, at 239-42 (noting that federal management of the 
$27 billion of mineral assets on the Crow Reservation currently yields a return of only .01 percent to the tribe).
209
 The conditions of each reservation are as distinct as are the more than five hundred tribes; several “report a sense of pride and 
accomplishment” in recent development of autonomous programs which include “law enforcement, education, organic farming, 
sustainable-resource logging, recycling plants, construction, environmental repair industries, language and culture academies, arts 
and crafts workshops, casinos, buffalo ranches, resorts, solar and wind energy production, computer assembly, tribal courts, 
veterans affairs offices, housing, road improvement, sanitation, etc.”  Atkinson, supra note 45, at 430.
210See Daniel Boxberger, Individualism or Tribalism?  The “Dialectic” of Indian Policy, 15 AM. IND. Q. 29, 29  (1991) (noting 
“complex factors that have shaped tribal institutions . . . [as] dependent, internal colonies”); see also ROBERT H. WHITE, 
TRIBAL ASSETS: THE REBIRTH OF NATIVE AMERICA 7 (1990) (“Less than 10 percent of [Indian] communities have . . . 
any control over their economic fate[.]”).  In addition to dependence for social services, many tribes rely upon low-wage federal 
and State jobs and the export of nonrenewable natural resources for subsistence.  WELLS, supra note 106, at 361-371.
211 See Mohawk, supra note 207, at 496-97 (suggesting Indian economic development is hostage to BIA interference with 
organization of independent political communities).
212 See Robert Williams, Small Steps on the Long Road to Self-Sufficiency for Indian Nations, 22 HARV. J. LEGIS. 335, 343-352 
(1985) (relating remoteness of reservations from centers of commerce and education to difficulty in accessing markets, capital, 
and managerial expertise).
213WHITE, supra note 210, at 273.  Admittedly, tribal governments do not always speak with a single voice as to the appropriate 
developmental path: there is a broad intra- and inter-tribal diversity of opinion as to the objectives, pace, and direction of Indian 
economic development. Still, a pan-Indian near-consensus favors independent Indian allocation, free from non-Indian mediation, 
of the cultural values informing Indian economic life.  ANDERSON, supra note 203, at 246.
214
 The U.S. defines the trust responsibility as the obligation to assert plenary power “to ensure the survival and welfare of 
Indian[s]” by “provid(ing) those services required to protect and enhance Indian lands, resources, and self-government and “to 
raise the[ir] standard of living . . . to a level comparable to the non-Indian society.”  WELLS, supra note 106, at 19.
215 See 25 U.S.C.A. §§393, 396, 415, & 483 (1994) (providing that an Indian individual or tribe who wishes to sell, convey, lease, 
or mortgage property in Indian Country for more than one year must first secure the permission of the Secretary of the Interior).
216
 Justifications for congressional refusal to consign the trust doctrine to the ashcan of history focus on the claim that the trust is 
necessary to protect Indians from exposure to market forces and the improvident disposal of their property.  See PERRY, supra
note 62, at 16.  However, it is questionable at best whether the increasingly sophisticated tribes of the 21st century are any longer 
in need of the “protection” afforded by an inept trustee such as the U.S. has demonstrated itself to be.  Critical examinations of 
BIA management decisions, as well as recent caselaw, support the argument that the trust doctrine operates as legal dressing for 
the assertion of federal politico-economic power for the benefit of non-Indian constituencies, such as industries that compete 
against, or rely upon raw materials derived from, Indian interests.  See WELLS, supra note 106, at 379 (identifying trust doctrine 
as facilitating corporate exploitation of Indian lands and resources); see also Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7-11 (D.D.C. 
1999) (finding as a matter of fact that the purpose of the trust doctrine was to “deprive Indians of their native lands and rid the 
nation of their tribal identity” to avail non-Indians of tribal lands and resources).  Within this understanding of the trust, agency 
decisions regarding Indian property are inherently governed by political considerations, rather than fiduciary concerns.
217 See ANDERSON, supra note 203, at 134 (illustrating process whereby the trust imposes opportunity costs, bureaucracy, and 
dependence rather than permits self-determination).
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grants the U.S. paternalistic control over Indian economic destiny.218  Although the U.S. is under a moral 
obligation to husband Indian resources, diligently advance Indian land claims against the States, secure 
adequate funding for Indian social services,219 and enhance the economic well-being of Indian people,220
federal agencies have withheld basic subsistence,221 mismanaged tribal resources,222 and violated the 
animating principles of the trust with near-impunity: only in very recent years has the trust doctrine 
charged the U.S. with judicially enforceable obligations apart from those incorporated in specific treaties, 
statutes, or executive orders.223  Although the protective dimensions of the trust doctrine have 
broadened,224 aggrieved Indian beneficiaries still lack effective legal recourse for its breach.225
218
 Royalties earned from leases of rights on Indian lands are paid not to Indian individuals or tribes but are deposited by the BIA, 
in theory, into trust accounts.  See 25 U.S.C.A. §415 et seq.  However, a 1996 federal audit discovered that the BIA could not 
account for $2.4 billion in Indian monies ostensibly safeguarded in federal trust funds.  See Atkinson, supra note 45 at 427. 
Indian beneficiaries seeking remedies for must confront the fact that U.S. authority over Indian resources held in trust is legally 
limited only by the requirement of “good faith.”  See Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (holding that U.S., as trustee, may 
alter the form of trust assets as long as it attempts, in good faith, to provide property of equivalent value).
219
 Although the trust imposes a moral obligation upon the U.S. to provide funding for Indian social services, the process whereby 
such funds are made available is a paradigm of inefficiency and paternalism: only a fraction of what Congress allots to the BIA 
reaches Indian tribes, and monies are specifically earmarked for programs selected by the BIA despite tribal determinations that 
funds are better allocated elsewhere.  WELLS, supra note 106, at 20-21.  Nevertheless, the U.S. has created a series of Indian 
benefit programs that purport to uphold its obligations under the trust responsibility.  See National Historic Preservation Act 
4006(a)(6), 16 U.S.C.A. 470(a)-(d)(6) (providing particular protection to properties with cultural and religious importance to 
Indian tribes); National Museum of the American Indian Act 1-10, 13, 16, 20 U.S.C. §80(q)-(q)(15) (1994) (creating museum 
exclusively for preservation and study of history and artifacts of Indians); Drug Abuse Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation 
Act 4106(d), 21 U.S.C. 1177(d) (1994) (giving preference to grant applications aimed at combatting Indian drug abuse); Native 
American Languages Act, 25 U.S.C. §§2901-2912 (1994) (according Indian languages statutory protection); Workforce 
Investment Act of 1998, 29 U.S.C.A. §2911 (supporting Indian employment); Native American Programs Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. 
§2991-2992 (1994) (creating financial and cultural benefit programs); Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 
25 U.S.C. §§3001-3013 (1994) (protecting Indian burial sites and remains).
220 Cherokee, 30 U.S. at 1.
221
 DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 36, at 181 (charging both major political parties with default on trust obligations).  
222
 The paternalistic policies of a non-Indian majority, violative of the moral and legal imperatives arising under the trust doctrine, 
add the insult of impoverishment to the injury of expropriation: the BIA arranges Indian leases, and collects their royalties and 
usufructuary benefits for their “protection.” See Atkinson, supra note 45, at 405.  Moreover, because all tribal land is held in 
trust, leases of more than one year are prohibited without permission of the Secretary of the Interior, and funds generated from 
such leases cannot be used to purchase land. U.S. mismanagement of Indian resources is of epic proportions.  See, e.g., S. REP. 
NO. 216, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 105-29, 140 (1989) (documenting century of theft of Indian oil and gas).  In the most recent case, a 
federal court, finding the U.S. in breach of a common-law fiduciary obligation due to its “long and sorry history” of gross 
mismanagement of over $500 million in 300,000 individual Indian Money Accounts, retained jurisdiction to enforce an 
accounting but stopped short of ordering further remedies unauthorized by statute.  Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 11, sub. nom. Cobell 
v. Norton, No. CIV.A.96-1285 (RCL), 2002 WL 1480903 (D.D.C.).  Although the Secretary of the Interior concedes the issue of 
gross federal mismanagement, the means proposed as the most cost-effective to make an accounting—statistical sampling—
would cost Indian claimants at least $70 million: whether relief will ever be afforded is uncertain, although the Court maintains 
jurisdiction and defendants’ are currently required to file reports as to trust reform activities.  Id.; see also Assiniboine and Sioux 
Tribe of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation v. Norton, 2002 WL 1627863 (D.D.C.) (finding case-at bar presented same questions 
of law and fact as Cobell, and refusing to refer case-at-bar, and other related tribal cases, to Calendar Committee).
223 See Skokomish Indian Tribe v. FERC, 121 F.3d 1303 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding no general obligation under trust doctrine entitling 
tribes to rights broader than those created by statute). Moreover, tribes must exhaust admininistrative remedies for claims of 
breach of trust to be justiciable.  See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 675, 677-68 (9th Cir. 1988).
224
 The full range of obligations owed under common law principles of fiduciary duty is broad. REST., (2nd), TRUSTS, §§170-72 
(listing, inter alia, duties to exercise diligence and prudence, avoid conflict of interest, deal fairly, and assume liability for loss).  
A few limit U.S. management of the Indian trust.  See, e.g., Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 229 (1923) (construing statute 
in light of trust doctrine to protect Indian right of occupancy); Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 296-97 (judging U.S. conduct with 
respect to Indians “by the most exacting fiduciary standards”); Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 
370 (1st Cir. 1975) (enforcing fiduciary obligations to Indians).  For a discussion of judicial efforts to expand enforcement, see T. 
Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975).
225 See COHEN, supra note 129, at 169 (noting full body of common-law duties and rights “does not exist between the [U.S.] and 
the Indians”); Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 7-11 (holding federal courts are limited by separation of powers considerations in 
reviewing executive management of Indian resources and, where not authorized by statute, cannot function as “a grievance 
committee”).  As of 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court has never granted relief for a breach of duty arising under the trust doctrine as 
defined at common law: relief for a putative breach is available only in those limited circumstances where the U.S. acts in the 
narrow role of (quasi)private, rather than public, trustee.  See Nevada, 463 U.S. at 128 (holding when the U.S. acts generally 
under the trust doctrine it “cannot follow the fastidious standards of a private fiduciary”).
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Plenary power, as well as judicial review of its exercise,226 further stifles Indian economic 
development by enabling Congress to terminate federal benefits227 and restrict or even abrogate Indian 
rights reserved under treaties.228  Domestic lobbying to induce Congress to allow non-Indian economic 
interests access to Indian resources229 threatens tribal sustenance and culture.230  Although Indians, as prior 
sovereigns, reserved rights in treaties to use water,231 hunt and fish, and engage in traditional modes of 
production and worship on customary lands and waters,232 recent cases suggests these are merely 
“temporary and precarious”233 privileges subject to revocation even absent explicit Congressional intent to 
do so.234  The synergy of the trust doctrine, plenary power, and judicial review in derogation of reserved 
rights is felt most acutely when tribes employ development methods that promote Indian culture and 
identity.235  When Indian “ethnodevelopment”236 threatens the regulatory jurisdiction, market power, and 
legal sovereignty of the States237 and the U.S.,238 federal Indian law checks its expression.
226
 Two centuries after Worcester the Supreme Court “continues to permit the exercise of plenary power . . . where . . . broad 
discretionary powers are vital to the solution of the ‘Indian problem.’” Williams, supra note 111, at 360.
227
 L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millenium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 809 (1996).
228 See supra at notes_ and accompanying text (elaborating doctrines of reserved rights, plenary power, and their intersection in 
federal Indian law).  The legal standard for abrogation of Indian treaties remains “plain and unambiguous” Congressional intent.  
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247-48 (1985); see also Lac du Flambeau Indians v. Stop Treaty 
Abuse-Wisconsin, Inc., 759 F.Supp 1339 (1991) (same); U.S. v. Dion, 476 U.S. at 740 (establishing that “Congress actually [has 
to have] considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose[n] to 
resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty.”).  Absent this showing, federal courts have read reserved rights to require 
imposition of corresponding State and federal duties, including obligations to secure access rights to historic lands and waters, 
insulate tribes from State licensing fees, and protect against discriminatory State regulations.  See Michael C. Blumm & Brett M. 
Swift, The Indian Treaty Piscary Profit and Habitat Protection in the Pacific Northwest: A Property Rights Approach, 69 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 407, 500 (1998) (enunciating duties of U.S. and States to protect Indian reserved rights).  
229
 Recent critics of Indian reserved rights have attacked the foundations of the reservation system itself, not merely as “some sort 
of Rube Goldberg device for the control of Indian people” but as an inefficent, ineffective system.  Some call for the dissolution 
of reservations and the redistribution of reservation-based resources.  See, e.g., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NORTH 
AMERICAN INDIANS 275. (John H. Moore ed., 1993) [hereinafter MOORE].
230
 Indian reserved rights to fish, hunt, use water, and possess land have been frequent subjects of violent treaty abrogation 
campaigns.  See, e.g., Progressive Animal Welfare Society et al. v. Slater et al., No. 98-36053, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3525 
(March 4, 1999) (affirming decision of District Court in refusing to grant preliminary injunction to prevent Coast Guard from 
implementing rule establishing protective zone around Makah Indian tribe exercising reserved right to whale); John Enders, Ore. 
Farmers Rejoice at Water’s Release, BOST. GLOBE, Mar. 30, 2002, at A2 (reporting conflict between Klamath Indian religious 
rights to take fish and farmers’ interest in use of dammed water in Oregon).  For a discussion of the cultural and religious 
importance of hunting and fishing rights to Indian tribes, as well as a sketch of the dimensions and intensity of the conflict over 
Indian reserved rights and their intersection with and opposition to non-Indian economic interests, see Shelley D. Turner, The 
Native American’s Right to Hunt and Fish:  An Overview of the Aboriginal Spiritual and Mystical Belief System, the Effect of 
European Contact and the Continuing Fight to Observe a Way of Life, 19 N.M. L. REV. 377 (1999).  
231
 Machinations within the so-called “iron triangle”—interlocking directorates of the Bureau of Reclamation, State officials, and 
corporate interests—have denied Indians the beneficial use of reserved water rights.  See LLOYD BURTON, AMERICAN 
INDIAN WATER RIGHTS AND THE LIMITS OF THE LAW 23 (1991).  For a discussion of this contested Indian right, see
Taiawagi Helton, Indian Reserved Water Rights in the Dual-System State of Oklahoma, 33 TULSA L. J. 979 (1998).
232
 Analysis of access to resources on lands ceded by treaty tracks closely with reserved rights in land not ceded, with explicit 
congressional intent the standard for abrogation.  See Oregon Dept. of Fish and Wildlife v. Klamath Tribe, 473 U.S. 753 
(termination of usufructuary rights requires express statutory language and cannot be inferred).
233 See Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 515 (holding Indian usufructuary rights are “temporary and precarious” privileges that do not 
survive admission of the State in which those rights are exercised into the Union).
234
 Recent caselaw suggests that, while the standard for abrogation remains clear expression of congressional intent, legal 
protection of Indian reserved rights is backsliding.  See, e.g., Western Shoshone Nat’l Council v. Moline, 951 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 
1991) (upholding ICC finding that Shoshone reserved rights to hunt and fish were extinguished “by gradual encroachment by 
whites”); Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982, 994 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1221 (1996) (treaty rights 
reserved “during the pleasure of the President” abrogated by equal-footing admission of Wyoming into the Union; Mille Lacs, 
562 U.S. at 224-25 (J. Thomas, dissenting) (finding Indian reserved rights, where they can be construed to operate in derogation 
of State sovereignty, are mere privileges subject to State regulation) (citation omitted).
235
 Indian culture is a meta-value informing and legitimizing Indian politico-economic organization. TERRY L. ANDERSON 
(ed.), PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INDIAN ECONOMIES 246 (1992).  Preferences, institutions, and strategies are determined 
by Indian culture, and observers identify BIA failure to craft development plans that enjoy a cultural “goodness of fit” as a 
primary determinant of relative Indian deprivation.  See, e.g., Prince, supra note 56, at 19 (positing cultural fit as condition 
precedent to sustainable Indian development).
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3.  Forced Assimilation
Early U.S.-Indian treaties did not contemplate incorporation of Indians as U.S. citizens, and later 
treaties incorporated only those individuals who had been “detribalized.”239  Against the force of a clear 
general preference for a primary affiliation with tribal institutions,240 federal Indian policy has subsumed 
individual Indians within the body politic, thereby facilitating the seizure of tribal lands and resources, the 
elimination of contending governmental entities,241 and the eradication of a critical mass of practitioners 
of alien cultures “stand(ing) in the way of progress.”242  The first such assimilative measure, Allotment, 
divested many Indians of land and created great physical and social distance between them and their 
tribes.  The imposition of U.S. citizenship in 1924243 added legal momentum by foisting an awkward dual 
allegiance upon Indians and pressuring them to transfer loyalties from their tribes to the U.S.244
a.  Termination
236 See Mireya Maritza Pena Guzman, The Emerging System of International Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, 9 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 251, 257 (1996) (defining “ethnodevelopment” as autonomous economic activity comporting with religious 
and cultural requirements of equitability and intergenerational responsibility, and citing international “soft law” in support). For 
Indians, hunting, fishing, and other ethnodevelopmental enterprises are religious duties that reinforce stewardship.
237
 Indian gaming, though but one of the economic modalities that generate competition and conflict with States, is perhaps the 
most visible. See Naomi Mezey, The Distribution of Wealth, Sovereignty, and Culture Through Indian Gaming, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 711, 736 (1996) (noting that States may soon enter the gaming market as competitors).
238
 Profound polarization of belief systems and underdeveloped historical understandings conspire to deprive Indian tribes of 
ethnodevelopmental rights, as a recent case illustrates.  In 1855 the Makah reserved the right to hunt gray whales as they had for 
millennia in traditional waters off Washington State.  See Treaty between the United States of America and the Makah Tribe of 
Indians, Jan. 31, 1855, 12 Stat. 939, 940.  By the 1920s, non-Indian whalers had hunted gray whales to near-extinction, and the 
Makah, motivated by a deep religious connection to gray whales, voluntarily ceased whaling.  When by 1993 gray whales were 
no longer endangered as a matter of U.S. law, the Makah asked the U.S. to espouse their petition for an aboriginal subsistence 
exception to the international legal prohibition on whaling.  See International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 
1946, Arg.-Austl.-Braz.-Can.-Chile, etc., 161 U.N.T.S. 72, 62 Stat. 1716 (1953) (prohibiting whaling listed species without a 
permit).  Although the U.S. assisted the Makah in receiving a quota to whale under international law, the 9th Circuit interpreted 
procedural provisions of environmental legislation narrowly so as to divest their substantive right to whale.  See Metcalf v. Daley, 
214 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2000) (interpreting U.S. executive action in support of Makah petition prior to completion of 
Environmental Assessment as violating timing requirements of NEPA); William Bradford,“Save the Whales” v. Save the Makah: 
Finding Negotiated Solutions to Ethnodevelopmental Disputes, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 155 (2000) (discussing case).
239 See Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of 
Forcing Citizenship Upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 107, 108-09 (1999) (discussing mechanisms 
whereby Indians became citizens prior to 1924, including acceptance of individual share of communal landholdings and 
assumption of “characteristics and mannerisms of a civilized person”).
240 See Rosen, supra note 40, at 245 (“Many [Indian tribes] want true self-governance to the exclusion of any other polity; many 
do not want citizenship imposed upon them[.]”).
241 See Herz, supra note 144, at 691 (stating indigenous groups “undermine political and social stability by creating an orthodoxy 
in competition with . . . the dominant culture” that “undermines the state’s claim to territorial sovereignty as well as its status as 
the representative of all citizens[.]”).  The solution to the problem of competing governance regimes is, for many states, the 
assimilation of indigenous peoples, whether through force or cooptation.  Id.
242
 LOPAC & CLOW, supra note 130, at 20; see also DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 36 (“American Indian[s] . . . have 
experienced cultural imperialism not merely as an unspoken [social] phenomenon . . . but through government policies that 
promoted their forcible assimilation[.]”); RUSSEL L. BARSH & JAMES Y. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES 
AND POLITICAL LIBERTY viii (1980) (chronicling “a history of attempts to subvert [tribal] consciousness and replace it with 
naked, alienated individualism[.]”)  As with many other dimensions of U.S. Indian policy, many assimilationists attach benign 
purposes to their proposals; “friends of the Indian” suggest assimilation is promotive of racial and ethnic harmony.  See, e.g., 
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON A MULTICULTURAL 
SOCIETY (1992); J. Harvie Wilkinson, The Law of Civil Rights and the Dangers of Separatism in Multicultural America, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 993 (1995).  This “benign assimilationism” flies in the face of culturally deprived, economically dependent 
urban Indians, who, as a consequence of their inability to participate meaningfully in either traditional tribal or majoritarian 
societies, suffer physical and mental ills.  See WELLS, supra note 106, at 61 (correlating increased incidence of Indian social 
pathology with assimilationist policies that divided kinship groups and divested Indians of culture); LAURENCE FRENCH, THE 
WINDS OF INJUSTICE: AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT xvi (1994) (discussing challenges facing 
assimilated urban Indians).
243 See Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as carried forward at 8 U.S.C. §1401(b) (1988) (“Indian Citizenship 
Act”) (granting citizenship to all non-citizen Indians “born within the territorial limits of the United States”)
244 See Joseph William Singer, The Stranger Who Resides With You: Ironies of Asian-American and American Indian Legal 
History, 40 B.C. L. REV. 171, 174 (1998); see also Atkinson, supra note 45, at 263 (noting that after passage of the Indian 
Citizenship Act it became extremely difficult as a matter of law for an Indian to claim dual citizenship).
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Although assimilationist pressure abated during the Depression and World War II, with the onset 
of the Cold War and mounting fears of enemies within the preservation of distinct political communities 
within U.S. boundaries became too offensive for many non-Indians to tolerate.245  House Concurrent 
Resolution 108 [“Termination”] exercised plenary power to “make the Indians . . . subject to the same 
laws and . . . responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the [U.S., and] to end their status as 
wards[.]246 Termination, under the direction of the former head of the War Relocation Authority,247 ended 
the U.S. trust relationship with over 100 selected tribes,248 curtailing federal benefits and services, 
dissolving tribal governments, and distributing former tribal lands and assets on a per capita basis.249  By 
legislatively disappearing tribes,250 Termination stripped Indian people not only of primary sources of 
political allegiance and economic sustenance but of sacred sites and other fonts of cultural renewal.  
Assimilationist pressure mounted, and in 1954 Public Law 280,251 by according States extensive 
jurisdiction over Indian tribes and individuals, granted non-Indian institutions of social control the legal 
authority to adjudge and condemn Indian domestic relations and employment practices.252
b.  Relocation
Predicated upon the misapprehension that the emerging “Indian problem”253 was rooted in 
segregation and parochialism rather than a cascade of assimilative legislation, Public Law 959 
[“Relocation”]254 directed federal agencies to create “Indians who were Indian in appearance but not in 
culture”255 and sap remaining tribal political strength.  At a time when reservations were increasingly 
unable to provide material necessities,256 Relocation, by portraying “contented Indian[s] working at good 
245
 DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 36, at 111.
246
 H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (Aug. 1, 1953) (enacted), repealed by 25 U.S.C. §2502 (1988) 
(authorizing administrative and Congressional action to terminate tribes in California, Florida, New York, and Texas).
247
 Perhaps uncoincidentally, the BIA Commissioner responsible for executing Termination, Dillon Meyer, served as Head of the 
War Relocation Authority, the agency  in charge of Japanese-American internment.  FRENCH, supra note 242, at 60.
248
 Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139, 140 (1977) 
(identifying 109 terminated tribes).  Although the process whereby tribes were selected for Termination is beyond the scope of 
this Article, scholars note correlations with wealth and political activism.  CADWALADER & DELORIA, supra note 42, at 119.
249
 H.R. Con. Res. 108, 67 Stat. B132.
250
 Termination has been partially reversed: thirty-one previously terminated tribes have been reinstated to federally-recognized 
status.  See, e.g., Oklahoma Indians Restoration Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 950281, 92 Stat. 246 (1977) (codified at 25 U.S.C. 861-
861(c) (1977).   However, many tribes remain terminated or unreconstituted and therefore unrecognized, a status which precludes 
availment of the protective aspects and benefits programs of the trust doctrine.
251
 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. 280, No. 83-280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A § 1161-1162 (1994), 
25 U.S.C.A. §§1321-22, & 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994).
252
 Subsequent to Public Law 280, State Departments of Health seized Indian children and placed then with non-Indian parents at 
rates disproportionate to other races, relying on the culturally-bound theory that traditional Indian parenting, reliant on extended 
kinship groups for monitoring and nurturing children, was tantamount to neglect.  BURNETTE & KOSTER, supra note 178, at 
133; see also Pritchard, supra note 154, at 259 (noting long history of forced division of Indian families). Although legislation 
has heightened protection of Indian familial and tribal rights, the right of Indian children to be raised as Indians by Indian parents 
remains a focal point in the struggle to remedy the assimilative effects of Public Law 280.  See Indian Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. 
No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978) (codified at 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901-1963 (1978)).  Similarly, adult urban Indians experience 
considerably more contact with criminal justice systems than they did prior to the passage of Public Law 280.  See JOSEPHY, 
supra note 203, at 75 (linking Indian maladjustment with federal Indian law and policy and stressing that “for the sake of our 
psychic stability as well as our physical well-being we must be free men and exercise free choices”); see also ERIC K. 
YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 94-
95 (2000) (linking cultural imperialism of federal Indian policies such as Public Law 280 with psychological trauma and social 
dysfunction, including substance abuse, incarceration, and domestic violence).
253
 The “Indian problem” from the mid-20th century dominant perspective consisted of (1) continuing tribal sovereignty on land 
within U.S. borders and (2) social maladjustment experienced by Indians forced from reservations by Allotment and Termination.
254
 Act of Aug. 3, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-959, 70 Stat. 986 (1956) (“Relocation”).
255
 PEVAR, supra note 80, at 32.
256 See JOSEPHY, supra note 203, at 72 (noting that by the 1950s many reservations could not support their populations).
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jobs and sitting beside televisions and refrigerators [in Northern cities,]”257 induced an exodus to magnet 
urban areas.  A generation of the Indian best and brightest258 were dumped into substandard housing259 and 
menial employment260 and subsumed in the American melting pot.261
By 1970 reservation populations had dwindled so far that final solution to the Indian problem 
appeared at hand, and yet the “stubborn [Indian] refusal to . . . become simply another American 
citizen”262 has sustained tribalism against a malign tide of assimilationism unto the present day.263
Although Indian individuals currently possess both tribal and federal citizenship, federal Indian law treats 
tribes as subordinate governments,264 and thus meaningful “dual citizenship”—predicated upon the 
assumption that tribal and federal governments exercise separate, if overlapping, spheres of authority in 
good faith—is a legal fiction.  For many Indians, this forced “split identification” was a genocidal act 
destructive of tribal political identities,265 and few believe that tribal and national political participation 
can coexist when Indian self-determination is construed to threaten U.S. territorial integrity.266
D.  Summary: The Claim for Indian Redress
“We have borne everything patiently for this long time.”267
The past two centuries of U.S. relations with Indians have been replete with “tremendous 
violence, treachery, and . . . pure evil.”268  Millions of Indians were murdered to depopulate and seize 
Indian land while eliminating rival polities within the colonial state constructed thereon.  Presently, a set 
of institutionalized legal impediments269 runs through the domestic order, trammeling what remains of the 
Indian right to legal, political, and economic self-determination.270 Caught in a web woven from a malign 
history and a skein of ongoing legal disabilities, Indians have been rendered the most materially 
257
 Russell L. Barsh, Are We Stuck in the Slime of History? 15 AM. INDIAN Q. 187, 191 (1991).
258
 BURT, supra note 199, at 78 (identifying Indians with leadership skills as targets of Relocation).  More than 35,000 were 
relocated after signing an agreement that they would never reestablish residence on reservations. Atkinson, supra note 55, at 409.
259 See BURNETTE & KOSTER, supra note 178, at 182 (noting institutionalized housing discrimination against urban Indians).
260
 FRENCH, supra note 242, at 66.
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deprived,271 politically and economically dependent, and legally exposed group in the nation.  It is perhaps 
impossible to overstate the magnitude of the human injustice perpetrated against Indian people: indeed, 
the severity and duration of the harms endured by the original inhabitants of the U.S. may well exceed 
those suffered by all other groups domestic and international.272  The next Part will present several 
theories of justice in regard to the Indian claim.
II. The Indian Claim for Redress: Existing Theories of Justice
“Hardly any two . . . agree on what should be done.”273
Extant theories of justice with respect to the Indian claim cluster around three distinct approaches: 
supersession, compensation, and restoration.274
A. Justice as Supersession
While the historical record of genocide, land theft, and ethnocide inflicted upon Indians might be 
understood as establishing a factual predicate presumptively obligating the U.S. and its political 
subdivisions to remedy these gross historical injustices, some theorists, foremost among them proponents 
of the Justice as Supersession [“JAS”] theory, reach a very different conclusion.  JAS theorists reject as 
foolishly naïve a “natural way of reasoning” that would require that lands illicitly taken by colonial 
invaders and passed on to their descendants through the generations be nonetheless returned.275   Although 
JAS theory recognizes that the historical record has an important place in the development and 
application of a theory of justice with respect to Indian claims, for JAS theorists the historical injustices 
suffered by Indian claimants must be weighed against the current injustice that would be inflicted upon 
innocent owners now in possession of erstwhile Indian lands were those lands stripped away and restored 
271
 Indian reservations remain among the most impoverished areas in the U.S.  Whereas between 8-14% of the U.S. population 
toils below the poverty line, the figure is 40% of all Indians, with some tribes faring worse.  See 138 Cong. Rec. S3426 (daily ed. 
Mar. 12, 1992) (statement of Sen. John McCain (Rep.-Ariz.); Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, Social and 
Economic Characteristics, United States 95 tbl. 95, 98 tbl. 98 (listing poverty rates for nine largest tribes—Cherokee, 22%; 
Navajo, 48.8%; Sioux, 44.4%; Chippewa, 34.3%; Choctaw, 23.0%; Pueblo, 33.2%; Apache, 37.5%; Iroquois, 20.1%; and 
Lumbee, 22.1%).  Indian unemployment hovers at 40%, eight times the national average, and the median Indian family income is 
less than half the national average. ANDERSON, supra note 203, at 1.  Underfunded reservation schools are the worst in the U.S.  
See Atkinson, supra note 45, at 421.  The socioeconomic status of “urban” Indians—the bulk of the Indian population—is no 
better.  See Terrell Rhodes, The Urban American Indian, i n A CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY, at 259, 262 tbl. 14.1 (data for 1990) 
(noting only 24% of Indians live on reservations).  Unemployment, infant mortality, suicide, homicide, substance abuse, 
homelessness, and poor health are common: by every objective indicator Indians are the most disadvantaged group in the U.S.  
WARD CHURCHILL, FANTASIES OF THE MASTER RACE 7 (1992) (Indians are “the poorest of the poor”).
272 See BROOKS, supra note 4, at 241 (“For more than five hundred years attempts have been made to exterminate, assimilate, or 
otherwise eliminate [Indians] from the American hemisphere . . . No other group within the [U.S.] has been subjected to such 
cruel, harsh, and deceptive exploits at the hands of dominant society and for such a long period of time.  Massacres at the hands 
of military and civilians, slavery, wars, removal, treaty deceit, starvation, disease, genocide, forced sterilization, and cultural 
genocide [were] used in the Euro-American effort to destroy the native peoples and their cultures[.]”).
273
 Spotted Tail, Lakota.
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 David Lyons, The New Indian Claims and Original Rights to Land, 4 SOC. THEORY & PRACT. 249, 252 (1977); see also
Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historical Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4, 27 (1992) (dismissing Indian claims as “simple” convictions).
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to Indian ownership.276  To sanction a moral understanding that demands restoration of Indian lands would 
have practical effects, foremost among them the dispossession and impoverishment of non-Indian 
landowners, an outcome with which JAS theorists are not prepared to abide.277  To avoid this, JAS 
theorists urge us to reconceive of the historical injustices suffered by Indian tribes and individuals as a 
“dead history”278 and to accept that Indian claims for redress have been superseded by demographic and 
ecological transformations279—in other words, while injustice may have been inflicted in centuries past, 
injustice is perishable, and the accreting rights of non-Indians in Indian land have incrementally 
extinguished, or at least rendered morally irrelevant, any present claims for its restoration.280
Although they recognize that “the view that a violated entitlement can ‘fade’ with time may seem 
unfair[,]”281 JAS theorists defend their supersession thesis by way of two arguments.  First, they claim that 
it is impossible to know with any degree of certainty whether Indian claimants would in fact have 
remained seized of their land entitlements (and thus transmitted their landholdings to their descendants) in 
the absence of non-Indian expropriation or whether they might have voluntarily parted with them for 
good consideration.282  In other words, because Indians might in theory have been divested of title by 
some other process, the moral relevance of forcible and fraudulent expropriation to the contemporary 
question of whether to afford redress for the seizure of Indian land is to be discounted in proportion to the 
perceived probability that Indians would have sold or otherwise alienated their entitlements.
Second, JAS theorists posit that the true test of the legitimacy of an entitlement stems not 
principally from the inherent justice of the process whereby it was acquired283 but rather from its 
indispensability to the subsistence of the party claiming it.  Thus, if a disentitled claimant generations 
removed from ownership cannot demonstrate that he has “organized his life around the use of [the 
property interest],” rather than simply “organize[d] [his] life around the campaign for its restoration[,]” 
his claim based upon original entitlement is depreciated and even forfeit to a party currently in possession 
for whom the property is presumptively indispensable as his current residence, business, or farm.284  In 
practice, because Indians have managed to stave off extinction and starvation despite the divestiture of 
nearly 98% of their pre-contact land mass, and because that land mass has been thickly settled over the 
276 See Waldron, supra note 275, at 26-27 (rejecting disruption of the settled expectations of non-Indian property owners and 
querying whether it is “fair to expropriate the land of an immigrant who purchased the land in good faith and whose ancestors 
had nothing to do with the injustice, in order to end the continued injustice of the expropriation of indigenous people’s lands?”).
277 See Lyons, supra note 275, at 270 (rejecting the return of Indian lands now occupied by non-Indians on the ground that it 
“would impose enormous burdens on small home owners and small businesses[.]”); Waldron, supra note 275, at 26 (divestiture 
of Indian lands from contemporary non-Indian possessors “would mean many people going hungry who might otherwise be fed 
and many people living in poverty who might otherwise have an opportunity to make a decent life.[.]”).
278
 Lyons, supra note 275, at 252.
279 See, e.g., Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984) (Marshall, J.) (“subsequent demographic history” is relevant to determining 
whether, with arrival of significant numbers of non-Indians upon Indian land, Indian rights in such land have been diminished).
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 Waldron, supra note 275, at 15.
282 Id. at 8.
283 See J. Angelo Corlett, Wrongdoing, Reparations, and Native Americans, 147, 151, in INJUSTICE AND RECTIFICATION 
(Rodney C. Roberts ed. 2002).
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 Waldron, supra note 275, at 18; see also Corlett, supra note 283, at 156-57 (describing this proposition as the “Acquired 
Rights Trumping Original Land Rights Objection” to restoration or compensation); JANNA THOMPSON, TAKING 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PAST: REPARATION AND HISTORICAL JUSTICE xvi (2002) (noting that the question of 
how historical entitlements ought to be weighed against the rights of current possessors of real property may be the central 
dilemma in developing a coherent theory of justice for historical acts of gross injustice).
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course of several generations by non-Indians who would “starve” or be “hurt or degraded”285 if they were 
evicted, it is plain to JAS theorists that the lands in question are indispensable only to their present 
possessors.  Although JAS theorists concede that the mechanisms whereby Indian claimants were 
separated from their entitlements were unjust, they maintain that the remediation of past injustices cannot 
be accomplished without inflicting a present and even greater injustice upon the non-Indian majority, and 
thus JAS theory rejects proposals to restore land to Indian ownership as practically irrelevant and 
fundamentally unfair in light of fundamental changes in circumstances.286  In short, property rights are 
“thinner and much more flexible, or variable with circumstances,” than Indian claimants understand them 
to be, and they must “bend to the needs and interests of human beings.”287
JAS proponents defend what they further concede is very much a prospective theory288 by 
asserting that only a deliberate discounting of the past can possibly ensure that resources are allocated in a 
manner that is “fair to all of [the world’s] existing inhabitants.”   Because they now constitute the 
overwhelming majority, non-Indians, rather than the Indians they have displaced, reduced, and greatly 
outnumbered, are the primary reference point for assessing the requirements of justice, and for JAS 
theorists even had they not come by their current entitlements through fraud and force they would 
presently be entitled to a share of Indian lands proportionate to their numbers by the simple virtue of their 
existence here in North America coupled with their legitimate need.289 Thus, although they accept that 
symbolic recognition and remembrance of historical injustices inflicted upon Indians may often be 
morally appropriate and that Indians are entitled to a more equitable distribution of the panoply of 
resources generally available within society,290 JAS theorists, protective of the interests of present 
possessors whom they hold blameless or at least legally and morally unaccountable for historical 
injustices,291 categorically reject any and all proposals that would go so far as to “actually . . . rectify past 
wrongs” by either re-transferring lands to Indian claimants or by paying their full, as distinct from 
symbolic, value in compensation.292  Compensation is thus, at best, an act of grace unrelated to any moral 
285
 Waldron, supra note 275, at 26-27.
286
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or legal obligation; at worst it is an underserved handout to the losers of a long-ago struggle for the 
continental landmass that, if employed injudiciously, may threaten non-Indians with personal financial 
loss and justifiably provoke resentment.
With regard to Indian claims for ethnocide and denial of the right to self-determine, JAS theorists, 
although they accept in theory that individuals have the basic human need to belong to groups “united by 
some common links—especially language, collective memories, continuous life upon the same soil[,]” 
and perhaps “race, blood, religion, [and] a sense of common mission,”293 reject Indian tribes as mere 
“partisans of small-scale community” lacking in any entitlement to “special support or assistance or to 
extraordinary provision or forbearance”294 from the U.S.  Rather than encourage an “artificial” 
commitment to tribalism, JAS theorists would require Indian cultures to “wither away[,]” to “amalgamate 
with other cultures” and to “adapt themselves to geographical and demographic necessity.”295  Further, 
rather than accept that Indian culture and the right to self-govern as distinct tribal communities are worthy 
of preservation and that injuries to either give rise to obligations to afford redress, JAS theory demands 
that Indians submit to a “mongrelization of [their] identity” and assimilate into the body politic in service 
to a cosmopolitan vision that broadens the scope of individual life possibilities and serves as a more 
“authentic response to the world in which we live[.]”296  Although JAS theory does not go so far as to 
immunize ethnocide and forcible denial of the right of Indian tribes to self-determine, it suggests strongly 
that the historical processes responsible for the loss of culture and the right to self-govern as discrete and 
insular communities are at worst of trivial moral or legal consequence and at best are even promotive of 
the individual rights and life possibilities of individual Indians.
In sum, JAS theory holds that while the U.S. may be obligated to negotiate toward a settlement 
that would offer some symbolic redress for expropriation, genocide, and ethnocide,297 any retrospective 
proposal to restore lands, pay market value for expropriations, or transform existing legal regimes to lend 
genuine political and material support to Indian self-determination would inflict greater injustices upon 
living non-Indians than the historical injustices visited upon long-dead Indians it would be intended to 
redress while simultaneously interfering with the opportunities of living individual Indians to partake of 
the superior virtues of Western liberal cosmopolitanism.
B. Justice as Compensation
For Justice as Compensation [“JAC”] theorists, a much more parsimonious approach to justice 
requires, quite simply, that where land has been acquired unjustly through fraud or force it must, 
regardless of whether or not it has been subsequently transferred lawfully, either be restored to its rightful 
owner or full compensation must be paid.298  Where sacred lands are concerned, the obligation to restore is 
at a zenith, and where restoration is pragmatically imprudent or otherwise not consistent with the 
293 Isaiah Berlin, Benjamin Disraeli, Karl Marx and the Search for Identity, in AGAINST THE CURRENT 252, 257 (Henry 
Hardy ed. 1980).
294
 Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 751, 762, 778 (1992).
295 Id. at 787-88.
296 Id. at 788.
297
 Lyons, supra note 275, at 270 (accepting the notion of a political resolution of Indian claims by federal intervention).
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requirements of justice inasmuch as it would require the dispossession of non-Indians,299 Indians must be 
grated rights-of-way to such sites.300  By accepting the duty to restore or compensate and thereby settling 
the normative question, JAC theorists are free to direct their energies to prudential issues such as 
membership in the remedial class, the form compensation is to assume, and the identities of the parties 
from whom restoration or compensation must issue.  JAC theorists accept the argument that the historic 
deprivation of Indian lands is causally related to the denial of the Indian right to self-determine and to the 
material deprivation currently experienced by Indian tribes and individuals, and consequently view 
compensation for expropriation as “just an example of ordinary corrective justice” that, coupled with 
“some form of group-based political autonomy”—whether exemptions from general tax legislation or 
other group-specific entitlements—befits the redress of Indian claims.301
Nevertheless, many who would otherwise recognize the duty to afford redress to Indians for land 
expropriation point to relevant treaties and statutes,302 the Indian Claims Commission [“ICC”],303 and a 
host of federal Indian benefits programs legislated and appropriated under the trust responsibility304 as 
evidence that compensation has already been paid and claims have been (at least partially) settled.305 Even 
298 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 152 (1974) (stating that justice in property entitlements can only 
be the result of just acquisition and just transfer or full compensation for unjust expropriation); Corlett, supra note 283, at 149-50; 
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 733.
299 See, e.g., Ross Poole, Justice or Appropriation? Indigenous Claims and Liberal Theory, 101 RADICAL PHIL. 5, 7 (2000) 
(accepting the general obligation to restore lands or compensate their former owners but mitigating this duty by noting that “there 
is no way in which indigenous people could have preserved their relationship to the land unchanged[,]” that “[g]iven the needs of 
the rest of the world, some sharing of land and resources was required[,]” and that “sometimes the needs of many count against 
the rights of the few.”); KYMLICKA, supra note 290, at 219-20 (stressing that to require a restoration, as opposed to a 
compensation, remedy “would create massive unfairness, given that the original European settlers and later immigrants have 
produced hundreds of millions of descendants, and this land is the only land they know.”).
300 See THOMPSON, supra note 284, at 63 (incorporating the obligation to grant easements to sacred sites not susceptible of 
restoration as part of a theory of justice in regard to Indian land claims).
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302 See Cherokee, 30 U.S. at 48 (Baldwin, J., concurring) (noting that although they ceded Indian territories to the U.S., many 
Indian treaties either recognized Indian title to unceded lands, provided tribes in lieu lands west of the Mississippi River, and 
granted compensation); Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 424 (holding that 1877 act removing Black Hills from Lakota ownership was a 
taking of recognized title under the 5th Amendment and upholding Court of Claims judgment for monetary damages); ANILCA, 
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305 See, e.g., Chad W. Bryan, Precedent for Reparations? A Look at Historical Movements for Redress and Where Awarding 
Reparations for Slavery Might Fit, 54 AL. L. REV. 599, 600 n.15 (“[T]he federal government has paid reparations to 
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those JAC theorists who would accept that further measures of compensatory relief are still due Indian 
claimants insist that amounts be negotiated through the political process rather than determined in 
accordance with some rational, objective framework.306  Some are likely to insist that a “commitment 
device” be engineered that would definitively and finally resolve Indian land claims and prevent their 
subsequent reopening even if justice should be determined to so require at some later date.307
Moreover, JAC theory is largely silent as to the remediation of the elements of ethnocide and 
denial of the right to self-determine.  Whether as the result of a presumption that cash cannot compensate 
these losses, an limited remedial reach, a philosophical commitment to assimilation akin to that held by 
JAS theorists, or an ignorance of these equally, if not more, compelling elements of the Indian claim, JAC 
theory, a mode of redress morphologically identical to reparations, is ultimately a narrowly-tailored 
approach to justice.
C. Justice as Restoration
Justice as Restoration [“JAR”] aims at a more holistic approach to the remediation of historic 
injustices.  For proponents of JAR, in-kind compensation, even if theoretically equivalent in value to that 
which was taken, is insufficient to rectify the original injustice occasioned by its expropriation; 
restoration of the illicitly appropriated property itself is essential to “set unjust situations right.” 308  Only 
by restoring land can the ongoing injustice of the original expropriation be terminated.309  Moreover, and, 
from a legal perspective, quite importantly, JAR theorists would reverse the presumption inherent in the 
arguments propounded by JAS, and to a lesser extent JAC, theorists, that non-Indian occupants of what 
was once Indian land are to be regarded as secure in their right to possession on the ground that they have 
acquired moral rights by accretion through the passage of time that are now immune from attack.  On the 
contrary, JAR theory rejects the argument that justice is perishable and maintains instead that the burden 
falls upon the U.S. to justify the entitlements of the present inhabitants of land seized from Indian tribes: 
Indian land is thus presumptively Indian land irrespective of the length of time it has been out of Indian 
possession.310  Accordingly, when JAR theorists “have good reason to think that an appropriate reparation 
should take the form of returning some of the land that was unjustly taken, then the entitlements of 
present owners should give way.”311
Harris, supra note 21, at 445 (claiming Indians have been compensated for land seizures and implying that Indian claims have 
thus been adequately settled); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 695 (describing the ICC as a reparations program).
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Even more significantly, JAR does not limit its remedial scope to the issue of land rights: rather, 
the remedial focus of JAR extends to those “injustices that may in fact loom larger in the minds of the 
victims or their descendants—murder, torture, enslavement, discrimination and degradation.” 312 Because 
the restoration of land rights alone is inadequate to the project of restoring moral parity between the 
Indians and the U.S., JAR theorists insist that a full moral, as distinct from a merely legal, accounting and 
settlement of claims necessitates that the U.S. first publicly acknowledge and apologize for specific past 
acts and then accept some form of social punishment (even if sanctions are limited to critical moral 
judgments).313  Many particularized JAR theories rely on truth and reconciliation commissions 
[“TRCs”],314 tribunals that investigate the gross human injustices of the previous regime and construct and 
publicize an unflinching historical record,315 as integral to this process.316
Furthermore, JAR contends that theories which purport to remedy the results of a genocidal and 
ethnocidal history solely “through the language of missing property”317 fail to reach and redress moral and 
other non-material harms while missing transformative opportunities whereby to reconcile victims and 
wrongdoers and lay the foundation for a peaceful and cooperative joint future.  Accordingly, in 
conjunction with land restoration and apologies, JAR theorists call for rehabilitative measures designed to 
heal the injured psyches of individuals and to nurture the capacity of victim groups to engage in 
meaningful self-determination.318  Some JAR theorists cast promotion of self-determination as a necessary 
condition precedent to the moral relegitimization of the nation.319  Still, although some JAR theorists 
advocate expansive proposals that would reinvest a significant degree of land and political autonomy in 
beneficiary groups and liberate them from the control of the majoritarian legal and political system either 
through limited legislative dispensations or through some process of formal secession,320 and while in the 
context of Indian claims they are more inclined to consider the merits of expansive self-determination 
proposals than they are in regard to other groups lacking in the ties of culture , religion, and political 
312 Id. at vix.  Some JAR theorists refer to these injuries as “spirit injuries,” defined as a combination of physical, emotional, and 
spiritual harms that cause the “slow death of the psyche, the soul, and the persona” at the individual level and lead to the 
“devaluation and destruction of a way of life or of an entire culture” at the level of the group.  Adriene Katherine Wing, Healing 
Spirit Injuries: Human Rights in the Palestinian Basic Law, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 1087, 1089 (2002).
313
 Corlett, supra note 283, at 153.
314
 Since 1974 more than twenty TRCs have been initiated on nearly every continent in states as diverse as Argentina, Bolivia, 
Chad, Chile, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Germany, the Phillippines, Malawi, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, and still 
more have been demanded for Bosnia, Mexico, South Korea, Honduras, and Sri Lanka.  KEN CHRISTIE, THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN TRUTH COMMISSION 2 (2000).  Though a lack of cash and courage has hampered them, several TRCs have aided 
reconciliation processes.  See id. at 54-55 (tbl. 2.1), 58-59 (tbl. 2.2) (providing dates, objectives, and accomplishments).
315
 TRCs typically publish an open record or final report, and in the interests of transparency public hearings are often broadcast 
on national media.  Jamie L. Wacks, A Proposal for Community-Based Racial Reconciliation in the United States Through 
Personal Stories, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 195, 207 (2000).
316
 For some JAS theorists, TRCs are less central to justice and simply “reduce the number of lies that can be circulated 
unchallenged in public discourse.”  MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, ARTICLES OF FAITH, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 113 (1996).
317
 Anthony J. Sebok, Reparations, Unjust Enrichment, and the Importance of Knowing the Difference Between the Two, 58 
N.Y.U.  ANN. SURV. AM. L. 651, 657 (2003).
318
 Roy L. Brooks, Rehabilitative Reparations for the Judicial Process, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 475, 476-77 (2003).
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 JAR theorists in particular link the moral legitimacy of states in the world community to the degree to which they distribute 
justice to all their domestic social groups and in particular to racial, ethnic, and religious minorities.  See Yamamoto et al,, supra
note 29, at 1272 (elaborating this linkage).  Questions such as the justice of the process whereby states acquired their landmass 
and the degree to which they permit such groups to establish and maintain autonomous political, economic, and cultural forms or 
organizations are central to this inquiry.  See, e.g., Corlett, supra note 283, at 147 (contending that the “moral legitimacy of a 
country” is contingent upon the degree to which its land base was justly acquired); ROBINSON, supra note 23, at 208 
(contending that without reparations, “America can have no future as one people.”).  For further discussion, see infra at p. 64.
320 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 735 (discussing proposals to grant  African Americans either an autonomous 
territory in the U.S. or offer voluntary repatriation to Africa).
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association that constitute Indian tribes,321 most propose far more limited self-determination agendae that 
do not would provide beneficiary groups a package of grants, subsidies, and tax incentives.322
D. Analysis
At its core, JAS theory is a not terribly subtle justification for conquest and forced assimilation.  
While JAS theorists may consider this characterization as reductionist and reflexively dismissive of the 
obvious merits of their theory—namely, its pragmatic and utilitarian approach to preserving the interests 
of the non-Indian majority—stripped of its academic veneer JAS theory is little more than the medieval 
dogmas once enunciated by conquistadors as justification for their adventures in the Americas.  The 
indispensability thesis central to JAS theory—that formerly Indian lands are indispensable not to Indian 
survival, as Indians have somehow survived without them, but to non-Indians currently in possession, 
who would suffer impoverishment and uprooting were they stripped of title—actually marshals the fact 
that Indians have managed to survive expropriation, genocide, and ethnocide as evidence against their 
claim: had Indians been extinguished as the consequence of the expropriation of their lands, then and only 
then would JAS theorists concede that Indian lands were indispensable to Indians, and even then there 
would be no claimants left for the benefit of whom justice might be done.  In other words, Indians have 
proven that they can do without Indian lands, but non-Indians either cannot or should not have to make 
the same showing.  The only explanations JAS theory offers to support its historical agnosticism and 
differential treatment are two: (1) that was then, and this is now; and (2) the fundamental precept of 
Western liberal jurisprudence, that like cases are decided alike, does not apply to Indian claims.
Moreover, JAS theory deliberately ignores millennia of Indian stewardship of lands and 
resources, consistent with their religious and social obligations to preserve entitlements for the benefit of 
future generations, in presuming that Indians might have parted with their land by some other process 
than force or fraud and that as a result it is impossible to link Indian disenfranchisement with historical 
injustice for which non-Indians must answer.  Although it is at least theoretically possible that Indian 
lands might have at some point in history passed from Indian proprietorship and become Indianrein323, as 
the history and philosophy of the relationship of Indians to their land demonstrates there is far more 
reason to build the presumption that, absent non-Indian deceit and violence, Indians would remain 
possessed of their lands as caretakers for future generations into a theory of justice, and a much more 
compelling argument that those who dispossessed Indians of title ought to be obligated to justify their 
actions.  It is difficult to ascribe the refusal to recognize this nexus to historical myopia rather than to a 
deliberate agenda that preserves the status quo and privileges majoritarian claims to an invaluable 
resource upon which nearly all other contemporary entitlements hinge.
In other words, rather than present a theory of justice, JAS theorists elaborate a rationalization for 
genocide and ethnocide that suggests to Indians that “our culture is superior to yours, that’s why we won 
the war, and to the victors go the spoils, so either content yourselves with scraps we throw you savages or 
321 Id.  at 741.
322 See Erin Daly, Reparations in South Africa: A Cautionary Tale, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 367, 403 (2003) (discussing legislative 
proposals to afford grants and tax relief as pragmatic means whereby to enhance the self-determination of South African blacks).
323 Indianrein is a corruption of Judenrein, a term used by  Adolf Hitler and the Nazis to refer to territory purged of Jews. Simon 
Wiesenthal Center, Museum of Tolerance, available at http://motlc.wiesenthal.com/pages/t035/t03532.html.
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better yet shed your anachronistic Indianness and embrace our modern civilization, but either way stop 
bringing up the past—it poisons our national body politic and scares us nice non-Indian people.”   Simply 
put, JAS, almost absolutely indifferent to the present effects of past injustice, categorically rejects any 
moral or legal obligations flowing from conquest and genocide In the face of the claim that the theft of 
Indian land and the murder of Indian people are neutral facts, Indians might conclude that the only path to 
justice is down the very same road whereby their rights to land and self-determination were taken.324
JAC theory, in contrast, rejects two premises put forth by JAS theorists, namely that history is 
dead insofar as the obligation to render justice for past wrongs is concerned and that the passage of time 
can and has rendered good a thief’s title.325  As such, it deserves to be taken seriously as a theory of 
justice.  Compensating Indians would alleviate grinding poverty and enhance the material conditions of 
their existence, and, if accompanied by expressions of regret and remorse, might demonstrate to future 
generations the continuing vitality of moral duties to refrain from genocide, land theft, and ethnocide.326
The infusion of significant sums into tribal institutions might even reduce dependence upon the U.S. by 
creating the financial preconditions for genuine self-determination and enabling tribes to pursue programs 
of land restoration and economic development.
However, JAC theory is morphologically similar to reparations, and thus far too quick to assume 
that cash and Indian land are commensurable327 and far too susceptible to counter-claims that, even if 
money may in respect to some tribal claims be a roughly adequate remedy, sufficient compensation either 
has already been paid or will be paid to discharge the obligation to remedy all the past injustices visited 
upon all Indians.  Simply put, money can play at best an indirect part in the satisfaction of the harms of 
which Indians complain: although a diversity of opinion exists within Indian Country, most Indians desire 
above all not to be made whole financially but rather to exercise their rights to self-determine and to 
express their unique cultures and religions upon their sacred ancestral lands.328  Only land restoration and 
legal transformations that permit the (re)development of separate political identities can actualize these 
fundamental rights and relieve the economic deprivation and emotional pain Indians bear 
intergenerationally.  While cash would improve Indians’ bargaining position in regard to reclamation of 
lands and reduce their sociopolitical dependency upon the U.S., there is no amount of money that can 
324
 Although one of the principal proponents insists that JAS theory does not create an “incentive for wrongdoers to seize others’ 
lands confident in the knowledge that if they hang on to them wrongfully for long enough their possession may eventually 
become rightful[,]” it is not apparent how, if it aims to be evaluated as a universal moral argument, JAS theory could proscribe 
the Indian reconquest of their lands.   Waldron, supra note 275, at 25.
325
 At common law, a thief’s title to property is void, and the thief cannot convey good title even to a subsequent good faith 
purchaser.  See, e.g., Schrier v. Home Indem. Co., 273 A.2d 248, 250-51 (D.C. 1971).  The rule is intended to protect property 
against thievery; for if a thief could convey good title “there must be an end of all social commerce between man and man, unless 
private possessions be secured from unjust invasions: and, if an acquisition of goods by either force or fraud were allowed to be a 
sufficient title, all property would soon be confined to the most strong, or the most cunning; and the weak and simpleminded part 
of mankind (which is by far the most numerous division) could never be secure of their possessions.”  3 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 145  (1765)
326 See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403, 421-24 (1992) (describing the capacity for 
compensatory remedies to accomplish moral instruction and correction).
327
 The “incommensurability thesis holds that people cannot always value options along a common metric[,]” that policy options 
cannot always  be reduced to evaluation in rational terms, and that not all goods will be exchanged by all persons or groups for 
money.  ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 186-93 (2000).
328 See STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE 152-56 (1988) (surveying answers to the question “What do 
Indians want?” across a range of political, economic, social, and legal variables and finding a general consensus in favor of land 
restoration and some form of self-determination despite a diversity of opinions).
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compel unwilling sellers, public or private, to reconvey formerly Indian lands, and no dollar figure for 
which tribes would be willing to trade their right to self-govern.  Cash, however beneficial to its 
recipients, cannot restore to Indians the capacity to self-determine on their aboriginal landmass.
Furthermore, JAC theorists who suggest that Indian claims have been retired misunderstand the 
nature of the federal trust responsibility.  Payments under the trust doctrine are categorically not 
compensation for injuries but rather consideration for the voluntary cession of lands and other resources.  
Moreover, compensation paid by Congress through the ICC or other mechanisms represents at best a tiny 
fraction of the value consequences of expropriation, genocide, and ethnocide.329
Moreover, even if Indian tribes could somehow be persuaded to surrender their claims to lands 
and rights for cash, the fair value would be so great as to threaten the national fisc and spark a  racialized 
political firestorm.330   Indian tribes presently control only 52 million acres, or 2.6%, of the U.S. 
continental landmass.  The ICC, charged with assessing relative U.S. responsibility for the expropriation 
of Indian lands, estimated that 35% of the two billion acres that comprise the U.S.—a total of 750 million 
acres—is legally Indian land.331  Assuming, arguendo, that the median value of an acre of land in the U.S. 
is approximately $1000,332 the fair market cost to compensate Indians for its expropriation would exceed 
$750 billion, an amount that, if paid, would have macroeconomic consequences.333  Even assuming that 
nothing close to fair market value would be paid as compensation for takings of Indian land,334 and even if 
off-sets were applied to reduce the award by the amounts paid under the trust doctrine or by the ICC, the 
enormity of any proposal that would offer only “payment on the cheap” would still be so great as to 
almost certainly preclude its payment.  If one factors into the compensatory scheme additional monies for 
the wrongful deaths of at least five million ancestors of present Indian claimants335 at a paltry rate of 
$100,000 for each decedent—and JAC theory is further to be faulted for failing to extend its remedial 
reach to genocide—the total cost to taxpayers would exceed a trillion dollars.  Those ignorant of the 
historical predicate behind the demand for justice might mistakenly equate compensation with revenge;336
others, merely self-interested, may be unwilling to effect such a radical redistribution of wealth. Either 
way, many Indians, concerned that application of JAC theory is likely to thrust Indians and non-Indians 
329 See, e.g., Jo Carrillo, Land Claims and Reparations, 51-60, at 54 in READINGS IN AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: 
RECALLING THE RHYTHM OF SURVIVAL (Jo Carrillo ed. 1997) (detailing sharp limitations on the compensatory regime 
established by ICC and noting how few tribes ever received compensation).
330 See Meredith Lee Bryant, Combating School Resegregation Through Housing: A Need for a Reconceptualization of American 
Democracy and the Rights it Protects, 13 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 127, 149-50 (1997) (“any attempt at putting a dollar 
figure on past racial harms often yields an amount too large or otherwise politically unfeasible.”).
331
 Newton, supra note 79, at 776-84.
332
 In 2003, the average price per acre of farmland in the U.S. was more than $1000.  See Statement of Keith Collins, Chief 
Economist, U.S. Department of Agriculture Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural 
Development and Related Agencies, May 15, 2003, at http://www.usda.gov/agency/oce/speeches/collinsmay152003.pdf.  
Although some of the acreage in the U.S. is desert, otherwise not arable, or of lesser value, much of it, particularly where suitable 
as residential or commercial real estate, is worth a great deal more.
333 See Yamamoto, supra note 22, at 515 (conceding that the $20 billion in compensation to Japanese Americans was a “small blip 
on the radar of the [U.S.] economy” but that compensation of Indians would have a much more profound effect).
334 See Newton, supra note 120, at 460 (analyzing historical compensations of takings of Indian land and finding, based on 
historical experience, that nothing close to fair market value is likely to be accorded Indian claimants).
335 See supra at note 48 (enumerating Indian victims of genocide).
336 See Emily Sherwin, Compensation and Revenge, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1389 (2003) (suggesting that when 
compensatory remedies are “pressed too far” they can begin to approximate revenge rather than “justice”).
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into contending camps and lock them in political and legal combat in which anything goes in the fight 
over the wealth and power of the state,337 join with non-Indians in opposing this approach to justice.
Finally, JAC theory completely fails to account for the most important variable in the remedial 
equation: law.  Under the doctrine of plenary power, Congress has nearly absolute and unreviewable 
dominion over Indian tribes, and in concert with the political question doctrine plenary power precludes 
judicial undoing of fraudulent treaties, proscribes the review of takings, insulates violations of treaty 
provisions, and withdraws Indian property, culture, religion from the protection of the Constitution.338
Moreover, that which Congress can give, Congress can take away.   Any settlement of Indian claims must 
therefore be understood as dependent not upon the honor of the U.S. but rather upon the inconstant will of 
a majority of its legislative branch.  Under the current legal regime, should a future Congress elect to 
reclaim monies paid as compensation, take property purchased with such monies without paying 
compensation, or even terminate each and every Indian tribe, dissolve each and every reservation, and 
criminalize each and every aspect of Indian culture, nothing—nothing—save for any resulting moral 
outrage at such a naked assertion of power will stand in its way.  In other words, federal Indian law—
already barren terrain for the expression of Indian claims—is structurally incapable of according Indians 
the sort of commitment device that might ensure the finality of any compensation agreement, even in the 
decidedly unlikely event that an agreement could ever be fashioned that would reach most, or even some, 
of the elements in the Indian claim.  Power is still the only currency fully negotiable in intercourse 
between the U.S. and Indians.
Of the three theory clusters, only JAR embraces restoration as the method of redress appropriate 
in respect to Indian land claims, and only JAR is theoretically amenable to consideration of the non-
material injuries that occupy a central place in the Indian claim for redress.  Furthermore, only JAR would 
hold the U.S. accountable under moral, as opposed to strictly legal, principles, and only JAR would even 
attempt to induce the U.S. to acknowledge and repudiate past acts of egregious injustice, as opposed to 
simply internalizing their costs.  Quite distinct from JAS and JAC theories, JAR recognizes that justice is 
not merely a settlement of historical accounts but an opportunity to reconcile with Indians and to 
relegitimize the nation in its relations at home and abroad, and of the various theoretical offerings only 
JAR hints at an institutional framework wherein to attempt this.339  Finally, JAR is, if not positively 
encouraging, at least not as hostile as are the other theoretical clusters to the notion that self-
determination, in whatever form it comes to assume, is the legitimate objective of Indians in their 
relations with the U.S., and that the U.S. has an obligation to assist them in this endeavor.
Still, while JAR is the most normatively attractive of the three theoretical clusters, JAR theory is 
not the final stop on the theoretical journey to justice for Indians.  JAR theory is susceptible to criticism 
on several grounds.  As compelling as the argument that non-Indian land owners are obligated to vacate 
337
 If past is prologue, even if a battle for reparations were to result in Indian victory, an increase in Indian economic prosperity, 
without reform of the laws and institutions that suppress Indian autonomy, will invite a corresponding increase in the degree of 
external interference with and manipulation of tribal institutions.  See LOPACH & CLOW, supra note 130, at 5.
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 Newton, supra note 120 (noting that for all parties save for its indigenous peoples, the U.S. accepts the constitutional 
obligation to remedy takings of land in violation of law by restitution either in natura or in damages); see also supra at pp._ 
(describing lack of constitutional protections afforded Indian religions and cultures).
339 See supra at notes 314-16 (discussing TRCs in the context of the resolution of claims).
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their entitlements in favor of the descendants of their Indian predecessors-in-title may be, principles of 
equity, as JAS theory is quick to assert, should proscribe the wholescale evacuation of millions of acres of 
land and the forced relocation of innocent and newly-homeless non-Indians to places uncertain.  Even if 
equity alone is not sufficient to counsel prudence, the prospect that non-Indians threatened in the security 
of their property interests might organize to induce political action resulting in further abridgement of 
Indian resources and rights340 must be accounted for in any theory of Indian justice.  If the only remedy for 
a past injustice is a present injustice, a perpetual cycle of bloody conflict over land is inevitable.341
However, the most radical of JAR theorists are practically oblivious to the broad externalities the 
restorative element of their philosophy might spawn: despite warnings that it is now much too late to 
“give back Manhattan,”342 some insist that nothing short of the dissolution of the U.S. will suffice if we 
are to “tak[e] seriously morality and justice.”343  If politics is the art of the possible,344 a theory that insists 
on the dismemberment of the modern-day U.S. or other forms of “radical social surgery” 345is too fantastic 
to be given serious consideration as a political proposal.
Furthermore, if JAR may conceivably go too far in pressing for land restoration, like JAC theory 
it does not go far enough toward facilitating Indian self-determination because it does not recognize, let 
alone engage, federal Indian law as the primary variable preventing the balancing of the moral equation.  
Compensation and apologies, gestures potentially part of an amicable settlement, do not contribute 
directly to the reinvestiture of sovereignty in Indian tribes.  Only a comprehensive program of legal 
reform that dispenses with doctrines and precedents perpetuating the denial of Indian rights will create the 
preconditions for Indian self-determination.346  As law, more than any other social variable, has 
(re)produced the subordination of Indians,347 legal reform occupies central position in a theory of Indian 
340 See WARD CHURCHILL, STRUGGLE FOR THE LAND 377 (2002) (“[E]very major Indian land recovery initiative . . . the 
Western Shoshone, those in Maine, the Black Hills, the Oneida claims in New York State are prime examples . . . has been met 
with a propaganda barrage from right-wing organizations ranging from the Ku Klux Klan to the John Birch Society[.]”).
341 See PETER S. TEMES, THE JUST WAR 175-76 (2003) (warning of this risk in regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict). 
342 See Martha Minow, Why Retry? Reviving Dormant Racial Justice Claims, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1133, 1139 (2003) (warning 
proponents of racial justice to be wary of proposals that demand the politically impossible, such as the restoration of Manhattan 
to Indian sovereignty nearly four centuries after its sale for unconscionably low consideration).
343
 Corlett, supra note 283, at 155; see also CHURCHILL, supra note 340, at 382 (calling for land restoration even if it should 
lead to the destruction of the U.S. “megastate”); Noel Pearson, Reconciliation: To Be or Not To Be: Separate Aboriginal 
Nationhood or Aboriginal Self-Determination and Self-Government Within the Australian Nation?, 3 ABORIGINAL L. BULL. 
14, 15 (1993) (noting that many JAR theorists regard any compromise on land restoration as a betrayal of the indigenous cause); 
Russell Means, TREATY Program (advocating total restoration of Indian lands), available at http://www.russellmeans.com.
344 See R.A. BUTLER, THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE (1971) (describing politics as the “art of the possible.”).
345 See Lyons, supra note 275, at 249 (using this phrase to describe extreme land restoration proposals).
346
 Events in the Balkans, the former Soviet Union, Africa, Afghanistan, and elsewhere raise “radical questions about the 
legitimacy of law and the nature of legal order.”  DAVID DYZENHAUS, ED., LAW AS POLITICS: CARL SCHMITT’S 
CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM 13 (1988).  Indigenous peoples across the globe, burdened by legal precedents and doctrines that 
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for critical revision of U.S. law is no less compelling: doctrines given permanent place in the legal pantheon reduce tribes to mere 
wards under the trust of a fickle Congress with plenary power to terminate their legal existence.  See M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 
(establishing Indian tribes as diminished sovereigns); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. at 17 (establishing trust responsibility 
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 See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus’ Legacy: Law as an Instrument of Racial Discrimination Against Indigenous Poeples’ 
Rights of Self-Determination, 8 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 51 (1991) (detailing legal subordination of indigenous peoples).
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justice.348  Thus, while much of JAR theory is germane, neither it nor the other theories surveyed accord 
the full measure of relief or provide as accurate a diagnosis of the problem as is necessary to generate 
effective solutions.  Part III offers a theoretical alternative.
III. Justice as Indigenism: An American Indian Theory of Justice
“Complaint is just toward friends who have failed in their duty; accusation is against enemies guilty of injustice.” 349
A.  General Theoretical Premises
Because the past and present effects of a rapacious, bloody, and dishonorable history are factual 
and moral predicates to the Indian claim for redress, the theory of Justice as Indigenism350 [“JAI”] is 
committed to the premise that the development and application of a theory of Indian justice must not and 
cannot be undertaken except in full cognizance of the history of U.S.-Indian relations.351 Although other 
groups have claims upon the U.S., JAI rests upon the additional premise that Indians, by virtue of their 
existence on American soil prior to the founding of the U.S. and the unbidden arrival of all other social 
groups352 as well as the unavailability of a “homeland” abroad to which they could seek shelter from the 
vicissitudes of U.S. majoritarian politics and law,353 are entitled to primacy, if not special consideration, in 
the examination and evaluation of their claims for redress.354
Third, JAI ventures into terrain heretofore unmapped by insisting that a major project of legal 
reforms designed to cabin plenary power, restore a meaningful measure of self-government to Indian 
tribes, and make the nation safe for the peaceful coexistence of basic value-differences between peoples is 
a necessary, if not sufficient, step toward the attainment of justice for Indians.  Legislation and even 
constitutional amendments to strengthen protection of Indian cultural and property rights, tighten judicial 
canons of construction, and incorporate legal principles protective of the rights of Indians are within the 
contemplation of this indigenist approach to justice.
Fourth, although it asserts the primacy of Indian rights and challenges the legitimacy of U.S. 
dominion over Indians, JAI rejects the substitution of one ethnocentric perspective on justice for another: 
348
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in North America.” CHURCHILL, supra note 340, at 367.
351 See Tyron J. Sheppard & Richard Nevins, Constitutional Equality—Reparations At Last, 22 U.W.L.A. L. REV. 105, 127-28 
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the [harms.]”); see also Report to the President from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United States in the 
Prosecution of Axis War Criminals, June 7, 1945, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 178, 184 (1945) (advocating documentation of 
atrocities “with such authenticity and in such detail that there can be no responsible denial of these crimes in the future[.]”).
352 See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Not “Strictly” Racial: A Response to “Indians as Peoples,” 39 UCLA L. REV. 169, 184 
(1991) (“Unlike most other ethnic groups, whose ancestors came to the [U.S.] understanding that they would be participating in a 
multicultural community, the ancestors of native people made no such commitment[.]”); ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF 
INDIANS IN THE UNITED STATES vii-viii (1970) (“The dominant race can never forget that [Indians] were here first[.]”).
353 See Kenneth Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C.L. REV. 303, 337-40, 356 (1986)) 
(“Unlike other American ethnic groups, Indians cannot rely on perpetuation of their tradition in a home country abroad.”). 
354 See, e.g., Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 
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[Indians].”); THOMPSON, supra note 284, at xi (conceding that doing justice for Indians may “clash with a duty to make society 
more equitable for all citizens” but suggesting Indians have claims to remedial priority).
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without compromising Indian rights to lands and self-determination, JAI amalgamates indigenous 
traditions and values and treats reconciliation between disparate yet interdependent peoples, rather than 
prescription of a formula for the distribution of social resources or the administration of punishment or 
vengeance, as the appropriate teleology of a theory of justice for Indians.355  For JAI, the healing of the 
American nation and the joint authorship of a peaceful and harmonious future—not simply the redress of 
Indian claims—are crucial objectives.
Fifth, although it rejects the tendency to essentialize Indians as an undifferentiated population 
with a uniform bloc of interests, JAI contends that a pan-Indian consensus does in fact exist as to a set of 
shared objectives the attainment of which is central to the project of Indian justice and that the most 
important of these are a just resolution to Indian land claims and the investment of the notion of Indian 
self-determination with real meaning.356  At the same time, JAI is specifically tailored to the requirements 
of justice for Indians, and generalization to the question of justice on behalf of other groups must proceed 
with caution and the benefit of rigorous contextual research and analysis.
Finally, and perhaps somewhat paradoxically in light of the preceding proposition, JAI cautions 
that the application of a theory of Indian justice generates moral consequences not merely in the sphere of
U.S.-Indian relations but internationally.  JAI insists that if its political and legal system cannot or will not 
afford justice to its original inhabitants, the U.S., no matter how presently committed to justice on behalf 
of other social groups foreign and domestic, must concede that the aspirations of its founders to “establish 
Justice” in a constitutional republic in which “all men are created equal” before the law and into which 
they invested their “sacred Honor”357 have been sacrificed at the altar of an avaricious Indian policy.358  In 
other words, JAI theory posits that the legitimacy of the U.S. and its leadership in international relations 
is a function of the extent to which it affords, and is perceived to afford, justice to Indians.
 B.  JAI Applied: The Redress of Indian Claims for Genocide, Ethnocide, and Land Expropriation
As applied, JAI commits its practitioners to a sequential process consisting of seven distinct 
stages: acknowledgment, apology, peacemaking, commemoration, compensation, land restoration, legal 
reformation, and reconciliation.  While each and every step marches closer toward Indian justice, failure 
to press onward to each subsequent objective foreshortens remedial possibilities. Only upon reaching the 
final destination—which is in reality the promise of a shared journey—can JAI be said to be complete.  
1.  Acknowledgement: The American Indian Reconciliation Commission
“[W]e should not fear to cast the light of day on this murky chapter of our nation’s past[.]”359
355
 The claim that a theory of justice on behalf of indigenous peoples must “respond to voices” from within the indigenous 
community and not simply draw upon Western moral, legal, and political theory occupies a prominent place in the scholarship of 
several theorists as well as in this Article.  See, e.g., Poole, supra note 299, at 5.
356 See CORNELL, supra note 328, at 152-56 (mapping interests of Indians across a series of issue-areas and dimensions).  This 
Article is solely the assessment of the author and does not purport to stand as the official proposal of any Indian tribe or 
individual.  Indian opinion ranges broadly, and while many Indians surely subscribe to the proposals and recommendations 
offered under the rubric JAI, some may prefer other approaches.  Part of the process of doing justice by Indians will certainly be 
reconciliation between, and within, Indian tribes, and each and every Indian voice should be granted the opportunity to speak.
357 See U.S. CONST., Preamble (1789).
358
 The notion that democratic legitimacy and the treatment of Indians are linked is not new.  See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, The 
Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953, 62 YALE L. J. 348, 390 (1953) (“[O]ur treatment of Indians, even more t han our treatment 
of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith.”).
359 Fort Sill Apache Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 477 F.2d 1360 (1973) (Nichols, J., dissenting).
42
Although most Americans disavow the malignant racism that inspired their forefathers,360 they 
remain a remarkably presentist people, particularly with regard to the factual and moral understandings of 
the events marking the “discovery,” formation, and expansion of their nation.361  This ahistoricism has dire 
consequences for Indian redress, particularly where claims are asserted on unfamiliar intellectual terrain 
and arise out of violations of complex historical agreements “rather than being ignited by the fire of the 
moment[.]”362  Without a firm understanding of the nexus between past acts of injustice coupled with the 
present effects of a legal order erected to serve the conqueror on the one hand and the Indian claim for 
redress on the other, it is all too easy for existing theories of justice—particularly JAS, and to a lesser 
extent JAC—to treat Indian claims as pleas for distributional justice rather than as moral arguments 
demanding the internalization of the consequences of this unjust history.  Displacement of a mythical 
version of national genesis in favor of the truth is therefore required in order to erode the theoretical bases 
of U.S. sovereignty and control over Indian people, culture, and land.  Even for those non-Indians willing 
and eager to make amends, “legal amnesia” interposes between Indian claims for redress and a legal and 
political order that has denied justice for centuries.363
Therefore, the first step in applying JAI theory is the retelling and re-envisioning of U.S.-Indian 
relations from “objective” perspectives as well as from the cultural viewpoint of the victims of that 
history.364  Indian claims stories—rich sources of oral history that contextualize and humanize the Indian 
experience while revealing the inadequacies of the record as it has been constructed—can be a powerful 
source of liberation for all Americans.  To enable national demythification, Congress should pass 
legislation to establish and fund an independent TRC365 charged with (1) investigating Indian claims 
afresh; (2) allowing Indian voices to enrich and debunk the sanitized national record with their oral 
histories; and (3) persuading the U.S. to formally acknowledge the wrongs inflicted upon Indians over the 
period since 1776 and enable the telling of a new national creation-story.
360
 While racism is still too much with us, there is reason to hope that its prevalence and intensity are in gradual decline.  Still, 
Indian tribes and people remain targets of legal, political, and popular discourse that can properly be described by no other term.  
For an examination of the infiltration of anti-Indian attitudes into legal and political spaces, see Robert A. Williams, Jr., 
Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of 
Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237, 258-78 (1989).
361
 For too long, the American national myth has swept genocide, land theft, and ethnocide under the national rug.  See Michael 
Schudson, Dynamics of Distortion in Collective Memory, in MEMORY DISTORTION: HOW MINDS, BRAINS, AND 
SOCIETIES RECONSTRUCT THE PAST 346 (Daniel Schacter ed., 1995) (“If you recall the [Indian Wars] . . . as part of the 
history of nation-building, it is one story; if you recall it as part of a history of racism it is another.”).
362
 Charles Wilkinson, To Feel the Summer in the Spring: The Treaty Fishing Rights of the Wisconsin Chippewa, 1991 WISC. L. 
REV. 375.
363 See Aviam Soifer, Objects in the Mirror Are Closer Than They Appear, 28 GA. L. REV. 533, 553 (1994) (labeling “failures of 
memory” that resulting in the discounting of Indian claims for redress “legal amnesia” and characterizing this process as an act of 
indeliberate injustice).  Unconscious psychological processes shield individuals from the pain of awareness of past atrocities and 
prevent them from having to grapple with present obligations to provide redress.  Martha Minow, The Work of re-Membering: 
After Genocide and Mass Atrocity, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 429, 429 (1999).
364 See Aviam Soifer, Redress, Progress, and the Benchmark Problem, 40 B.C. L. REV. 525, 526 (1998) (“The prevailing 
presumption is that somehow, sometime—perhaps when we weren’t paying attention—sufficient justice and equality came to 
prevail.  Therefore . . . we all now enjoy an equal, fair start in the cosmic race of life.  We hold tightly to this credo as if it were 
self-evident, no matter what the actual evidence may be.”)
365 See Wacks, supra note 315, at 221-24 (suggesting that although federal, State, and local governments would assist with 
funding and logistics any TRC created to advance the cause of racial reconciliation in the U.S. must retain formal independence 
in order to preserve neutrality and functionality); see also Rose Weston, Facing the Past, Facing the Future: Applying the Truth 
Commission Model to the Historic Treatment of Native Americans in the United States, 18 AZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L 1017 
(2001) (discussing proposal to create such a TRC).
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Membership of the American Indian Reconciliation Commission [“AIRC”] would consist of 
equal numbers of Indians and non-Indians and include tribal chairpersons and national elected officials; 
jurists, lawyers, and scholars versant in federal Indian law, tribal legal systems, and indigenous rights 
regimes; and clergy.  Drawing upon the experiences of precedent TRCs, AIRC would identify sites across 
the U.S., such as Indian reservations, major urban centers with significant Indian populations, and 
universities, where fora would be established to which tribes and individual Indians could submit requests 
to testify.366   Requests might be reduced to writing on a standard form, filed with the closest forum, and 
considered by a committee established for that purpose.
AIRC would broadcast hearings and testimony on public media and a website, and transcripts 
would be circulated in newspapers to facilitate transparency and the wide dissemination of Indian stories.  
Although certain testimony, such as oral histories of the massacres of defenseless Indian civilians that 
have been passed down through the generations, might shock listeners,367 since nothing could conceivably 
implicate living persons in any criminal activity AIRC need not keep secret witness identities, nor would 
it need to grant amnesty.  Victims would receive a certificate recognizing their contribution to truthtelling 
and reconciliation.368  Upon conclusion of its hearings, AIRC would send a Final Report to Congress and 
the President with nonbinding remedial recommendations, to include apologies, compensation, land 
restoration, and other measures to promote and protect self-determination.
B. Apologies
“Any good thing you say to me shall not be forgotten.”369
The second step in the application of JAI to the question of Indian justice is the grant of an 
apology to Indians.  JAI assumes that the AIRC hearings are likely to cause many citizens to experience 
the moral taint of the history of U.S. treatment of Indians for the first time.370  After persuading many 
citizens to acknowledge harm to Indian tribes and individuals, AIRC should next direct the U.S. to relieve 
the burden of its national guilt-complex371 while advancing the process toward forgiveness by 
recommending in its Final Report that the U.S. government issue a formal apology, on behalf of the U.S. 
and all its citizens past and present, as symbolic recognition of the role of public and private actors in past 
acts of genocide, land theft, and ethnocide.372  National church and corporate boards might apologize for 
366
 For those unable or unwilling to testify publicly, testimony might be taken through deposition, affidavit, or by other means.
367
 If testimony does not disturb, it does not serve truthtelling or deterrence.  See Minow, supra note 342, at 429 (“if we are not 
shocked . . . we have forgotten to remember, ‘Never again.’”).
368 See Wacks, supra note 315, at 233.
369
 Ten Bears, Comanche.
370
 “Moral taint” is defined as the complex of emotions and thoughts experienced by a group of persons who come to accept an 
“association with wrongful behavior over which they had no control and therefore for which, under traditional individualistic 
premises, they carry no blame.”  Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 709.
371
 WHITE, supra note 210, at 273.
372
 An apology need not address contemporary effects of past discrimination to initiate reconciliation; to do so might trench upon 
terrain too sensitive for a present-day majority whose willingness to concede national fallibility may be merely retrospective.  An 
apology might track with the letter accompanying compensation to Japanese Americans:
The United States acknowledges the historic significance of its illegal and immoral actions and expresses its deep 
regret to the Indian people.  Money and words alone cannot restore lost ancestors or lands, or erase painful memories; 
neither can they fully convey American resolve to rectify injustice, but the U.S. recognizes that serious injustices were 
done to Indians over the course of the creation and expansion of the U.S.  In enacting a law calling for restitution and 
reconciliation and offering a sincere apology, your fellow Americans have, in a very real sense, renewed their 
traditional commitment to the ideals of freedom, equality, and justice.  The Nation humbly asks for your forgiveness.
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acts in which these institutions were complicit.373  An appropriate apology must incorporate recognition of 
a corresponding moral, if not legal, obligation to negotiate the next stage of JAI: peacemaking.
C. Peacemaking
“If their minds are clean, and if they are obedient and promise to obey . . . they shall be welcome.” 374
1.  Cultural Hermeneutics
If a theory of justice is to span the chasm between peoples, ideas, and objectives, its enunciation 
and implementation will require negotiation.375  Although their resilience is unquestionable after a half-
millennium of extreme challenges, Indian tribes are now too numerically and militarily inferior to impose 
solutions by force; on the other hand, reason, principle, moral obligations, and the aspirational values of a 
constitutional, republic erected upon prior sovereigns with whom it is interdependent conspire to restrain 
the U.S.376  While the conflict has been waged primarily on battlefields and in courtrooms, the origins are 
rooted largely in cultural differences difficult to exaggerate: the “problem of learning how meaning in one 
system of expression is expressed in another” is one of the “most difficult tasks we confront in a 
multicultural world.”377  Recognition of mutual sovereignty—a companion obligation to the establishment 
of a multicultural ethic of respect—will require a cross-cultural hermeneutics, which in turn mandates the 
clearing of barriers to communication and the sharing of stories, fears, hopes, and dreams.  By restoring a 
large measure of legal personality to Indian tribes,378 identifying shared interests obscured by history and 
emotion, tempering tendencies toward extremism, and tutoring both parties in the common humanity of 
each other, U.S.-Indian negotiations can usher in a new era of peace and justice. Fittingly, the ancient 
Indian method of dispute resolution known as Tribal Peacemaking (“TPM”)379 can guide the journey 
toward greater mutual understanding and trust.
373
 Eric Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: Agency, Responsibility, and Interracial Justice, 3 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 33, 70 (1995).
374
 The Law of Great Peace, Iroquois (1750)
375
 Currently, a federal statute prevents recognition of Indian tribes as nations with whom the U.S. may contract by treaty.  See
Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §71 (1994).  Repeal of this statute—a demand of many 
Indian tribes—would revive the principle of mutual sovereignty and infuse negotiations with the ethics of mutual respect and 
consent so vital to the process of atonement, forgiveness, and reconciliation. See Vine Deloria, Jr., Reserving to Themselves: 
Treaties and the Powers of Indian Tribes, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 963, 970-72, 979-80 (1996) (arguing that the historical treaty 
process should serve as a template for a contemporary framework of U.S.-tribal negotiations between mutual sovereigns).
376 See ANAYA, supra note 104, at 130 (stressing that where a state acquired its sovereignty by displacing original sovereigns it 
incurs the obligation—moral if not necessarily legal—to “foster the capacity of Natives to govern their own communities as well 
as contribute to the development of all our peoples, indigenous or immigrant.”).  Constitutional republics are particularly 
committed, at least as a matter of political theory, to tolerating dissent as a bulwark against repressive hierarchy.  Daniel A. 
Farber, Richmond and Republicanism, 41 FLA. L. REV. 623 (1989) (noting commitments of neo-republican governments to 
tolerance of dissent and negotiated compromise).  Persuasion, in contrast to domination, is currency of the realm in the liberal 
constitutional republic, and the most convertible denomination is U.S.  See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 348, at 107 (stating 
that because in democracies the laws are reflective of the will of the people, those who wish to modify the laws must “either 
change the opinion of the nation, or trample upon its decision”).
377
 Williams, supra note _, at 1039-49.
378 See Frickey, supra note 71, at 1783-84 (aguing that negotiation on neutral sites, in contrast to adjudication in the courts of the 
conqueror, grants subordinated groups equal ownership of, and responsibility for, the resolution of their disputes with the 
dominant power); Rebecca Tsosie, Negotiating Economic Survival: The Consent Principle and Tribal-State Compacts Under the 
Indian Gaming Act, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 25, 35- 37 (1997) (contending that because the exercise of majoritarian political preference 
dictates that tribal rights cannot be fairly adjudicated in courts of the United States, negotiation, though also risky, is the only path 
through the minefield of power and prejudice).  Still, while the post-Cold War era is a fruitful moment to discuss enlargement of 
the international legal personality of nonstate actors as international law becomes ever-more concerned with the “ought” and not 
simply with the “is,” the U.S. has not committed to the vision of mutual sovereignty advocated by these Indian scholars.
379 See Phyllis E. Bernard, Community and Conscience, The Dynamic Challenge of Lawyers’ Ethics in Tribal Peacemaking, 27 
U. TOL. L. REV. 821, 835 (1996) (defining TPM as “any system of dispute resolution used within [an Indian] community which 
utilizes non-adversarial strategies . . . [and] incorporates some traditional or customary approaches . . . the aim of which is 
conciliation and the restoration of peace and harmony.”).  TPM weds ancient and abiding values to dispute resolution techniques 
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2.  Tribal Peacemaking (TPM)
TPM heals wounds by publicly and ceremonially deploying spiritual380 norms and collected tribal 
wisdom, listening compassionately to the widest possible circle of people, and reminding participants of 
their relational obligations to one another.381  Rather than address only disputants, TPM balances the 
intellectual, emotional, and physical dimensions of the entire tribe on its journey toward restoration.382
Despite its nonpunitive foundations,383 TPM can provide effective redress for offenses as serious as 
robbery, rape, and murder.384
a.  procedures
TPM reflects the interests of parties against the backdrop of tribal norms, and behavior-altering 
mechanisms—anger, shame,385 embarrassment, and encouragement—modify negotiating positions and 
guide parties toward harmony.  Neither lawyers nor judges are present.  All who know the parties or are 
familiar with the history of the dispute are required to sit together in a circle.386  The oral procedure is 
supervised by a “peacemaker” who is an exemplar of tribal virtues387 yet possesses merely persuasive 
rather than compulsory powers: his obligations do not extend further than inducing people to talk to one 
another by exemplifying tribal values and ways.388  The peacemaker is not neutral: he or she has the 
respect of the parties, who are frequently related to him or her by blood or marriage.389  Thus, the parties 
appropriate to the pluralist context in which tribes are now situated.  It profoundly transformed Indian conceptions of justice since 
its reintroduction in the 1970s.  Although the particular dispute resolution methods employed by any particular tribe are distinct 
as from every other in that they are the experiential products of the unique culture, history, and wisdom of that tribe, it is possible 
to describe TPM in theoretical abstract.  
380
 TPM recognizes no separation of religious and secular, and supernatural power is directed to overcome disharmony and 
reestablish order.  Philmer Bluehouse & James W. Zion, Hozhooji Naat’aanii: The Navajo Justice and Harmony Ceremony, 10 
MEDIATION Q. 327, 332 (1993).
381 See Dianne LeResche, Editor’s Notes, Native American Perpsectives on Peacemaking, 10 MEDIATION Q. 321, 321 (1993).
382 Id. at 321-22. TPM is rarely used in disputes between members of different tribes. See Michael D. Lieder, Navajo Dispute 
Resolution and Promissory Obligations: Continuity and Change in The Largest Native American Nation, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
1, 16 (1993) (noting that where outsiders are involved in disputes with members of Indian tribes, particularly where physical 
injuries are involved, the absence of common ties of kinship, religion, community, and ethos that drive the process of Indian 
dispute resolution and encourage parties to remove the conflict from the adversarial plane tend to preclude the success of such an 
enterprise); see also Daniel W. Van Ness & Pat Nolan, Legislating for Restorative Justice, 10 REG. U. L. REV. 53, 53 (1998) 
(noting that while elements of TPM, termed “restorative justice,” have been introduced into non-Indian contexts such as family 
group conferences, “community injury,” and victim/offender mediation, these efforts have not met with anticipated success, 
largely because urbanized, atomized settings do not offer the “spiritual glue” of communal obligations to condition individual 
conduct).  In essence, so central to the successful functioning is the commitment to shared tribal values and responsibilities that 
extension of TPM beyond the boundaries of the reservation or beyond the subject matter of disputes between tribal members is 
inherently problematic.  Nonetheless, where individuals are linked not by membership in a political community but by common 
commitments to justice and to restoration, TPM retains its potential to heal. See generally William C. Bradford, Reclaiming 
Indigenous Legal Autonomy on the Path to Peaceful Coexistence: the Theory, Practice, and Limitations of Tribal Peacemaking, 
76 N. DAKOTA L. REV. 551 (2000).
383
 TPM is decidedly nonpunitive in its philosophical underpinnings: in contrast to state adjudication, no central authority can 
directly apply coercion to enforce the collective will.  Id.
384 See Lieder, supra note 382, at 17-18
385 See Carole E. Goldberg, Overextended Borrowing: Tribal Peacemaking Applied in Non-Indian Disputes, 72 WASH. L. REV. 
1003, 1015 (1997) (describing how, within the tightly interconnected tribe, the technique of shaming—calling down personal 
criticism upon one who deviates from group norms—can induce those who wish to remain accepted within the tribe to modify 
contrarian positions in order to bring themselves into a state of harmony with others).
386 See Bernard, supra note 379, at 830.
387 See LeResche, supra note 381, at 321 (demonstrating that one of the most important criteria in the selection of “leaders” of 
traditional Indian tribal societies was skill in mediating intragroup hostility).  Research suggests that selection as leaders of those 
with skill in dispute resolution may be a common characteristic of the tribal level of sociopolitical organization.  See, e.g., Walter 
Otto Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case of the “Gypsies,” 103 YALE L. J. 323, 352-53 (1993) 
(identifying the main criteria for chiefdom among the Roma as “intelligence and a sense of fairness” in resolving group disputes).
388 See Costello, supra note 181, at 887
389 See Bluehouse & Zion, supra note 380, at 329 (explaining that the “core of common law” of Indian legal systems is the 
“lineage system,” a method of tracing relationships and adjusting disputes between people with the assistance of clan and family 
members whose influence constituted a form of “ingrained emotional cement.”).
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are strongly inclined to follow proffered “guidance”390 encouraging them to live up to their communal 
responsibilities, grant apologies and restitution,391 and depart “with their tails up [rather than one] with a 
tail up, one with a tail down.”392
b.  peacemaker
The peacemaker typically enters the peace circle393 to lead a prayer summoning the aid of the 
supernatural and framing the attitudes of the parties.  The peacemaker then listens to all subjective points 
of view to determine the reasons for disharmony.  In loosely structured discussion, feelings and emotions
are recognized as equally important to reason, and all persons are required to directly confront the full 
consequences of their actions, including the injustice done and the resultant harm.394  Emphasizing future 
relations rather than the legal consequences of past events, the peacemaker (1) presents a lecture on how 
or why the parties have violated tribal values and breached tribal solidarity,395 (2) leads a discussion of 
practical means whereby the parties can end the dispute, and (3) suggests how all can conform future 
conduct to values reflective of tribal relational aspects and rights to justice and harmony.
c.  remedies
Remedies are generally implemented without resistance.  As agreements are the product of a 
consensus, the personal honor and communal obligation of the wrongdoer(s) is pre-enlisted in support of 
compliance.  Further, TPM recruits extended family and friends as “probation officers” with 
“responsibility to the victims and communities to prevent the wrongdoer from causing further harm.”396
Moreover, given the powerful psychological sanctions available to the tribe in the form of ridicule, 
ostracism, and banishment, a wrongdoer’s need to remain in good stead is easily exploited.397
390 See id. at 332.  For the peacemaker there is explicit stress upon an affirmative, interventionist role in maneuvering parties back 
to harmony by reference to traditional values.  In the language of mainstream alternative dispute resolution, the TPM peacemaker 
can be cast as a directive and activist mediator whose expertise in the particular substantive domain in which the dispute occurs 
permits him to thrust himself into the conflict and make judicious use of persuasion, influence, and judgments to achieve concrete 
settlement of an otherwise elusive problem.  Nevertheless, TPM is neither mediation nor arbitration as understood by the Western 
mind as such terms do not capture its inherently spiritual, communal, and restorative essence.  Id.  at 335.
391 See ANDERSON, supra note 235  (noting that TPM almost never offers the guilt of the accused as the “question presented”; 
rather, the gap separating parties is generally the amount of restitution, either material or services, to be paid, and this amount is 
the subject of bargaining, negotiation, and intervention by the peacemaker).
392
 LeResche, supra note 381, at 322
393
 The circle is sacred in many Indian religions as the circle of life, a “delicate thread that unites all living things.”  Darla J. 
Mondou, Our Land is What Makes Us Who We Are: Timber Harvesting on Tribal Reservations After the NIFRMA, 21 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 259, 259 91997).  The path of life follows a circular progression and thus does not have a beginning and an end 
in linear time but is part of a journey connected to all other living things.  Use of the circle in TPM expresses spiritual rootedness 
to all creation: every person sitting in the circle focuses upon the peacemaker who moves the dispute from the circumference to 
the center so all four quadrants (spiritual, emotional, physical, and intellectual) reenter balance and recomprise a united whole.
394
 “[TPM] addresses denial, minimalization and externalization in ways that [mainstream] systems cannot do.  In a given 
[mainstream] system, proving the facts of a case is difficult and burdensome.  In criminal systems with the privilege against self-
incrimination, defendants cannot be compelled to discuss motives, attitudes, . . . or causes of misconduct.  In [TPM], which does 
not utilize punishment, people are free to “talk out” the problem fully and get at the psychological barriers which impede a 
practical solution.”  Zion & Yazzie, supra note 34, at 81.
395 See Cruz, supra note 144, at 581-82.  Breaches of tribal solidarity are occasioned by individuals who place greater emphasis 
upon their needs and desires than they do upon the interests of the tribe.  Id.
396
 Costello, supra note 181, at 899-900.
397
 Research at the intersection between political economics and anthropology suggests that the tribe performs an essential 
insurance function by facilitating survival tasks that can only be performed in teams: tribal members, in exchange for this 
insurance, grant their loyalty unreservedly.  As a product of these mutually advantageous intratribal interactions and the ease of 
observing and transmitting information and norms within the small community, the problem of monitoring to prevent free-riding 
inherent in team production disappears.  Not only does the tribe reduce or eliminate bad-faith incentives to opportunism or 
cheating, but expulsion, ostracism, and other forms of collective refusal to deal, highly effective sanctions given the importance 
of individual reputation in a small interdependent circle, are far more efficient than formal legal enforcement mechanisms. 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 245-47 (1979).  Research into 
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d.  U.S.-Indian TPM Conference (USITPMC)
The U.S.-Indian TPM Conference (“USITPMC) would be conducted shortly after AIRC 
concluded its final report and before the drafting of proposed legislative reforms.  USITPMC might enlist 
the most respected elder Indian and non-Indian statesmen as peacemakers to supervise, lead, and guide 
negotiations as to remedies for the redress of Indian claims.398  Such persons would collect and merge 
spiritual and secular values common to both Indian and non-Indian cultures and urge negotiators to 
envision a future when all U.S. citizens, Indian and non-Indian, are full and equal members of one great 
nation.  Peacemakers would urge the U.S. to confront again the history of genocide, land theft, and 
ethnocide, renew the apology to Indian tribes and people, and suggest remedies that would restore dignity 
and demonstrate a genuine desire to live up to the highest values enshrined in the Declaration of 
Independence.  Peacemakers would also encourage Indian nations to express their suffering but to be 
forgiving and willing to start relations with the U.S. anew, freed of the burdens of a painful history.  
USITPMC might meet at a series of venues, including sacred tribal lands and U.S. retreats such as Camp 
David.  Although the recommendations of USITPMC need not be binding, remedies agreed upon could 
be committed to paper and transmitted to Congress as the basis for legislative action.
D.  Commemoration
“It does not require many words to speak the truth.” 399
The next step in the process of implementing JAI theory—commemoration of the history of 
genocide, land theft, and ethnocide—is necessary to ensure that future generations will neither forget nor 
perpetuate the injustice toward the original inhabitants of the U.S.  Erection of monuments at sites of 
Indian genocide400 and on the National Mall,401 naming of public buildings and parks after Indians of 
historical significance, and creation of a wing in the National Museum of the American Indian with 
specific focus on the gross human injustices suffered by Indian people will serve these transformative and 
deterrent purposes.402  Posthumous pardons should be granted to Indians executed for resisting genocide 
other tribal legal systems supports the finding that psychological pressure is at least as effective in securing compliance as the 
formal institutions of state coercion.  See Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 387, at 358-59 (noting that among the Roma, the 
permanent sentence of marime (“impurity” requiring ostracism) is the equivalent of a death penalty since the permanent outcast, 
subjected to the shunning of the entire Roma community, is frequently driven to suicide); see also Posner, supra this note, at 182 
n.144 (describing how Amish wrongdoers make public confessions lest they be shunned, a fate which results in the deviant 
member becoming a social pariah with whom no one will eat, speak, or do business).
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 Peacemakers would not be granted authority to commit their respective nations unless agreed-to prior to USITPM.
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 Chief Joseph, Nez Perce.
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 The value of memorials to the preservation of history and the attitudinal reform of citizens is inestimable.  In 1881 the U.S. set 
aside land to honor U.S. soldiers of the 7th Cavalry who fell  with Custer at the Battle of the Little Bighorn River in 1878.  No 
mention was made of the Indian soldiers whose victory checked, even if for a short time, the advance of settlers into their lands.  
However, in 1991, the U.S. renamed Custer Battlefield as Little Bighorn Battlefield and hired an Indian as Superintendent, and in 
November1999 groundbreaking for the Indian Memorial at Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument.  The Indian Memorial 
will include a “spirit gate” to welcome all the dead and, according to its designer, to “symbolize the mutual understanding of the 
infinite all the dead posses.”  See Bert Gildart, Two Sides of Little Bighorn, MIL. HIST. (June 2001), at 27-28.  According to 
curator Kitty Deernose, “Everyone feels more welcome now for the story includes comments from those who won rather than by 
just those who lost.  Ironically, people from all ethnic groups seem to like that.”  Id.  Many more such memorials could dot the 
U.S. landscape: AIRC should recommend sites to Congress where memorials to other gross injustices can be created.
401
 Critics might find in this an example of a “memorial fever” sweeping the nation and causing interest groups to “fiercely 
compete for space on the most hallowed memorial space in the nation[.]”  Elaine Sciolino, Fighting For Space in Memorial 
Heaven, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 28, 2001, at A18 (noting critics who claim that a “growing tendency to memorialize individual 
groups” and to “car[ve] the nation in ever-thinner slices of hyphenated Americans divides rather than unites the country.”).
402
 The National Holocaust Museum might serve as a model for a planned National Museum of the American Indian.  See 20 
U.S.C. §§80q to 80q-15 (“National Museum of the Indian Act”) (Supp. 1990).  Exhibits might include original copies of U.S-
Indian treaties along with subsequent histories and specific dates and circumstances of U.S. breaches.  Histories of tribes, from 
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and land expropriation.403  Establishment and funding of cultural, historical,404 linguistic, and religious 
centers405 will regenerate sources of tribal cohesion while offering non-Indians the opportunity to adjust 
their perceptions of Indian culture and religion toward understanding and tolerance.  While the object of 
JAI theory is to unite rather than to divide peoples, the mythical version of history from which the 
genocide, land theft, and ethnocide of Indians has been redacted no longer functions as political adhesive.  
Historical revision, in the most visible and tangible manner possible, is necessary to restore the 
gravitational force between disparate groups in the American polity, and, particularly where history has 
not been co-authored by subordinated groups, memorials are an appropriate way to initiate this process.
In sum, commemoration will concretize the findings of AIRC and the USITPM and inscribe the 
unvarnished history of U.S.-Indian relations in the minds and hearts of successive generations of 
Americans, both Indian and non-Indian.  Thus, commemoration functions as a sort of moral commitment 
device that speaks the message, “Never again,” in a language accessible to all.
E.  Compensation
“Do not touch the money of the white man or his clothes.  We do not fight for these things.  The Seminole is fighting for his 
hunting grounds.” 406
It is impossible to objectively quantify the value of the injuries inflicted upon Indian people over 
history, and morally odious to try.407  Moreover, compensation cannot reach, let alone discharge, the 
wrongful deaths of ancestors, the denial of the use of tribal lands and resources, and legal assaults on 
Indian religions, languages, and cultures.  These harms can never be repaired with money, and JAI theory 
would regard any wealth transfer from the U.S. as a symbolic act undertaken in further recognition of 
moral responsibility, rather than a settlement of claims for loss, grief, and trauma.  Although endowment 
of a fund sufficient to allow tribes to repurchase some lands and to serve as a social support net for the 
poorest Indian individuals, and in particular off-reservation Indians who do not presently enjoy the legal, 
medical, and educational entitlements their tribal counterparts receive,408 would not be incompatible with 
first contact to dispossession and genocide to the present, could be preserved in rich detail.  Names of Indian individuals 
murdered might be inscribed on a national register, and certificates could be issued to descendants of each victim 
commemorating the circumstances of their deaths.  Indian curators with tribal cultural and historical knowledge would play an 
important role in the establishment and development of all aspects of the Museum, which is scheduled to open in fall 2004.
403 See Steven Braun, Clemency for Hanged Man Delivers Justice Long Awaited, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 2001, at A10 (noting 
Maryland gubernatorial grant of posthumous pardon to black man executed for rape of white woman in 1917 after a trial held in a 
climate of mob violence); Chomsky, supra note 61 (discussing execution of Dakota warriors for defending their territories from 
invasion by the U.S. in violation of a treaty).
404
 Existing institutions might be assisted in discharging this function, possibly as a central archive with satellite branches across 
the U.S. and in tribal colleges or in consortium with other institutions.  See, e.g., the D’Arcy McNickle Center for American 
Indian History of the Newberry Library, the foremost institution for Indian studies (http://www.newberry.org).
405
 As the cost of higher education is one of the greatest obstacles to Indian students, scholarship grants to attend the thirty-three 
Indian tribal colleges and universities would be appropriate.  The American Indian Higher Education Consortium, an 
organization founded in 1972 by presidents of tribal colleges to support higher Indian education, might be tapped to administer an 
Indian Educational Trust to benefit financially needy Indian students.  See http://www.aihec.org.
406
 Osceola, Seminole.
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 The harm suffered is inherently inestimable to peoples for whom ancestors, land, and culture are spiritually interwoven and 
constitutive of identity in a manner irreducible to comprehension by Western legal minds.  Moreover, any proposed sum might 
stoke the perception of greed or suggest that the real motivation for redress is vindictive and goad the majority into backlash.
408
 Wacks, supra note 315, at 209 (suggesting cash is the most desirable remedy for the poorest victims of injustices). The amount 
necessary to sustain such a trust fund, though significant, is certain to be far less than the $1 trillion or more that could potentially 
be claimed as reparations.  See supra at pp._.  A fund endowed with a per capita sum of $10,000 for the nearly 2 million Indians 
would total $20 billion.  Some or all might be raised through grants in fee simple of federal surplus lands and resource rights to 
Indian tribes.  Revenue-sharing from sales of leases of natural resource rights on former Indian lands, abeyance of taxation on 
Indian incomes (presently, most Indian income, whether earned on- or off-reservation, is taxable, see Superintendent of Five 
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the application of JAI theory to the question of justice for Indians, money is simply an unimportant, and 
potentially even a dispensable, element of JAI theory. 
F.   Land Restoration
“The ground on which we stand is sacred ground.  It is the dust and blood of our ancestors.” 409
One of the most difficult stages in applying JAI theory will be the process of land restoration.     
Scholars have posited that the diffusion of transnational rights-based arguments claiming the sanctity of 
private property and objections to unjust enrichment may have generated a more favorable political and 
legal climate for restitution of Indian lands.410  However, even if preceding stages in JAI commit the U.S. 
and its people in theory to do “justice,” it will prove far more difficult in practice to reach an agreement 
with Indian tribes as to what measures must be implemented to yield a “just” result, and still more 
difficult to cobble together legislation implementing agreed-upon measures without catalyzing opposition.  
For much of the non-Indian majority, a land restoration agenda resonates not as the legal obligation of a 
constitutional republic descended heavily upon prior sovereigns but rather as an existential threat.  
Indeed, non-Indians are Americans too, and they have nowhere to go if transformations in land tenure 
regimes evict them from their homes.  Broaching the subject of land restoration with a non-Indian can 
trigger defensive backlash: as a white businessman huffs, “I didn’t persecute anybody at Plymouth Rock . 
. . This is the 1990s.  We didn’t do anything to them, and we don’t owe them anything.”411
Nonetheless, while it concedes that centuries after the facts of expropriation it is “too late now to 
develop a theory of land law that would throw the whole structure of land title . . . into confusion[,]”412
JAI straightforwardly insists that Indians are entitled to the restoration of their ancestral lands to the 
furthest limits of reason and equity.413  A necessary precondition for the exercise of the powers of self-
government, the generation of wealth, the propagation of culture, and the expression of religious belief is 
the secure possession of a physical space upon which to center these forms of human endeavor and from 
which it is possible to exclude others hostile to these activities.  Where Indians have ceded lands in a 
process free from coercion, fraud, or duress, such cessions are to be respected categorically, along with 
the private entitlements of those individuals and corporations currently in possession of such lands.  
However, where Indian lands were seized by force-of-arms or by coercive, duressive, or fraudulent 
dealings, or where the lands in question are uniquely sacred to a tribe, JAI requires as a general rule that 
those specific lands be restored to the ownership of the tribes from which they were taken.  Only where 
this would prove so disruptive to the settled expectations of blameless present landowners that it would 
threaten social peace414 or otherwise inflict gross injustice would alternative arrangements for remediation 
of Indian land claims be considered.
Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 418 (1935), as well as other negotiated solutions might also be considered as 
compensatory remedies whereby to fund such a trust.
409
 Plenty Coups, Crow (1909).
410 See Newton, supra note 120, at 454.
411
 Timothy Egan, Backlash Growing as Indians Make a Stand for Sovereignty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1998, at A1.  
412
 Wik v. Queensland, 134 Australian Law Reports 637 (1996).
413 See CHURCHILL, supra note 340, at 376 (stating that “the beginning point for any indigenist endeavor . . . centers . . . in 
efforts to restore direct Indian control over the huge portion of the continental [U.S.] that was plainly never ceded by [Indians].”).
414
 Because the prospect of wholesale evacuation of white landowners from Indian lands threatens the social peace, courts have 
been loathe to order the remedy of ejectment is applicable to redress white encroachment on Indian lands. See Cayuga Indian 
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That restoration of rights in Indian lands will inflict unwarranted hardship on non-Indian 
possessors is not lightly to be presumed.  Even if the U.S. becomes genuinely committed to this project of 
land restoration, no serious person believes that the U.S. is “about to divest itself or its non-Indian citizens 
of large acreage in the name of its own laws.”415  One need not ascribe without qualification to the critical 
legal studies premise that “law is politics” 416to recognize that the conceptual boundaries between law and 
politics break down rather easily in regard to the question of Indian rights in land.  Moreover, although 
the “Great Fear”417 of many non-Indian possessors of residential real estate, family farms, and small 
businesses is that the assertion of Indian claims to land will eventually lead to their ejection and 
impoverishment,418 this concern need not be justified in practice, for JAI theory unequivocally proscribes 
the involuntary dispossession of non-Indians, as well as the uncompensated takings of their 
improvements.419  Although JAR theory is unabashedly disinterested in the fate of non-Indians now 
residing upon lands claimed by Indians, JAI, noting that “one incorporates these non-Indian interests as 
relevant to the question of justice and notes that “one can search high and low, and never find an instance 
in which Indians have advocated that small property owners be pushed off the land in order to satisfy land 
claims,”420 regards non-Indian interests as morally relevant.421
Accordingly, JAI insists that the transfer of sovereignty over territory need not disturb private 
land titles:422 Indian tribes reinvested with powers of public sovereignty over lands now settled by non-
Indians are free to recognize some or all of these private titles, and, despite the anomaly of M’Intosh423, 
neither public international law nor JAI theory encourages the notion that a change in sovereignty is 
destructive of the system of land titles established by the prior sovereign.424  The public right of 
sovereignty, defined as the ultimate dominion over territory and the power to make and enforce laws, is 
Nation of New York v. Cuomo, 1999 WL 509442 (N.D.N.Y. 1999), 2001 WL 1182395 (2001) (refusing to order ejectment of 
non-Indian possessors of land claimed by Cayuga Indians on grounds that the “public interest” would not be served by disrupting 
settled reliance expectations of non-Indian improvers of land and “prov[ing] all too vividly the old axiom: “Two wrongs don’t 
make a right[,]” and that enforcement would be a practical impossibility); but see Banner v. United States, 238 F.3d 1348 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001), aff’g 44 Fed. Cl. 568 (Fed. Cl. 1999) (ejecting white possessors who refused to accept Congressionally-ratified leases 
from Seneca Nation from Seneca land within limits of City of Salamanca and declining to compensate lessees for the lost value 
of improvements on ground that ownership of improvements on land belong to the owner, rather than the improver).  
415 County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
416
 Attributed to Vladimir Lenin.
417
 CHURCHILL, supra note 340, at 376.
418
 The “new nightmare” that non-Indian possessors of real property experience upon the reawakening of Indian claims to land is 
succinctly described as follows:
At the door of your suburban house a stranger in a business suit appears.  He says he is a Native American.  Your land 
has been illegally acquired generations ago, and you must relinquish your home.  The stranger refers you to his lawyer.
James Clifford, Identity in Mashpee, in Carillo, supra note 329, at (217).
419 See, e.g., Banner, 238 F.3d at 1348 (holding that an “innocent improver” is generally entitled to the value of the improvements 
he mistakenly constructs on land to which another party is in fact entitled).
420
 CHURCHILL, supra note 340, at 383.
421
 The question of whether titles to real property held by States, corporate parties, or absentee owners should be granted the same 
treatment might potentially be answered differently, although it is best left to negotiation.  See Carillo, supra note 329, at 21 
(describing land claims settlement negotiations between Indian tribes in the Northeast and noting that Indian tribes excluded all 
but large tracts of undeveloped land held by States and timber companies from consideration as potentially subject to 
expropriation) (referencing Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 427 F. Supp. 899 (D. Mass. 1977).
422 See, e.g., U.S. v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 54, 56 (1833) (Marshall, C.J.) (holding that at customary international law it was 
“very unusual, even in cases of conquest, for the conqueror to do more than to displace the sovereign” and that “the whole 
civilized world would be outraged, if private property should be . . . annulled” upon the change in sovereignty).
423 M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 574 (holding that the private rights of Indians to hold and convey real property were “impaired” by the 
transfer of sovereignty to the U.S. through the discovery doctrine).
424 See, e.g., 1 D.P. O’CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 101-41 
(1967) (principles of customary international law presume that private law is undisturbed by a change in sovereignty).
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conceptually and practically distinct from the private right of “ownership,” conceived as the power to 
make individual decisions as to the use and alienation of land.425  As a general rule, JAI envisions that the 
process of land restoration will be undertaken in the least disruptive fashion possible: non-Indians are 
encouraged to remain in possession of their real property entitlements on the sole condition that they 
agree to live in peace with their Indian neighbors under Indian sovereignty.426  Non-Indian titles would 
either be left totally undisturbed by the transfer in sovereignty or, at the very least, non-Indians would be 
entitled to just compensation and other relief for the taking of their property.427
Furthermore, should non-Indians elect not to accept Indian sovereignty subsequent to the program 
of restoration, JAI proposes that, rather than bring actions in ejectment, tribes consider either granting 
these parties long-term leases on fair market terms to be negotiated,428 thereby granting de facto autonomy 
to the extent compatible with the exercise of Indian sovereignty over the remainder interests.  Such lease 
agreements might incorporate terms providing compensation for lost rental earnings and damages for 
prior trespass and might have the effect of terminating all prior claims relating to the leased parcels.429
Still, where restoration would clearly inflict gross injustice upon blameless non-Indian possessors, and the 
land in question is not sacred, JAI is prepared to accept in-kind grants from federal landholdings  in lieu.
More than 650 million acres of federal lands are held in public trust for purposes of grazing, 
forestry, wilderness, and other uses and managed by federal agencies, in particular the Bureau of Land 
Management.430  Current federal law provides that the homeless receive first priority for use of “surplus” 
federal land and property.431  The General Services Agency (“GSA”) administers conveyance of surplus 
federal land and orders sale when there is no federal use to the private sector for fair market value, either 
through sealed-bid competition, public auction, or mail auction.432  Although Indian tribes are permitted to 
acquire surplus federal lands, the trust doctrine continues to impose, through extensive federal regulations 
and Secretarial oversight and veto power, obstacles to land acquisition.433  A minimalist approach to 
expansion of the tribal land base might transform the role of the Secretary of the Interior in regard to 
425 See THOMPSON, supra note 284, at 59-60 (differentiating sovereign from private rights in land); see also MICHAEL 
WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 57 (1977) (same).
426 See CHURCHILL, supra note 340, at 390 (welcoming non-Indians to live under Indian sovereignty so long as they are 
“willing to be governed by Indian law.”).
427
 Responsibility for payment of just compensation to non-Indians should attach to the U.S., the party responsible for the original 
dispossession of Indians.  This obligation, although it would not arise under the 5th Amendment inasmuch as the expropriating 
party would be said to be the Indian tribe(s) in question, could be construed to inhere in the U.S. under the trust doctrine as part 
of its responsibility for enabling Indian self-government.  See supra at notes_ (describing the trust doctrine in U.S. law).  In 
addition to direct compensation for acts of expropriation, non-Indians suffering loss of property interest might be granted other 
measures of relief, including tax remission on income or property situated elsewhere.  CHURCHILL, supra note 340, at 108.
428 See, e.g., Seneca Nation Settlement Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. §§1774 et seq. (creating the framework for the negotiation of fair 
lease terms between the Senecas as lessors and non-Indian lessees for the purpose of resolving claims to Seneca lands and 
promoting reconciliation and economic development).
429 Id. at 1774(b)(b); see also CHURCHILL, supra note 340, at 107 (discussing similar settlement proposals in ongoing land 
claims battles between the Onondaga and the City of Syracuse and the Cayuga with the State of New York); BRODEUR, supra 
note 274, at 106-07 (noting that the land claims settlement reached between Maine and the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot 
cleared titles and dismissed trespass claims against all private non-Indian property owners) (referencing Maine Indian Land 
Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§1721 et seq. (1980), Pub. L. No. 96-420 et seq., Oct. 10, 1980).
430 See http://www.blm.gov/nhp (describing the jurisdiction and missions of the Bureau of Land Management and illustrating 
lands under its management authority).
431
 42 U.S.C. §11411(5) (Stuart B. McKinney Act) (1999).
432
 63 Stat. 377, 40 U.S.C. §475 et seq.
433 See 25 C.F.R. 151, Acquisition of Title to Land in Trust (requiring Indians seeking the U.S. to acquire land for their benefit to 
undergo extensive application procedures). 
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surplus land acquisitions from gatekeeper to facilitator; the National Congress of American Indians Land 
Recovery Task Force has offered proposals to this end, but no implementing action has been taken.434
More extensive legislative proposals might provide that some or all of federal surplus lands be 
granted to Indian tribes in proportion to the acreage of their existing land claims against the U.S.435
Millions of acres of Western States such as Nevada, currently under federal control, might be allotted to 
tribes for occupancy, resource extraction, rental, or even in fee simple.  In lands granted in fee, the U.S. 
might negotiate the reservation of leases, easements, or other rights of usufruct for the benefit of non-
Indians.436  Although such a proposal might not directly restore sacred lands, it would enable tribes to sell 
recently acquired federal surplus acreage and resources for the purpose of purchasing sacred lands.
The most expansive measure calls for the creation of a “Buffalo Commons” [“BC”] centered 
upon nearly 150,000 square miles of territory in 110 counties situated in a broad swath extending from 
Texas and New Mexico north to the Canadian border through Oklahoma, Colorado, Nebraska, Kansas, 
Wyoming, North and South Dakota, and Montana.437  The vast majority of this territory consists of lands 
that were never lawfully ceded to the U.S. and to which Indian tribes therefore remain legally entitled.438
To this land mass—currently occupied by a sparse and dispersed non-Indian population of only 
400,000—advocates of the BC would seek to append the unceded lands of over a dozen other Indian 
tribes,439 a land mass encompassing an additional 100 bordering counties, the Great Basin and Sonoran 
Desert, those parts of several other States (Utah, Nevada, Montana, Idaho, Washington, Oregon, and New 
Mexico) designated surplus federal lands or land otherwise held in public trust, adjacent grasslands, 
national forests, military bases, and existing Indian reservations.  Tribes claiming lands not within the 
area described in the BC might negotiate with the U.S. and tribes the acceptance of grants of land within 
the BC in exchange for the surrender of claims, and tribes within the BC would negotiate arrangements 
for joint use of its resources.440  Although proponents of the BC stress that it is possible to facilitate the 
return of  “every square inch of unceded Indian Country in the [U.S.] without tossing a single non-Indian 
homeowner off the land on which they [sic] now live[,]” individual non-Indians electing not to  remain 
living in and accept Indian sovereignty over this “North American Union of Indigenous Nations”  would 
be paid just compensation for the cession of their property interests by the U.S.441
In sum, the recovery of a land mass sufficient to create the material preconditions for economic 
self-determination, religious freedom, and self-governance is crucial, and thus JAI proposes land 
434 See 64 Fed. Reg. 17, 574—17, 588 (April 12, 1999) (proposing modifications to, inter alia, limit discretionary power of federal 
agencies and officials, particularly with respect to the purposes for which such lands are acquired).
435 See ROBERT WARRIOR, LIKE A HURRICANE: THE INDIAN MOVEMENT FROM ALCATRAZ TO WOUNDED 
KNEE (1996) (describing early such discussions in late 1960s and 1970s).
436 See Carlos Scott Lopez, Reformulating Native Title in Mabo’s Wake: Aboriginal Sovereignty and Reconciliation in Post-
Centenary Australia, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 21, 79 (2003) (describing a “joint sovereignty proposal” that would 
enable restoration of land to indigenous peoples without denying non-indigenous peoples some rights in restored lands).
437 See CHURCHILL, supra note 340, at 384-87 (elaborating the “Buffalo Commons” proposal whereby to accomplish land 
restoration and enhance the prospects for Indian self-governance without compromising the rights of non-Indians).
438 See supra note 303.  Much of the land mass constituting what would become the core of the BC is the ancestral territory of a 
small number of tribes, including the Lakota, Pawnee, Arikara, Hidatsa, Crow, Shoshone, Assiniboine, Cheyenne, Araphao, 
Kiowa, Comanche, and the Jicarilla, and Mescalero Apache.  CHURCHILL, supra note 340, at 384-85.
439 See id. (noting that the lands of the Blackfeet, Salish, Kutenai, Nez Perce, Yakima, Western Shoshone, Goshutes, Utes, 
Paiutes, Navajo, Hopi, Chiricahua Apache, Havasupi, Yavapai, and O’odham were never lawfully ceded to the U.S.).
440 Id. at 386-87.
441 Id. at 383, 390.
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restoration to the furthest limits possible short of imposing injustice on non-Indians.  To this extent, it is 
far more aggressive on the issue of land rights than JAS or JAC.  Nevertheless, JAI is far more sensitive 
to the rights of non-Indians and to the political realities attendant to territorial questions—an issue of 
“high politics”—than is JAS.  Although undoing the present consequences of historical force and fraud 
will invariably entail a major reallocation of some degree of public sovereignty to Indian tribes, JAI 
maintains that this process need not compromise the settled rights and expectations of blameless non-
Indians and their descendants.  Hundreds of millions of acres exist in connection with which there are few 
conflicting claims.  By negotiating a creative strategy for identifying suitable and appropriate lands 
wherein to transfer some quantum of sovereignty, whether along the lines of the BC proposal or in some 
lesser degree, and by jointly committing to the preservation of the private property rights of non-Indians 
resident upon lands over which sovereignty is transferred or else accepting the responsibility to pay 
compensation for the taking of these rights, Indian tribes and the U.S. can author a restorative program 
that will prevent or internalize the demoralization costs associated with uncompensated expropriation past 
or present and preserve the political and territorial integrity of the U.S.  
G.  Legal Reformation
If land restoration portends challenges, the penultimate step of JAI promises even more.  
Although the restoration of lands to tribes is a partial measure toward redress, JAI, unlike existing 
theories of justice, specifies a program of legal reformation as the critical stage in concretizing other 
remedies and, above all, in clearing away obstacles to the expression of Indian self-determination.  Taken 
together, the legal doctrines of discovery and conquest, as incorporated in domestic law, as well as a 
judicially unenforceable trust doctrine, plenary power, and the subversion of Indian rights reserved under 
treaties constitute an interconnected matrix of legal disability that refers Indian rights to property, culture, 
religion, development, and self-government, no matter how broadly any given generation of non-Indians 
might choose to construct and protect them, to perpetual reinterpretation, appropriation, and suppression 
by future non-Indian majorities and hostile judges.  That a system of law imported and imposed by a 
settler state should hobble the rights of an indigenous people is an oft-repeated story across the globe; that 
this system must be transformed if the impediments are to be swept away and those rights secured to their 
bearers is a proposition that follows logically but has largely gone unstated heretofore by theoreticians 
concerned with justice on behalf of Indians.442  Accordingly, legal reform, oriented toward the reservation 
of this bundle of Indian rights as against non-Indian majorities, occupies the apex of the remedial pyramid 
JAI directs its proponents to construct.  Until Indians are free to engage in meaningful self-
determination—in other words, until either the U.S. is prepared to grant a substantial measure of 
territorial autonomy or at the very least legally tolerate the coexistence of basic value- and cultural-
differences that often spark conflict between Indians and non-Indians—the struggle to achieve the 
objectives of JAI will remain incomplete.
442
 For an example of a judicial recognition of the proposition that legal reform is a necessary condition precedent to the security 
of indigenous rights in real property, see Mabo v. Queensland,107 A.L.R. 1 (1992) (Austr.) (“The fiction by which the rights of 
indigenous inhabitants in land were treated as nonexistent was justified by a policy which has no place in the contemporary law 
of this country . . . Whatever the justification advanced in earlier days for refusing to recognise the rights and interests in land of 
the indigenous inhabitants of settled colonies, an unjust and discriminatory doctrine of that kind can no longer be accepted.”).
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The first question that must be answered in designing an appropriate package of legal reform 
proposals is whether, and to what extent, the U.S. is willing to allow Indian tribes to invest the phrase 
self-determination with real meaning.
1.  Indian Self-Determination
The customary international legal principle of self-determination provides that social, political, 
and economic institutions should be substantially and continuously guided not by alien or colonial powers 
but by the will of the governed.443  Under international law, states are duty-bound to promote the self-
determination, and therefore the independent and unmediated social, political, and economic 
development, of their indigenous peoples.444  Taken to its logical extreme, obligations to enable self-
determination may be construed to require states to permit their indigenous peoples the right to secede 
from their parent states and form independent states,445 as well as to require other preexisting states to 
recognize these newly-independent states, particularly where the peoples in question are subject to alien 
domination or hobbled in the “meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination internally.”446
Thus, an Indian tribe with a population, territorial base, government, and the capacity to enter into 
international relations could in theory declare independence and gain international recognition.447
Arguably, Indian nations, as a matter of international law, continue to possess the right that existed prior 
to contact with European discoverers to create their own forms of organization without reference to the 
states in which they are now situated.448  Some Indian rights advocates suggest that only full tribal 
sovereignty in the form of independent nation-states recognized as such by other members of the 
international community can overcome the disabilities imposed by federal Indian law.449  However, 
although the history of U.S.-Indian relations strongly suggests that Indian interests and those of the U.S. 
majority are not often commensurable, any proposal to compromise the territorial integrity of the U.S. is 
unlikely to be met with anything but the most hostile of responses in majoritarian political circles. The 
suggestion that tribal self-determination be bolstered with legal significance evokes reactions to “Indian 
443
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49-
52, U.N. Doc. A16316, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1966), at Part I, Art. 1(1) (“All peoples have the right to . . . freely 
determine their political status [and] . . . development.”).
444 See, e.g., 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States 
[“Friendly Relations Declaration”], G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess. (adopted Oct. 24, 1970), Supp. No. 28, at 121, 
123 (charging states with duty to respect self-determination), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970); ILO Convention No. 169, supra
note 33, at art. 6(2) (requiring states to consult with indigenous peoples as to formation and endowment of indigenous institutions 
and programs); Draft Declaration, supra note 142, at Art. 3 (“Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination.  By virtue 
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”); 
Western Sahara Case, I.C.J., Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (incorporating UNGA resolutions to “[f]ree association [and] 
voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory concerned expressed through informed and democratic processes.”).
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 Paul H. Brietzke & Teresa L. Kline, The Law and Economics of Native American Casinos, 78 NEB. L. REV. 263, 338 (1999) 
(“[U.S.] notions of sovereignty echo those prevailing in international law prior to World War II: you cannot be a little bit 
sovereign, and entities like Indian tribes are entitled to little legal respect because they are not recognized as states.”).
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 Reference re: Secession of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. 217, 37 I.L.M. 1340 (S. Ct. Can. 1998).
447 See RESTAT. (3rd), FOR. REL. L., §201 (“Under international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a 
permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in or has the capacity to engage in international 
relations.”); Inter-American Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 8811,119 U.N.T.S. 3 (Art. 
9) (as amended by the Protocol of Amendment in 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6487 (Art. 12) (same).
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 Tully, supra note 306, at156 (stating that to pretend otherwise is to “dispossess the aboriginal peoples of their property rights, 
forms of government, and authoritative traditions without so much as an argument.”).
449 See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not to Live with Eurocentric Myopia: A Reply to Professor Laurence’s Learning to 
Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over the Indian Nations, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 439, 445-49 (1988); Winona LaDuke, 
Introduction, in CHURCHILL, supra note 340, at 12 (declaring that Indian tribes hold the right to secede from the U.S.).
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separatism” verging on enmity, even when offered by the U.S. President450: a U.S. senator angrily 
proclaims that “[c]itizens of the [U.S.] should not have their rights limited by separate governments 
within the [U.S.]”451  In short, full independence is likely not negotiable, but a significant degree of 
political and legal autonomy may be.
In fact, most tribes do not define secession and independent statehood as the desired end-state of 
a program of self-determination but rather an intermediate status that would devolve degrees of political 
and legal power that has been arrogated to the U.S. and the States and allow tribes to “challenge . . . 
intrusions across the full spectrum of locations at which . . . injury is felt.”452  A pragmatic approach, 
organized around issue-area autonomy, that would allow Indians to “recuperate” traditional laws and 
modalities of governance453 and assert alternative institutional structures more consonant with their 
cultural imperatives represents an approach to self-determination that demands a lesser quantum of 
independence while departing sufficiently from the current paradigm to satisfy most tribes.454
Under this approach, which might well be implemented by the resumption of the treatymaking 
process, the presumption against autonomous tribal self-governance, gradually accreting since the early 
19th century,455 would be overturned, and tribes would once more be presumed to possess near-absolute 
territorial autonomy complete with the powers to create and enforce laws over all persons within their 
jurisdiction in respect to all issue-areas, save for commerce and the dimensions of external sovereignty—
i.e., foreign relations and defense.  Where Indian self-determination does not implicate the external 
powers of U.S. sovereignty, matters concerning whether and how Indians choose to hunt and fish, to 
produce the necessities of life, to raise children, to pass on knowledge to succeeding generations, to create 
and enforce law, and to worship ought simply to be of no concern beyond the territorial limits of Indian 
jurisdiction.  Finally, under the pragmatic program of Indian self-determination, rather than shed their 
allegiance to the U.S., individual Indians would, through participation in their own institutions and the 
elaboration of their own systems of social regulation and welfare, enjoy an enhanced bicultural identity 
while retaining their national identity as U.S. citizens.
In return for accepting external limitations upon their sovereignty, tribes would receive material 
support in reconstituting antecedent tribal institutions as well as specific legal guarantees committing the 
U.S. to specific undertakings necessary to preserve and protect tribal autonomy.  An Omnibus Indian 
Rights Act [“OIRA”] and a series of constitutional amendments together constitute the package of legal 
reformation necessary to carry these guarantees into force.
2.  Omnibus Indian Rights Act
450 See William J. Clinton, Remarks to Indian and Alaskan Native Tribal Leaders, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 941, 942 
(May 9, 1994) (“This then is our first principle: respecting your values, your religions, your identity, and your sovereignty.”).
451
 Timothy Egan, Backlash Growing as Indians Make a Stand for Sovereignty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1998, at A1 (quoting Sen. 
Slade Gorton, R-Wash.).
452
 Herz, supra note 144, at 697.
453
 Poole, supra note 299, at 13.
454
 CHURCHILL, supra note 340, at 389 (stating that most Indian tribes would prefer a form of commonwealth and home rule 
governance over total secession).
455 See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 536-63 (holding that although tribes were subject to the plenary power of Congress they were 
immune from the reach of the States and sovereign in their internal affairs).
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Four primary reform measures, each centered upon a different functional area, must be completed 
to guarantee Indian self-determination: (1) the strengthening of protections of Indian religious and 
cultural rights; (2) the creation of specific and enforceable trust-based remedial programs for Indian 
beneficiaries; (3) the creation of new judicial institutions committed to resolving ambiguities and 
construing treaty terms in favor of tribal reserved rights and to the enforcement of the trust doctrine; and 
(4) the incorporation, by implementing legislation, of those principles of international law supportive of 
the rights of Indians as indigenous peoples.
With regard to Indian rights, process is at least as important as doctrine.  Even if the entire corpus 
of caselaw burdening Indian cultural, religious, and property rights were stricken in a single legislative 
fiat, failure to alter the process by which laws are made in a democracy that enshrines the principle of 
majoritarianism would sow the seeds of future Indian disability in the soil of the newly amended legal 
system.  Although the precise mechanisms whereby to accomplish Indian participation in the drafting of 
legislation trenching in Indian affairs is open to debate, and although mere participation does not preclude 
truncation of rights through judicial review, the representation of Indian interests in the U.S. legal process 
is essential. Substantively, OIRA might (1) craft explicit statutory exceptions to the Endangered Species 
Act for religious-based takings of endangered species, (2) mandate inclusion of Indian representatives in 
U.S. delegations to international organizations and quasijudicial bodies with competence over subject 
matter that implicates indigenous rights, including, e.g., the International Whaling Commission, the 
United Nations Human Rights Commission, and the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues;  and (3) 
preempt State laws imposing penalties for religious-based use of controlled substances by including 
specific language in AIRFA to exempt Indian religions from State laws.  If Indians, as part of their 
religious heritage, wish to hunt whales or ingest peyote, it should not be within the power of the States or 
of the federal government to interpose their contrary will, and only specific legislative enactments can 
sweep away the prohibitions that attach to such practices through laws of general application.
Second, the inclusion of specific trust-based programs within OIRA will free remedial funds from 
the strings of dependence.  Recent federal block grants to tribes, though they have increased opportunities 
for economic development, have all too frequently been accompanied by a maze of regulations that 
defeats tribal initiative and substitutes legal accountability for cultural appropriateness.456  A chapter of 
OIRA would streamline the grant process, reduce management costs, and liberate future remedial 
programs from unnecessary federal oversight.  Greater consultation with tribes in the block-granting 
process would rationalize expenditures of funds and lead to greater, and more culturally relevant, 
economic development.  Legislative deconstruction or decomposition of the BIA457 and tribal 
456 See supra at notes_.
457
 If the BIA still serves an important lobbying function by securing allocations of trust funding, its positive contributions are 
more than offset by negatives: most Indian scholars conclude that the BIA, a top-down institution, has undermined traditional 
tribal structures, co-opted tribal autonomy and resources, and reinforced a relationship of dependency.  See, e.g., AMERICAN 
INDIAN POLICY, supra note 266, at 99-100.  So long as Indian economic initiatives must travel through the BIA and external 
interests drive analyses of priorities, culturally appropriate development is subordinate to external process.
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governments,458 as well as by other measures that restructure U.S. relations with Indian tribes, may be 
necessary to carry this element of OIRA into effect in practice.
Third, because U.S. federal courts are precluded, by institutional commitments to the legal 
doctrines of stare decisis and the political principles of majoritarianism and separation of powers, from 
asserting a principled defense of Indian reserved rights against legislative incursion,459 a new judicial 
institution unfettered by such legal and political baggage may be necessary.  A separate Court of Indian 
Affairs [“CIA”], with a bench populated in part by Indian judges schooled in the history of U.S.-Indian 
relations might be a fruitful avenue for further investigation and discussion.460  The CIA might be created 
by Congress as an Article III court with appellate jurisdiction to hear cases sounding in federal Indian law 
and competence to award restitution of Indian lands and rights.  Moreover, to resituate the trust doctrine 
on a more stable moral and legal foundation and create judicially enforceable obligations to Indians, cases 
concerning breaches of the trust might be heard by the CIA under a grant of original jurisdiction, and the 
political question doctrine might be declared inapplicable in respect to Indian claims.461  The trust doctrine 
has decayed into a relic of colonialism and paternalism rife with the potential for abuse and dereliction: if 
it is to be reimagined as a judicially-enforceable guarantee of Indian welfare, an institutional approach 
less captive to majoritarianism than the current system of Article III courts must be introduced.  
Corresponding measures to strip doctrinal defenses otherwise available to the U.S. will be necessary; 
amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act should also be considered as part of the jurisdictional 
provision authorizing the CIA.462 Finally, to assist the CIA in the reformation of the trust doctrine, OIRA 
might authorize an Indian Assembly, consisting of representatives from all Indian nations and created 
outside the U.S. political and legal framework, to serve as a quasilegislative body that would negotiate 
directly with Congress and executive agencies as to broadening the substantive contours of the trust and 
developing more robust methods of enforcement.
Further, administrative agencies, particularly those that distribute benefits to tribes, should create 
rules that Article I courts, when adjudicating cases affecting Indian rights, appoint a special master fluent 
in Indian legal issues to hear the merits.  To provide institutional support for this remedial proposal, 
OIRA might endow pan-Indian legal organizations, such as the Native American Rights Fund, the 
Institute for the Development of Indian Law, and the University of New Mexico Indian Law Program, 
with funds to draw additional Indians into the legal profession and thereby enhance the autonomous 
458
 Reformation of Indian institutions to enhance their benefit to Indian people requires considerations of the goodness of fit of 
goals and political and economic strategies.  In some instances, the near-total reconstitution of tribal governments may be a 
necessary condition precedent to the creation of fully independent, culturally integrated, and functional Indian societies.  
Friedman, supra note 41, at 526 (correlating an increase in the incorporation of the principle of indigenous self-determination in 
formal institutions with increases in indigenous health and social welfare).  Rather than accept as permanent fixtures the tribal 
governments and constitutions created by the IRA and modified by subsequent federal legislation and regulation, Indian people, 
as part of their rights to self-determination, must be permitted to define their governance structures and processes as they see fit.  
Federal financial assistance in this reconstruction is welcome where it aids, rather than derails, Indian self-determination.
459 See supra notes_.
460 See Vine Deloria, Jr.., & Clifford M. Lytle, The Future of Indian Nations, in THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND 
FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 244-64 (Vine Deloria, Jr., ed.,1984) (proposing such a Court).
461 See supra notes _ (noting narrow grounds under which suit by Indian claimants for breach of duty under the trust doctrine can 
be maintained against the U.S.). Although opinion is divided as to whether the trust doctrine ought to be preserved with enhanced 
judicial enforcement provisions or jettisoned entirely as a colonialist remnant, a pan-Indian consensus supports major revision.
462 See Bradford, supra note_, at pp. _ (discussing doctrinal defenses to Indian claims for redress).
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Indian capacity to frame and defend Indian rights and interests in the panoply of U.S. courts.463  Similarly, 
because the investiture of tribal colleges and charter schools for Indian children with sufficient funds to 
allow their expansion, curricular development,464 and maturation is also essential if the next generation of 
Indian leaders is to develop the legal sophistication necessary to part with non-Indian intermediation,465
OIRA might make additional funds available for this purpose.  Since passage of the proposed bundle of 
legislation will be hotly contested and require political horsetrading, inclusion of language committing the 
U.S. to a general process of legislative reform at the outset may suffice.466
Finally, the positive legal reforms proposed in OIRA may be inadequate, standing alone, to 
secure to Indians the guarantees of genuine self-determination. In addition, the ongoing normative 
process of interpreting federal Indian law, conducted by the political as well as the legal branches of 
government, may require reinfusion with the spirit of the medieval ecclesiastical humanism that 
“perceived a normative order independent of and higher than the positive law or decisions of temporal 
authority” and “provided the jurisprudential grounds . . . to withhold the imprimatur of law from acts of 
earthly sovereigns found to violate th[is] moral code.”).467  Accordingly, a conference of jurists, scholars, 
and practitioners—assisted by the American Legal Institute—might be convened to restate a corpus of 
federal Indian law ameliorated by the influence of this far more humanist tradition.  This Restatement of 
Federal Indian Law might strike a balance between majoritarianism and moral obligations to afford 
justice more favorable to Indians and thereby render a more normatively attractive foundation upon which 
to base the future legal and political relationship between the U.S. and Indian tribes.
3.  Constitutional Amendments
Even if Indian self-determination is buttressed by a comprehensive OIRA, the project of legal 
reformation may be incomplete.  Constitutional amendment[s] may be necessary to (1) renounce plenary 
power or permit devolutions of power that enhance tribal autonomy and sharply limit the subject matter 
and issue-areas in which Congress may treat Indian tribes as domestic dependencies; (2) recognize Indian 
property as within the full meaning of the protections of the Fifth Amendment Takings and Just 
Compensation clauses of the U.S. Constitution; and (3) restore or confirm the status of Indian tribes as 
entities superior to the States in the federalist hierarchy.
Precedent exists with the inter-American system for constitutional amendment in recognition of 
indigenous rights to self-determination: several American states have expressly adopted constitutional or 
463 See Nader & Ou, supra note 165, at 21.
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statutory provisions to implement elements of international declarations regarding indigenous peoples.468
If plenary power were abridged by constitutional amendment to recognize tribal autonomy in all issue-
areas save for defense, foreign relations, and the power to regulate commerce with Indian nations—the 
sole power constitutionally committed to Congress by the text of the Constitution—arguments for its 
retention would be easier, normatively speaking, to marshal.  Only by narrowly restricting plenary power 
through a constitutional amendment clarifying the limits of the Indian Commerce Clause can the exercise 
of Indian rights to religion, culture, economic development, and the creation and application of law be 
authoritatively withdrawn from the vagaries of the U.S. political process.  It is not inconceivable that 
devolution of power to Indian tribes might pave the road to an eventual resumption of treatymaking with 
Indian nations and the incorporation of the substantive guarantees of proposed constitutional reforms 
within new sacred texts pledging a union of Indian and non-Indian peoples.469
A more radical transformative proposal might shift central administrative authority over tribes 
from Congress to UN trusteeship under an Article 73 mandate for the international community to aid non-
self-governing Indian tribes in reaquiring their lands and developing their rights to and capacities for self-
determination.470  Although this measure more directly challenges U.S. authority than a narrowing of the 
definition of the Indian Commerce Clause in keeping with the limited textual support for plenary power 
offered in the Constitution, precedents support internationalization of domestic trust responsibilities under 
similar circumstances.471  The juxtaposition of this internationalization proposal to the proposal to limit 
the definition of plenary power might well render the latter more politically palatable.
Second, Indian property is not within the full protection of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution inasmuch as Congress may lawfully take Indian title, provided that title has not been 
“recognized” by treaty or statute, without paying compensation.472  An amendment to include the phrase 
“nor Indian property, regardless of whether it has been recognized by the United States,” between the 
words “private property” and “be taken for public use” in the Fifth Amendment would remove this legal 
disability and act as a bulwark against takings and as limitation on the depreciation of Indian resources. 
Third, although nothing in the U.S. Constitution mandates that Indian tribes are inferior to State 
and federal governments, practice has rendered them so, and a constitutional amendment to specify their 
co-equality with, at a minimum, States, would free Indian tribes of the obligation to submit their rights to 
468 See, e.g., CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) sched. B. (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) (guaranteeing that 
interpretation of the Constitution does not abrogate or derogate from aboriginal rights); Constitution of Argentina, at Art. 75 
(1994) (recognizing indigenous peoples, their distinctive cultural identities, and their ancestral land rights, and directing the 
legislature to act accordingly); Constitution of Nicaragua, art. 5 (as amended 1995) (affirming that the indigenous people of 
Nicaragua have the right to live and develop according to their customs, language, beliefs, and aboriginal rights to land).
469
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471 See, e.g., Karl J. Irving, The United Nations and Democratic Intervention: Is “Swords into Ballot Boxes” Enough?  DENV. J. 
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self-determine to hostile State review.473 In recent years the executive branch has verbally supported an 
enhanced tribal position in the federalist system,474 but practice has not followed promise.  Indian tribes 
remain the least powerful in the tripartite system of federal, State, and tribal governments, and moral and 
legal obligations arising under the trust doctrine are subject to majoritarian preference at multiple levels 
of governance.  More expansive reform proposals that would relate Indian tribes to the surrounding States 
by altering the current federalist structure, such as a separate Indian legislature with power to veto State 
legislation, or the set-aside of seats in Congress for Indian representatives, though perhaps radical 
departures from the domain of the politically possible, may merit further consideration if only to 
illuminate the reasonableness of more limited measures.
G.  Reconciliation
“We took an oath not to do anything wrong to each other or to scheme against each other.”475
The final stage of JAI theory is distinguished from the preceding stages in that it imposes a duty 
not upon the U.S. but upon Indian people.  The execution of the first six stages of JAI will “portend 
changes in power and wellbeing”476 for some non-Indians, and may well compromise the universalist 
approach to conceiving of, promoting, and protecting rights.477  JAI will therefore invite contestation over 
its form, pace, and scope.478  However, if the U.S. acknowledges, recognizes responsibility for, and repairs 
the gross injustices suffered by Indians over the course of its creation and expansion, JAI obligates 
Indians to find it in their hearts and minds to forgive.  If the U.S. restores a meaningful measure of land to 
Indian tribes and amends its legal and political order to ensure respect for and protection of fundamental 
Indian rights to self-determination, a new regime of peace and justice worthy of emulation and export 
must be rewarded with the most precious gift Indians can bestow: forgiveness.  By forgiving the U.S. and 
all its people in a solemn ceremony479 broadcast globally to symbolize the dawn of the new relationship, 
Indians will finally be allowed to heal, and all Americans will be released from the chains of history and 
freed to forge a better tomorrow. The U.S. and Indian tribes are not only intertwined geographically and 
historically, they are interdependent.  Indian autonomy and prosperity on the one hand, and U.S. 
473 See Stephanie Dean, Getting a Piece of the Action: Should the Federal Government Be Able to Tax Native American Gambling 
Revenue?, 32 COLOM. J. L. & SOC. PROB’S 157 (1999) (describing subjection of Indian gaming to veto through State 
compacting processes); see also supra at pp. 75-78 (describing restriction of Indian religion by operation of State laws).
474 See Clinton, supra note 450, at 942 (“We must . . . become full partners with the tribal nations.”).
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governments are non-Indian people prepared to cede?”
477 See Ruth Gupta, Indigenous Peoples and the International Environmental Community: Accommodating Claims Through a 
Cooperative Legal Process, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1741, 1766 (1999) (noting even liberal states have been unable to resolve tension 
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that addition of indigenous rights to the equation complicates the intellectual and governance task of determining when, how, and 
to what extent minority groups claiming rights to self-determine may “discharge themselves from the reach of general 
community norms” without compromising the liberal project of promoting universal human rights).
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legitimacy and global leadership on the other, are inseverable, with each a necessary condition for the full 
realization of the other.480 Just as the political and economic development of its “domestic dependent 
nations” is tied to U.S. leadership of the global political economy, so also is the moral legitimacy of the 
U.S. linked to its respect and promotion of the rights of Indians of Indians to self-determine.  If U.S.-
Indian relationships advance on the basis of a recognition of, and respect for, mutual sovereignties, with 
disputes resolved not by coercion and domination but by negotiation and harmonization, a new era of just 
peace, worthy of emulation and export, will follow.
IV.  Conclusion
An unwillingness to grant redress to victims of gross human injustice is perhaps the greatest 
source of national delegitimization.481  Failure to do justice festers in the national conscience as “toxic 
guilt” that degrades the attractive force of citizenship.482  By initiating intergroup dialogue and denaturing 
pernicious group attachments in favor of mutual identification with past tragedies as well as a collective 
stake in the future, the process of redress can encourage “a politics of reidentification” in which 
relegitimized national citizenship and universal concepts of justice become chief repositors of individual 
loyalties and a nation is “born again.”483
Despite its imperfections, the U.S. is an exceptional nation, and the greatest exponent of liberty 
the world has ever known.  Still, its moral legitimacy has of late been called into question by those, 
critical of its recent intervention in Iraq, who accuse the U.S. of attempting to establish global 
hegemony484 and undermine human rights.485  Even if one rejects both charges as entirely without merit—
and there is good reason to do so—in its current geopolitical posture the U.S. has drawn upon itself 
increased scrutiny of its own record regarding the promotion and protection of rights. Accordingly, failure 
to afford the full measure of justice due its indigenous peoples casts a shadow over U.S. foreign relations 
and makes it easier for its critics to ask the question, “Why do we invade Iraq to kick it out of Kuwait but 
not do justice at home?”486 As we approach the second anniversary of September 11th, the moral coherence 
of the nation in the watchful world it so frequently seeks to mould is at stake, and if Indians continue to 
480
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slip through the interstices of law, policy, and convenience, communication of this fact cannot help but 
undermine the moral foundations of American authority and power.
However, just as the Japanese Civil Rights Act of 1988 signaled to rivals and detractors that the 
U.S. occupied the high moral ground in the long twilight struggle against Communism,487 a serious 
commitment to justice on behalf of Indians might remind contemporary critics of the inherent goodness of
the U.S. and legitimate its international leadership.  As the renowned scholar of federal Indian law, Felix 
Cohen, noted more than a half-century ago, “[t]here is no nation on the face of the earth which has set for 
itself so high a standard of dealing with a native aboriginal people as the United States and no nation on 
earth that has been more self-critical in seeking to rectify its deviations from those high standards.”488  It is 
thus quite opportune that, at a historical moment when these standards have been called into question, the 
long-simmering issue of justice for Indians presents a chance to publicly reaffirm our national moral 
character.
Still, although reparations talk is all the rage, this discourse does not translate well into the 
language in which Indian claims are phrased.  Although compensation may well be the proper form 
redress should assume in relation to the crime of African American slavery, reparations is ill-suited as a 
remedy around which to construct a theory of justice for Indians, not because of the social resistance it 
would be likely to engender, but because money simply cannot reach, let alone repair, land theft, 
genocide, ethnocide, and, above all, the denial of the fundamental right to self-determination.  Only a 
committed and holistic program of legal reformation as the capstone in a broader structure of remedies, 
including the restoration of Indian lands and the reconciliation between Indian and non-Indian peoples, 
can satisfy the preconditions for justice for the original peoples of the U.S.
Existing theories of justice for Indians either whitewash the historical conquest and forced 
cession of Indian lands in order to preserve the contemporary entitlements of non-Indians (JAS); 
mistakenly commodify former Indian lands, despite the inconsistency of this position with Indian 
cosmology, and treat them as already converted to cash paid through remedial trust-based programs  
(JAC); or offer land restoration proposals that would inflict grievous injustice upon blameless (if 
historically ignorant) non-Indians and catalyze reactionary anti-Indian politics across a much broader 
legislative spectrum (JAR).  Worse, because these theories have no strategy whereby to dislodge the 
impedimenta of federal Indian law and tame the plenary power of Congress, JAS, JAC (essentially an 
applied model of reparations), and JAR offer no proposals whereby to assist tribes in reclaiming their 
inherent rights of sovereignty and self-governance and no visions for the restoration of harmony and 
peace between peoples.
Justice as Indigenism, by boldly declaring that the justice claims of the original inhabitants of the 
U.S. deserve priority in the remedial cue, that past injustices against Indians are as deserving of redress as 
if they were committed today, that Indians are presumptively entitled to the restoration of their lands and 
to the most extensive freedom from interference with their rights to self-determine compatible with the 
corresponding rights of non-Indians and the territorial integrity of the U.S., and that the canon of U.S. law 
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governing relations with Indians must be fundamentally transformed if justice is to be done, lays out a far 
more ambitious project than any existing theory.  Whether JAI will find favor beyond the boundaries of 
Indian Country is partly a function of the degree to which non-Indians prove willing to revisit and 
reconsider the history of U.S.-Indian relations, as well as of the degree to which they will muster the 
courage to call into question the policies by which the U.S. acquired territory, distributed land titles, 
asserted dominion over Indians, and rationalized this entire process through the instrumentality of law.  
There will be those who categorically reject the Indian claim for justice, just as there will be those who 
adhere to existing theories as more “fair” or more pragmatic.  Still, if propounding a theory of Justice as 
Indigenism accomplishes nothing more than to promote a more searching inquiry on the requirements of 
justice for Indians, it will have spelled progress, and until that day when they are free once again to self-
determine on their aboriginal landmass, Indians will continue to vow to endeavor to persevere.489
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489 The character Lone Watie, played by the Indian actor Chief Dan George in the 1976 film The Outlaw Josey Wales, relates to 
Josey Wales (Clint Eastwood) his visit circa 1850 to Washington, D.C., where Lone Watie met with the Secretary of the Interior. 
Upon telling the Secretary that his tribe’s land had been stolen by the U.S., Lone Watie is advised by the Secretary to “vow to 
endeavor to persevere.”  After a pause, Lone Watie tells Josey Wales that “[a]nd when we had thought about it long enough, we 
declared war on the Union.” 
